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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
This study examines how China’s human rights and sustainable development record is 
covered in mainstream South African media. It further explores how this coverage has 
been shaped by influences on South African journalists as set out by Reese’s (2001) 
explanation of the hierarchy of influences. Furthermore, it also examines Chinese 
outgoing media’s counter-coverage of China’s human rights and sustainable 
development, as well as how this coverage is shaped through the hierarchy of 
influences in Chinese newsrooms. 
The study contributes to our understanding of how Chinese soft power operates in 
different contexts. The frames found in this study reveals how China is portrayed in 
South Africa media, in comparison to how China portrays itself in its outgoing media, 
and therefore how it aims to be perceived. The interviews with South African and 
Chinese journalists on the other hand, provides insight to the influences that produce 
these two types of coverage of China. This contributes to our understanding of 
China’s soft power successes and failures thus far, and the role that the media plays in 
wielding that power. 
  
1. China in Africa: the controversy of sustainable development and 
human rights 
The relationship between China and Africa can be traced back to at least the fifteenth 
century, and China has maintained relations with the African continent in a variety of 
forms (Wasserman, 2012; Webster, 2013). China and African countries share 
similarities as developing nations, having socialist legacies, and colonial or semi-
colonial histories. China’s entry onto the African economic scene was delayed by the 
Western-led “Washington Consensus, privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and 
austerity policies” (Sautman & Hairong, 2007:77). The China-Africa relationship has 
been cemented in recent years with China’s “Going Out” policy encouraging China to 
increase trade and diplomacy with African nations.  
Many claims have circulated in the global media discourse that China is a 
“neocolonial” force on the African continent (Sautman & Hairong, 2007; Hairong & 




Clinton, warned African nations that China’s conduct did not meet international 
standards of good governance and transparency (Hairong & Sautman, 2013). Also in 
2011, the US-African affairs official Johnnie Carson claimed that China was stealing 
jobs from Africans and failing to comply with local labour laws, pay decent wages, 
train staff, and share technology (Hairong & Sautman, 2013). The U.S. labelled China 
a “rogue creditor” for providing low-interest loans to African nations without political 
conditions (Phillips, 2006). Additionally, Western nations have criticised China’s 
foreign policy. “In its drive to secure reliable supplies of raw materials, it is said, 
China is coddling dictators, despoiling poor countries and undermining Western 
efforts to spread democracy and prosperity” (Lucas, 2008). 
China’s involvement in Africa has been perceived as controversial for several 
reasons, including China having a lack of concern for good governance, transparency, 
freedom of the press, worker’s rights, human rights, and environmental protection in 
Africa (Sautman & Hairong, 2009; French, 2014). At the core of this criticism lies the 
perception that China exports its environmental damage and human rights abuses to 
the African continent: “The lax environmental and labor standards by which Chinese 
companies operate in Africa unfortunately replicate the lax environmental and labor 
standards practiced at home” (Webster, 2013:650). 
 
2. China and sustainable development 
China has rapidly expanded its environmental footprint in Africa (Bosshard, 2008 & 
Taylor, 2015). The Chinese government and state-supported enterprises have made 
significant investments in African resources, and by extension, mines, oil exploration 
and secondary infrastructure, such as pipelines, roads, railways, power plants and 
transmission lines. According to Webster (2013), China's objectives in Africa are 
perceived as essentially exploitative, extracting the continent's natural resources to 
feed China's growth. 
China’s integrated investment strategy is visible across the African continent. The 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) entered Sudan in 1995 and expanded 
its exploration after Western competitors withdrew because of public outrage over 
their complicity in the country’s civil war. In 2005, Sudan provided 5% of China’s oil 




pipeline, an oil refinery, a railroad, and several thermal and hydroelectric power 
plants, such as the Merowe Dam. China is implementing similar investment packages 
in Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, and Zambia (Bosshard, 2008). 
In Gabon, the activities of the Chinese state-run oil company Sinopec have stimulated 
public outrage. In 2002, Gabon selected a quarter of the country as a nature reserve, 
protecting 67,000 square kilometres of mostly virgin rainforest. Sinopec has since 
been found to prospect for oil in one of Gabon’s national parks, without approval of 
their environmental impact study. The company has been charged with mass 
pollution, illegally dynamiting areas of the park and carving roads through the forest. 
A Gabonese government delegation visited the park and corroborated that Sinopec 
was guilty of a variety of environmentally damaging practices (Taylor, 2015). 
These kinds of activities and enterprises occur especially in countries with weak 
governance structures (Taylor, 2015; Bosshard, 2008). However, alongside cases of 
what John Lonsdale (2000) refers to as “African agency in tight corners,” contexts 
have also emerged showcasing multiple forms of African agency working to its own 
benefits. Researchers have found African governments both colluding with and 
resisting the Chinese government (Haglund, 2008; Ampiah & Naidu, 2008; Ferreira, 
2008).  
According to Mohan and Lampert (2012:108), “weak local political capacity is a toxic 
cocktail in which Chinese firms are relatively free to abuse labour and environmental 
laws”. African trade unions have achieved mixed results in improving local working 
conditions in Chinese enterprises, particularly where government support has been 
influential in its organised labour. They opine: “Africa cannot be seen as simply a 
passive space increasingly subject to intervention by China” (Mohan & Lampert, 
2012:109)and further emphasise the responsibility of academics not to overlook 
African agency and create “political nihilism” in China-Africa studies. African actors 
have also shaped the China-Africa political relationship to benefit African 
development at the levels of the individual, organised civil society, and within parts of 
the state.  
However, it appears that most often the African political and business elites benefit 
from the Africa-China relationship, such as the elite “nodes” (Mohan & Lampert, 




weaken the accountability of political and economic governance (Mohan & Lampert, 
2012). Furthermore, concerns have arisen that Chinese competitors are using lower 
environmental standards as a strategy to win a larger business share in the 
international infrastructure and extractive sectors. In this light, investment and 
expansion into Africa can be viewed negatively and is increasingly becoming a 
serious topic of debate, particularly in Western academia and media (Taylor, 2007; 
Tull, 2006).  
China and Wildlife Trafficking 
Particularly significant to the South African context is the perception of Chinese 
involvement in wildlife trafficking. According to Thompson (2015), the East Africa 
coordinator of Traffic, South Africa has seen an increase in both elephant tusk and 
rhino horn trade. Whereas about 13 rhino were poached in 2007, about 1 200 were 
poached in 2014. Large numbers of pangolins, abalone, lion bone and even timber are 
increasingly exported to places such as China – both legally and illegally. Shaw 
(2015) maintains that poaching and its accompanying violence is becoming more 
sophisticated. “This leads to an increase of militarisation by government: is this the 
most useful or holistic solution to the problem? Government is simply providing more 
guns” (Shaw, 2015).  
Julian Rademeyer (2015) from the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
Crime calls for an international approach to tackle the chain of wildlife trade that he 
labels as African countries to Laos, Vietnam and China. “The poachers on the ground 
are easily recruited by international crime organisations. They are expendable and 
easily replaced. Thus shooting and arresting on-the-ground poachers is not the key 
solution” (Rademeyer, 2015). According to Rademeyer, the so-called “kingpins” are 
the least at risk. “Therefore the linkages need to be drawn between various countries 
that are involved. This is a big organised crime network that requires collaboration at 
a global level.” He explains that poaching syndicates’ reach goes beyond wildlife 
trade to weapons exchange and the drug trade – all of these at an increasing human 
cost. “People are dying – for example three rangers and a soldier have recently been 
gunned down, and roughly seven soldiers have died in SA” (Rademeyer, 2015). 
About 300 poachers have been killed in the last five years, which impacts poor 




Eradicating the ivory and rhino horn market, which is often perceived to be located in 
China, is central to the illegal wildlife trafficking debate. Western media has referred 
to China as a “threat” to the wildlife in Africa (Leithead, 2016). According to the 
BBC, illegal wildlife trade is driven by economic development in China. “China is 
just a bigger scale. We not only have to address the demand in China, but we also 
have to address Chinese criminal networks that have penetrated the supply chains 
here in Africa” (Leithead, 2016:1). 
According to Zhou (2015), the Chinese government prioritises environmental 
conservation. China’s 13th Five-Year Plan includes the aim to eliminate illegal 
wildlife trade. Among others, China issued the “Guidance on Accelerating Building 
of Ecological Civilisation” policy in 2015 and launched a national Inter-Agency 
CITES1 Enforcement Coordination Group in 2011. “This has helped to increase the 
effectiveness of combating illegal wildlife trade in China” (Zhou, 2015). In 2014 the 
Chinese government committed $10 million in aid to wildlife protection in Africa, 
and in 2015, implemented policies banning ivory import and export, ivory carving 
and trophy hunting (Zhou, 2015). 
Poaching is subject to severe punishment in China. China has launched outreach and 
education programmes on wildlife trafficking in countries such as Ethiopia and 
Mozambique (Zhou, 2015). Several high-profile campaigns using Asian celebrities 
and Chinese social networks have been launched to educate new generations on the 
impact of consuming ivory, abalone, and rhino horn.  
According to Thompson (2015), the word “poaching” tends to elicit images of rhino 
horn or ivory from elephants being exported to China. “We see Chinese involved in 
this trade. But they are not doing this alone, they are doing this in collaboration with 
their African counterparts” (Thompson, 2015). Addressing the corruption and 
collusion involved in this issue has also been deemed crucial (Rademeyer, 2015). 
Because of the complex financial flows, the issue of wildlife trade goes beyond 
government and requires the involvement of the corporate sector as well (Thompson, 
2015). 
 




A major challenge in addressing wildlife trade is communication and translation 
skills. Rademeyer (2015) notes, for example, that cases have been thrown out of 
courts because there were no Vietnamese interpreters available. There is also a lack of 
understanding of how poaching syndicates operate; research seems to be dated and 
law enforcement is also lacking expertise in this area.  
 
3. China and human rights 
China has reviewed and appraised its human rights policy since the late 80s. In 2004, 
the Chinese Constitution was amended to include in Article 33 the phrase: “The State 
respects and preserves human rights” (Krumbein, 2015:159). Rhodes (2013) defines 
China’s human rights as “where human rights are defined and conferred on the 
individual by the state, and can thus be taken away by the state.” 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) promotes collective rights, such as the right to 
development, over individual rights. Ideological differences often put China at odds 
with Western-oriented commentators who perceive collective rights as unessential, 
and a natural outcome of the implementation of individual rights. According to the 
Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP, 2017:8), criticism of China’s 
human rights record is “often simplistically portrayed as the West finding fault with a 
repressive East”. Defenders of China’s human rights record claim that the state’s 
approach to human rights is sufficient to safeguard citizens against exploitation by the 
controversial hukou system, one-child policy, and capital punishment, among others 
(ISDP, 2017). 
China’s tumultuous history might have led to its emphasis on collective rights, and 
shaped its view on the way citizens interact with the state (ISDP, 2017). Historically, 
China has been subjected to famine, war and internal strife, as well as the challenging 
first steps towards modernisation. These incidences left large portions of the mainland 
vulnerable to malnutrition, violence, disease, infant mortality, and trauma. Therefore, 
the Chinese state emphasises the right to development and economic opportunities, 
both of which are codified in the United Nations Declaration on the Right to 
Development. China’s National Human Rights Action Plan for 2016-2020 enshrines 




subsistence” (Webster, 2013:649), as part of the UN platform on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights – of which China is a signatory (ISDP, 2017).  
China’s National Human Rights Action Plan specifically targets migrant workers, a 
key driver of the transformation of China into a global economic powerhouse, aiming 
to increase opportunities for them to start small businesses and encourage skill-
specific training (ISDP, 2017). Labour rights have increasingly received public 
attention via the media and NGOs, which has put government and employers under 
pressure to improve working conditions. However, according to Chen (2007), labour 
laws are still largely ignored and poorly implemented in China. One constraint of this 
implementation is the Chinese state prioritising “efficiency over equity” (Chen, 
2007:60), which is perceived to be exported to the African continent (Webster, 2013). 
One particular case which has put the priority of human rights in the China-Africa 
relationship in the spotlight, has been copper mining in Zambia. Contributing factors 
to this discourse have been Zambia’s Patriotic Front’s (PF) anti-China sentiments and 
a Human Rights Watch (HRW) 120-page report published in 2011 (Hairong & 
Sautman, 2013). When the PF came into power in Zambia in 2011, it essentially 
changed its position on China and Chinese firms, but “the consequences of its anti-
Chinese incitement remain very much present” (Hairong & Sautman; 2013:132).  
The China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining (CNMC) Group’s African subsidiary, Non-
Ferrous Metals Mining Company Africa (NFCA) owns the four companies 
Chambishi Mine, Luanshya, Sino Metals and Chambishi Copper Smelter, that came 
under fire in the 2011 HRW report. The HRW criticises Chinese-run copper mining 
companies in Zambia for routinely flouting labour laws and regulations designed to 
protect workers’ safety and the right to organise (Hairong & Sautman, 2013).  
 
The report is based on research conducted during 2010 and 2011 and draws on more 
than 170 interviews, including with 95 mine workers from the Chinese mines 
mentioned above, and 48 from other multinational mining operations. “Sometimes 
when you find yourself in a dangerous position, they tell you to go ahead with the 
work”, an underground miner at Non-Ferrous China Africa (NFCA) told HRW. 




tomorrow. And if you report the problem, you’ll lose your job” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2015).  
Hairong and Sautman (2013) later researched the various accusations against the PRC 
in the HRW report and both debunked some as myths or placed them in a broader 
context. They maintain that “the HRW report singles out China and Chinese for 
scrutiny and in a way that is methodologically problematic and inconsistent with 
sound social science” (Hairong & Sautman, 2013:132). Essentially HRW accused 
Chinese companies of being the “biggest violator of workers’ rights among Zambian 
copper industry employers”, as the worst offenders regarding safety, wages, hours, 
unionisation and job security (Human Rights Watch, 2015).  
However, Hairong and Sautman (2013) argued that the interviews conducted by the 
HRW were not representative of permanent workers, and that they interviewed a 
sample of PF supporters – who are known to have a strong anti-Chinese sentiment. 
The researchers furthermore mentioned that close observers of Zambian mining 
disagreed about China being the worst regarding safety, and that the focus on the 
Chinese-owned mine has actually shielded the other foreign-owned mines from 
criticism. Zambia’s Assistant Labour Commissioner listed only Chinese companies 
when asked about which mining companies complied with Zambian labour laws, and 
they were commended for their advanced technology that affects health and safety 
(Hairong & Sautman, 2013).  
 
Hairong & Sautman (2013) essentially found that Chinese mines were on par with, or 
at times an improvement on, western-owned mines operating in Zambia. However, 
thousands of media reports about HRW’s study fueled the fire of anti-China sentiment 
on the African continent (Dow Jones Network, 2011; Voice of America, 2011; Radio 
Free Asia, 2011). China’s ambassador to Zambia at the time commented that “in the 
‘Western media’ … if you have not written something bad about China in a given 
day, then you have not done your job” (Hairong & Sautman, 2013:152). 
 
Chinese prison labour in Africa 
 
Since the late 2000s, rumours have circulated globally that China sends convicts to 




“newspapers on five continents promoted these rumours to ‘facts’ by publishing 
sensational, but unsubstantiated, charges about the export of Chinese prisoners”. 
Hairong and Sautman argued that Roberta Cohen, former US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights, sparked these rumours by claiming in a New 
York Times article that 75 per cent of workers that China’s Jiangsu Construction Co. 
employed to build a road in Benin were Chinese convicts. In 2008, a British tabloid 
published an article entitled How China is taking over Africa and why we in the West 
should be VERY worried (Malone, 2008) accusing China of shipping prisoners as a 
form of cheap labour to Africa. The article was then reproduced globally by other 
newspapers and websites (Hairong and Sautman, 2013). 
 
They are said to have been made to fight rebels, build a pipeline, guard oil 
installations in Sudan, put up parliament buildings in Malawi and Gabon, work in 
mines and build power stations in Zambia, labour on roads and plantations in 
Zimbabwe, work as textile and garment workers in [privately-owned Taiwanese] 
factories in Lesotho, slave in a cement factory in Rwanda, engage in construction 
and even serve as “foreign experts” in Nigeria (Hairong & Sautman, 2013:400). 
 
Though they have since been debunked, initial rumours portrayed Chinese prisoners 
coming to Africa as opting to do their time overseas, that ex-convicts are paroled into 
developing countries, or, in the majority of portrayals, that prisoners were forcibly 
sent out to work as cheap labour. Often quoted in western media, Michael Sata, leader 
of Zambia’s then opposition Patriotic Front (PF) claimed: “Zambia has become a 
labour camp. Most of the Chinese are prisoners of conscience” (Hairong & Sautman, 
2013:406). The Chinese managers in Africa interviewed by Hairong and Sautman 
(2013) “found the idea of importing convicts laughable because of African 
governments’ close scrutiny of and long delays in processing applications for visas 
and work permits” (Hairong & Sautman, 2013:413). 
 
Hairong and Sautman (2013) conclude that the portrayal of China’s poor human 
rights in light of prison labour, evokes themes of authoritarianism (China’s abundance 
of prison labour as “slaves”), another Chinese export (along with cheap goods, 
labour) and colonialism (cruel exploitation). Despite China's contribution to Africa in 




pilot projects, criticism remains for their “human rights footprint” on the continent 
(Webster, 2013).   
4. Sustainable development, human rights and the media 
Sustainable development and the media 
Sustainable development is one of the greatest challenges facing the world today. 
Defined in the 1987 Brundtland report as “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (WCED, 1987), sustainable development reflects an important 
acknowledgement of the interconnected social and ecological issues humanity 
wrestles with globally (Yacoumis, 2018). Barbier (1987), cited in Adelekan (2009), 
states that “the primary objective of sustainable economic development focuses on 
creating lasting and secure livelihoods based on minimisation of resource depletion 
and environmental degradation”. Following Holt & Barkemeyer (2012), this study 
combined the terms sustainability and sustainable development and used it 
interchangeably, since though they differ, they both refer to the same basic conceptual 
framework of the consideration of ecological impact of development (Holt & 
Barkemeyer, 2012; Yacoumis, 2018). The link between environment and 
development is particularly strong in sub-Saharan Africa where nations heavily 
depend on agriculture and natural resources for their economic growth.  
While the concept of sustainable development has been contested for its “utopianism” 
(Yacoumis, 2018), other critics have challenged the concepts of green growth or 
ecological modernisation embedded in the current sustainable development paradigm 
for the belief that economic growth and ecological protection are mutually 
compatible. Ecological modernisation emerged as an environmental discourse in the 
1980s, and more recently as a political discourse as a more moderate alternative to the 
radical consideration of demodernisation as a response to ecological destruction. 
(Kangas, 2019). As continued economic growth inevitably means an increase in 
resource consumption, it could lead to a global collapse of ecosystems. This further 
raises issues of equity and poverty, as some scholars argue sustainable development 
currently reproduces the embedded structures of power in a capitalist society that 




technological innovation and incremental political reform (Kangas, 2019; Kemp & 
Van Lente, 2011; Yacoumis, 2018). 
Alongside the Brundtland Commission Report, the 1992 UNCED report not only 
highlights a crucial economic development and environment link, but the importance 
of environmental information in achieving public engagement with sustainable 
development issues (Adelekan, 2009). Sustainable development and climate change 
has seen an increase in sustainability awareness (Holt & Barkemeyer, 2012; 
Yacoumis, 2018), often facilitated by media coverage on television, in newspapers, 
online, and through films and documentaries, as well as school curricula and 
environmental education programmes (Adelekan, 2009; Holt & Barkemeyer, 2012). 
The press is influential through its gatekeeping and agenda-setting role: the media 
informs and educates the public on important issues, creates perspectives on these 
issues and influences behavioural change and action from the public, including policy 
making. (Adelekan, 2009; Holt & Barkemeyer, 2012; Yacoumis, 2018). However, 
Holt & Barkemeyer argue that sustainable development issues have not sufficiently 
moved into the mainstream of public consciousness. 
Throughout the history of environmentalism, some issues have risen to prominence 
around a specific event, and then faded from public view, and this is still reflected by 
the findings of SustainAbility’s tracking of sustainability in the media (Holt & 
Barkemeyer, 2012). Since mainstream media responds to breaking news and events, 
journalists find it challenging to sustain the public’s interest in sustainable 
development, and often coverage is centered around policy or legislative trigger 
events such as the 2012 Rio +20 Sustainable Development Summit, and more 
recently the Paris climate conference (Adelekan, 2009; Holt & Barkemeyer, 2012). 
Similarly, an increase in coverage of climate change was found when Al Gore’s An 
Inconvenient Truth reached its peak in 2007 (Holt & Barkemeyer, 2012). Yacoumis 
argues that the media treats these trigger events with skepticism – particularly on the 
topics of diplomacy and politics. Furthermore, sustainability issues often compete 
with other urgent topics such as politics and the economy, and coverage decreased 
during late 2008 as the global focus turned to the recession at the time (Holt & 
Barkemeyer, 2012). Adelekan (2009) argues that the “creeping nature” of the 
sustainable development issue reduces its salience. He encourages coverage to 




link to everyday life lacking in his case study on the Nigerian press’ coverage of 
climate change.  
In their study on community radio in Zambia, Young & McComas (2016) found that 
although sustainable development campaigns are dominated by new media, there is 
still a great need for traditional media in developing countries with little access to 
electricity or the Internet. Young’s study examines the use of media to increase the 
adoption of sustainability agriculture among farmers in Zambia who listen to an 
educational radio programme called Farm Talk, produced by Community Markets for 
Conservation (COMACO). Farm Talk could be considered an innovative form of 
entertainment education, which combines entertainment and education to help create 
positive social change. Most of the success of this radio programme is attributed to 
the fact that the producers, Comaco, is trusted by the rural Zambian community. 
Though most media positions itself as truthful and objective, Yacoumis (2018) adds 
that regarding sustainable development, coverage may reproduce hegemony, by 
reflecting dominant discourses, ideologies, and power relations. Such discourses 
include the portrayal of the global South as idle in terms of sustainability and 
development, and therefore needing assistance – essentially financial or technology-
based, from rich countries. These discourses also blame developing countries for 
climate negotiation failures. Yacoumis’ study of Australian media coverage of 
sustainable development, found that coverage centered around discontent with 
environmental policy, the promise of technology as solution to sustainability, the 
business case for sustainability, and the image of progress in the sustainability field. 
The latter theme overwhelmingly dominated – symbolising an expectation of growing 
commitment to sustainability. In particular the journey metaphor was used, which 
avoids defining where society is and where it is heading, but suggests to the reader 
that achieving the “silver sustainability bullet” is within reach. Such frames shield 
readers from contradictions between economic growth and environmental protection, 
and consequently impedes further public and political engagement.  
In his examination of the visualisation of sustainability in the media, Kangas found a 
technological dualism inherent in the conventional media imagery of climate change. 
This dualism builds on the media’s use of two particular visual themes recurring in 




(renewable) energy. These images represent alternatives to each other, embody the 
conceptual categories of “cause” and “response”, and suggest a technology-oriented 
view on climate change (Kangas, 2019). These binaries are both anthropocentric – 
smokestacks represent the human impact on nature, whereas renewable energy 
represents the human-driven solution through technology. According to Kangas, 
journalism presents two modernities – the current destructive vs a future ecological 
one, and as such simplifies sustainable development issues rather than encouraging 
more complex discussions of what true ecological modernity might be. 
Yacoumis (2018) also accuses the media of distorting, over-determining and 
simplifying reality, often reproducing news from foreign press without a detailed 
analysis of environmental events and issues. This is exacerbated by the resource, time, 
and space constraints increasingly facing newsprint journalists. Yacoumis’ study 
found that authors were from a wide range of fields as the topic has a broad scope, but 
also highlights an absence of journalistic expertise in the sustainable development 
beat. Meaningful analysis beyond mere reporting is necessary, and in particular, a 
focus on the involvement and accountability of relevant stakeholders. Adelekan 
(2009) refers to sustainable development coverage as an example of Schoenfeld’s 
(1980) “journalism of uncertainty”. This is evident in environmental reporting’s 
challenge to comprehend and communicate the deeply interconnected system of 
people, resource and technology, and consequently also not providing the needed 
complexity of the energy, economy and environment link. 
Human rights and the media 
The media’s involvement in human rights protection became prominent in the 1990s, 
when several governments started incorporating human rights principles in their legal 
frameworks (Sadaf, 2017). The modern human rights movement relies on the media 
as an essential partner to hold governments accountable for human rights violations. 
Amnesty International was born from the union of human rights activists and the 
press, while Human Rights Watch from its inception relied on the media for public 
naming and shaming of human rights violators (Winston & Pollock, 2016).  
According to Hamelink (2001), the media relates to human rights on various levels, 
including creating awareness. Exposure gives recognition to victims, identifies the 




burden on the victims, shapes public opinion on human rights matters and educates a 
general public (Hamelink, 2001:4; Pulfer, 2012). Though the media is considered 
instrumental in human rights coverage, limited media attention is paid to the topic, 
and few media still have a human rights beat covering the topic with expertise and 
context. News reporting often depends on immediacy or sensationalism of short-lived 
events, while human rights reporting requires background, context and in-depth 
analysis of long-term processes. (Hamelink, 2001). Pulfer (2012) explains that 
training at the Journalism for Human Rights (JHR) organisation focuses on 
foregrounding human rights issues faced by the poor and marginalised, and holding 
authorities to account to protect those rights, ideally by linking coverage to policy and 
legislation. The JHR’s criteria for a good human rights story includes that it should be 
participatory, and balanced; should allow relevant authorities or individuals to 
account for their actions; its language should be neutral, clear and accessible; it 
should be empowering for marginalised communities through accurately reflecting 
their views and mentoring them on demanding rights; and should include a legal 
component (Pulfer, 2012). 
The human rights movement relies on a strong emotional appeal in the media, which 
has increasingly taken the shape of compelling biographies and memoirs, such as I am 
Malala, (Sadaf, 2017). In the case of Malala Yousafzai, Sadaf argues that she has 
been exoticised by media in the north. Sadaf accuses these news organisations 
decontextualising human rights coverage by dehumanising victims, promoting an us 
vs them narrative, and creating simplified direct links rather than highlighting 
complexities. Allen (2009) echoes the sentiment that decontextualisation of human 
rights coverage is promoted by images of suffering, referring to his case study on 
visual imagery of victims in Palestine. Allen explores the politics of immediation – 
which aspires to give the viewer access to an authentic experience and truth, by 
discussing the representation of damaged bodies as locus of proof and sentiment of 
human rights violations. Debates around appropriateness and usefulness of circulating 
images of suffering either sees it as an excessive display of violence that might be 
harmful, or a need from the media to illustrate the situation in Palestine to leverage 
international political support (Allen, 2009). Pruce and Budabin on the otherhand, 
encourage scholars and activists to pursue ambitious projects, with somewhat 




campaign (KONY2012) designed to make the Lord’s Resistance Army commander 
Joseph Kony a negative household name by employing films, merchandise, action 
kits, and donations to target celebrities, politicians, and cultural figures (Winston & 
Pollock, 2016). 
Human rights news is no longer simply produced by media organisations, but also 
NGOs, civic groups, or individuals (Winston & Pollock, 2016). Access to the Internet 
allows the framing and circulation of visual evidence or personal testimony within 
global media systems. Before the Internet, human rights activists were subjected to 
the gatekeeping of mainstream media to get exposure for their cause, which often led 
to tension between making the story timely and newsworthy and making sure it was 
accurate and contextualised (Winston & Pollock, 2016). According to Winston & 
Pollock, this led to human rights news being highly simplified and misleading, as well 
as to a preference for coverage of individual and security rights at the expense of the 
less sensational but more widespread abuses of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
Now, individuals can record and distribute human rights news instantly. However, 
this might also lead to decontextualised coverage, and Winston & Pollock urges 
audiences to be weary of misinformation and fake news. Human rights NGOs have 
also become savvier about using new media and social media (Winston & Pollock, 
2016). Financial challenges of news organisations, and their consequently smaller 
newsrooms, has created an opportunity for the major human rights NGOs to 
contribute to reporting international human rights news by often providing credible 
and authoritative sources such as human rights lawyers. However, he adds that the 
essential role that professional journalism should continue to play in safeguarding 
human rights should not be dismissed (Winston & Pollock, 2016). 
The media has also been responsible for human rights violations, for example creating 
and fueling tensions between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, or censorship during 
apartheid in South Africa. Media can be used as the social institutions for distribution 
of hateful propaganda or disinformation. Furthermore, the media can also fall victim 
to human rights violations. Press freedom in itself is an indicator of the state of human 
rights (Hamelink, 2001; Brooten, 2013; Reshi, 2015). To some extent the Internet has 
helped escape state censorship, but it is not fully impossible for a national government 
to establish control over a global network. Similarly, media independence can also be 




conglomerates. Additionally, a fear of defamation cases, accusations of hate speech or 
other types of covert pressure leads to self-censorship in media houses, as few 
countries have robust regulatory environments. (Brooten, 2013). 
Furthermore, organisations such as Freedom House’s indices of media freedom has 
been critiqued for emphasising individual freedoms to the detriment of economic and 
social rights. Prioritising individual rights undermines the needs of those in 
multicultural societies with allegiances to both local cultures and their country 
(Brooten, 2013; Nyamnjoh, 2005, 2009). Nyamnjoh (2009) highlights the tensions in 
Africa between allegiance to cultural or ethnic communities and dominant theories of 
journalism that demand of journalists professional independence and a socially and 
culturally disembedded professional ethic. Critics consider western officials arrogant 
and lacking introspection regarding their own implementation of a narrow definition 
of human rights. Hence, while the Freedom House Index is said to measure the degree 
of freedom, UNESCO’s index measures media development. 
 
5. China in the media 
Before China’s historic opening, it had retreated from the world and did not attempt to 
exert power across the globe. Once China had realised its potential to be a great 
power (a daguo), it started “reinventing globalisation in its own image – challenging 
Western dominance and norms of globalisation” (French, 2014:3). Specifically, 
China’s “going abroad” campaign has been implemented to counteract the Western 
media portrayal of China as “a mystic player and rogue donor in the global 
community” (Shi, 2013:30). The Western media’s portrayal of China in Africa has 
been linked with Orientalism (the image of “Yellow Peril” or the threatening Other), 
or as a mysterious, exotic and unknowable force (Wasserman, 2012). Zeleza (2008) 
categorises the portrayals of the Africa-China relationship in terms of imperialism, 
globalisation, or solidarity. He adds that some of the most significant criticism against 
Chinese involvement in Africa has come from South Africa. For example, former 
president, Thabo Mbeki, has asked for China not to colonise Africa (Zeleza, 2008). 
 
The China-South Africa relationship is a key component in China’s media “Going 




its state-owned media, Xinhua, CRI, China Daily and CCTV, in South Africa, and has 
become a key player in hosting those media (French, 2014; Kurlantzick, 2008). 
However, as Wasserman (2016) notes, it is important to keep in mind that there have 
been flows and contraflows in China’s relationship with South African private media. 
The media relationship that has developed between South Africa and China, has 
brought into question the media’s role in China’s efforts to wield its soft power in the 
African nation. China’s soft power efforts have partly focused on improving its 
reputation on the African continent – which has been influenced by critical news 
coverage of China’s perceived lack of human rights and environmental impact. 
China’s human rights and sustainable development reputation as outlined above, 
raises questions about the success of China’s soft power on the African continent. 
Negative coverage of China’s human rights and sustainability record could impact its 
reputation and credibility as a powerful yet peaceful nation. It is therefore crucial to 
understand how China reacts to being perceived as having a lack of respect for the 
environment and human rights.  
The objectives of the study are to establish a) how China’s human rights and 
sustainability record is portrayed in South African media; b) how China’s human 
rights and sustainability record is portrayed in Chinese media in return; c) what South 
African journalists’ attitudes towards Chinese soft power efforts are; and d) what 
Chinese journalists’ attitudes towards Chinese soft power efforts are. These objectives 








Chapter Two: Background 
 
1. A short history of the China-South Africa relationship 
International relations between China and Africa go back at least to the fifteenth 
century and, according to Wasserman (2012) and Webster (2013), China has 
maintained these in various ways. The distinctive links between China and Africa  
stem from China's status as a developing country, its socialist legacies, and its own 
semicolonial history, as well as from its late entry into Africa in the midst of a 
decades-long decline in African fortunes associated with Washington Consensus 
privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation, and austerity policies (Sautman & 
Hairong, 2007:77).  
During the 1990s, through its “Going Out” policy, China transitioned to a more 
globalised nation, encouraging trade with foreign countries, and particularly the 
African continent. Prior to that, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) played a 
supportive role in a number of African countries’ fight for independence, including 
South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle (Taylor, 2000; Sautman & Hairong, 2007). 
China’s anticolonial and postcolonial solidarity was repaid through African states’ 
recognition of the PRC. 
From ROC to PRC 
In 1931, South Africa established ties with the Republic of China (ROC), which 
strengthened in the 70s with its base in Taiwan. Besides the two countries’ 
commonalities in feeling at risk of communist influences (Taylor, 2000), the 
relationship also had important economic implications for both nations. South Africa 
needed new sources of foreign investment after trade boycotts from the west due to its 
oppressive segregation policies at the same time that Taiwan searched for new trading 
partners to meet their import needs. 
Increasing diplomatic isolation – South Africa had been expelled from the 
Commonwealth in 1961, and Taiwan had been removed from the China seat at the 




Taiwanese-South African cooperation. Between 1960 and 1970 Taiwan needed to 
boost its image in the newly independent nations of Africa; mostly to foster support 
for Taiwan's position as the representative of China at the United Nations. Since each 
newly independent country had a vote on resolutions, it meant Africa had become the 
largest group of voters. The 1971 vote resulting in Taiwan’s removal of the United 
Nations occurred despite the pro-Taiwan votes from predominantly from African 
countries. (Pickles & Woods, 1989). Though many countries terminated relations with 
Taiwan after this vote, South Africa continued its relationship with the ROC, and 
increased its anti-Peking stance. Taiwanese and South African consulates were 
upgraded to embassies in these countries and the Taiwanese ambassador at the time, 
H.K. Yang, publicly stated that they were “joined in the fight against communism” 
(Pickles & Woods, 1989:511). Ironically, ambassador Yang also said Taiwan and 
South Africa “are in favour of free enterprise, democracy and freedom” (Pickles & 
Woods, 1989:511).  
Virtually all Asian investments were in the South African homelands, particularly 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. The apartheid government directed 
Asian investment towards the homelands through a selective visa strategy: certain 
homelands awarded Asian investors residential status for an indefinite stay, while 
South Africa itself was reluctant to do the same. Asian investments provided jobs in 
high unemployment regions, and, to an extent, recognised the legitimacy of the 
homeland governments that had been rejected globally. The autonomous homelands 
were one of the South African government’s anti-urban apartheid policies, alongside 
influx control, the migrant labour system and the policing of migrants and squatters. 
By the 1970s, these policies had increased tensions in the homelands essentially due 
to decreased income and increased unemployment (Pickles & Woods, 1989). The 
homelands became unattractive as a point of investment because of “poor 
communications, an unskilled labour force, inadequate social infrastructure, 
remoteness from complementary services and ancillary industries, and few social 
amenities for managers” (Pickles & Woods, 1989:516).  
Consequently, the apartheid government implemented policies to nudge investors 
towards the homelands, such as the 1960 “Border Industries” scheme, which 
constructed companies close to the Bantustan boundaries, for easier commute of black 




up around 20 textile factories in the homelands, and after criticism from its major 
market, the United States, sold to Canadian, European and South African markets. 
Sanctions had limited South Africa’s access to certain forms of technology and 
foreign capital and created difficulties in exports. While Taiwanese investments were 
small compared to overall South African investments, they were important for the 
homelands. 
The significance of the South Africa-Taiwan relationship reached beyond economic 
ties. Taiwan employed public diplomacy efforts, such as an academic exchange 
programme between the two countries, and a series of cultural exchanges, including 
the Cape Town Symphony Orchestra’s performance at the Taipei Arts Festival. In the 
early 80s, military cooperation also increased as South Africa developed growing 
nuclear ties with Taiwan, signing a six-year contract to deliver 4 000 tons of uranium 
to the ROC. At the time, South Africa, Taiwan and Israel had shared nuclear 
technology and were even thought to have worked together in the production of a 
nuclear bomb. By 1987, bilateral trade between the ROC and South Africa had 
reached US$911 million. Amidst comprehensive sanctions, Taiwan even became a 
possible conduit for South African exports (Pickles & Woods, 1989).  
 
2. The PRC and South Africa’s freedom struggle 
In contrast to Taiwan’s relationship with apartheid South Africa, the communist PRC 
officially broke economic links with South Africa in July 1960. “Until the demise of 
the minority regime, Beijing’s official ties were largely with the South African 
liberation organisations” (Taylor, 2000:92). However, Taylor (2000) notes trade with 
South Africa continued on a covert basis, despite China’s public anti-apartheid stance.  
Initially, China’s conflict with Russia affected their support for South Africa’s 
liberation movements. In response to Russia’s support for the African National 
Congress (ANC), China put its weight behind the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). 
PAC units were trained in Tanzania, Zambia, and some in Ghana, by Chinese 
instructors (Gibson, 1972). The South African Communist Party’s (SACP) close ties 
with the ANC and Beijing’s hostile foreign policy towards Russia essentially shut out 




ideological, with the SACP being critical of Maoism and Chinese-style communism 
and its spread in Africa. 
 
In 1973. China was one of four UN Security Council members to vote against 
Pretoria’s credentials, and walked out when this failed to stop South Africa from 
addressing the General Assembly.  
 
Beijing was conscious of the need to reflect general Third World anger at the 
West’s perceived reluctant reaction to the situation in South Africa for this would 
enable China to maintain its position within the Third World, bolster Beijing’s 
credentials as a friend of the oppressed, and prevent Moscow from manoeuvring 
itself into the role of the chief anti-apartheid power (Taylor, 2000:98).  
 
As Moscow and Beijing warmed to each other in the 1980s, the ANC asserted that it 
was willing to resume normal links with Beijing if it rejoined the anti-apartheid 
struggle (Kempton, 1989). 
 
In 1989. Beijing began hosting delegations from diverse organisations including the 
PAC and the liberal Democratic Party, and explored a renewal of economic links with 
South Africa. According to Sautman and Hairong (2007), China’s anticolonial and 
postcolonial solidarity efforts with African nations were “repaid through African 
states’ recognition of the PRC” (Sautman & Hairong, 2007:78). China concentrated 
on promoting a positive image of itself in South Africa, particularly as a helpful 
supporter of the democratisation process. Taylor notes, however, that “the irony of 
China playing out this role in South Africa in the post-Tiananmen era should not be 
ignored” (Taylor, 2000:101).  
 
In 1992, Nelson Mandela visited China and met with Premier Li Peng and President 
Jiang Zemin. He expressed gratitude for Chinese support for the anti-apartheid 
struggle, and voiced South Africa’s admiration for China’s economic construction. 
China was one of the first nations to resume official trade with Pretoria after 
Mandela’s call for the removal of sanctions in 1993. East Asia, with its rapid 
economic development, promised to offer insights which would generate broad-based 




recognition of the ROC, to dual recognition of both the PRC and ROC. Eventually, 
South Africa officially renounced ties with the self-determined Taiwan, in exchange 
for the recognition of the “One-China” policy in which Taiwanese sovereignty is 
viewed as illegitimate (Alden, 2006; Grimm et al., 2014; Jiang & Shu, 2019).  
 
The recognition of the PRC did not happen immediately after the end of apartheid. 
The first democratic government under former President Nelson Mandela initially 
maintained ties with Taiwan, mainly because Taiwan had become a democracy in the 
1980s. China, on the other hand, had resisted the fall of communism, and received 
global criticism for its violent crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989. This made it 
a difficult cooperation partner at the time (Grimm et al., 2014). However, China 
became an uncontested regional and global partner as it reported an unprecedented 
growth in its economy and great progress in reducing absolute poverty, making the 
country indispensable. South Africa thus made what Grimm et al. (2014:10) call the 
“realist” move towards recognising Beijing that had already been undertaken by most 
of the African continent much earlier. 
 
Economic diplomacy strongly influenced South Africa’s shift from its recognition of 
Taipei to Beijing. Economic diplomacy concerns  “state formulation of economic 
policy by a given state or group of states, vis-à-vis other states. Crucial to the practice 
is a balancing-act in which states attempt to promote their own domestic interests via 
economic leveraging” (Grimm et al., 2014:6). With the increasing importance of 
global, multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
scholars have argued that understanding economic diplomacy as simply a practice of 
diplomats from Country A engaging with diplomats from Countries B and C has 
become more complicated (Grimm et al., 2014). Prior to the 2000s. global economic 
diplomacy was dominated by permanent officials from a few powerful countries, but, 
since then, the process has increasingly been shaped not only by diplomats, but also 
by business, civil society, non-government organisations and international 
organisations (Grimm et al., 2014). 
Business plays a crucial role in a multi-actor approach to international relations. South 
Africa’s engagement with the PRC has been influenced by a number of players, 




private sphere, although linked to government. Grimm et al. (2014) argue that 
economic diplomacy is perhaps even pushing public diplomacy into the background, 
as companies can dominate political instruments for their own ends, which would 
potentially shift the centre of influence to corporations. Scholte (2008), on the other 
hand, argues that the state remains an important actor since it is the main actor 
practising diplomacy and interaction between state and non-state actors at various 
levels. Diplomatic relations are used to open doors for strategic domestic industries in 
foreign countries through efforts such as high-level politicians’ state visits, or 
diplomatic missions actively showcasing important economic sectors via institutions 
such as organised trade fairs. 
 
China has used various economic diplomacy tools in order to promote economic ties 
with developing countries. Under the “going global” slogan, it has created various 
“business-promotion instruments” (Bräutigam & Tang, 2012). These include the 
China Development Bank, as well as the China Export-Import Bank (China 
Eximbank), which is owned by the Chinese government and responsible for export 
and import credit and loans for offshore contracts and overseas investment 
(Bräutigam & Tang, 2012). Chinese companies presently involved in South Africa 
include Zijin Mining, Minmetals, Jiquan Iron and Steel (Jisco), East Asia Metals, and 
Sinosteel (Taung Gold, n.d.). There is also a significant amount of investment in the 
telecommunication sector, including Chinese major companies such as Zhongxing 
Communications (ZTE) and Huawei Technologies. 
 
3. PRC trade and investment in South Africa 
The relationship between South Africa and China has grown rapidly since the late 90s 
– at its core, China’s aspiration is to strengthen political and diplomatic ties to 
increase economic engagement. South Africa is strategically important to China as a 
resource nation, while China sees its investment in energy and raw materials in South 
Africa as integral to developing local infrastructure and speeding up economic 
development (Beeson, et al., 2011). In 2009, China became South Africa’s single 
largest trading partner, with bilateral trade totalling US$16.3 billion. South Africa has, 
in turn, become China’s biggest trading partner in Africa, representing about 25 per 





In 2010, Presidents Jacob Zuma and Hu Jintao signed the Beijing Declaration, which 
committed both countries to “establishing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
based on equality, mutual benefit and common development” (Beeson et al., 
2011:1377). Regarding development, the debate around the most appropriate 
development strategy increased over recent decades (Kennedy, 2010; McKinnon, 
2010). While some credit the western concept of broad liberalisation with successful 
development, others suggest that China’s success challenges conventional theories 
about the role of the state in development. Joshua Cooper Ramo labelled what he 
views as China’s unique approach as the “Beijing Consensus” (BC, Beijing gongshi), 
thereby distinguishing it from the “Washington Consensus” (WC, Huashengdun 
gongshi), invented by American economist, John Williamson, which connotes a more 
conventional development approach. 
The Washington Consensus comprises ten policies that Williamson “thought more or 
less everyone in Washington would agree were needed more or less everywhere in 
Latin America” (Kennedy, 2010). The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and 
the World Trade Organization are renowned for advocating development in alignment 
with the Washington Consensus. The WC has often been conflated with the economic 
ideology of neoliberalism and a democratic political system. The WC’s failure to lead 
to sustained growth in different developing regions has led to severe criticism of the 
WC “brand”. It has been accused of raising the bar to unrealistic levels for any 
country seeking to develop. 
The BC has been viewed as challenging the normative authority and imperialism of 
the WC (Dirlik, 2006). According to Ramo (2004),  
China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure 
out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the 
international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect 
their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful 
centre of gravity.  
Kennedy (2010) argues that China’s economic development strategy is not unique – 
while having some distinctive elements, it does not hail a new consensus. In fact, 




states. Dirlik describes the “Beijing Consensus” as a notion, rather than a concept or 
idea. “The ‘Beijing Consensus’ appears, more than anything, to be a sales gimmick — 
selling China to the world, while selling certain ideas of development to the Chinese 
leadership” (Dirlik, 2006:2). 
A popular alternative to the Beijing Consensus has been the “China Model” 
(zhongguo moshi). This has been used to describe China’s gradualist reform strategy, 
while simultaneously maintaining China’s original political institutions, such as the 
Chinese Communist Party’s one-party rule. Under the China Model the concepts 
“capitalism with Chinese characteristics” and “authoritarian capitalism” have 
strengthened. Dirlik suggests the China Model could be more useful to China than the 
BC, because the BC is more likely to arouse fears overseas of the Chinese threat to 
the international system. 
China has designated South Africa as the preferred country on the preferred continent 
for Chinese investment. Chinese companies have invested in a range of sectors in 
South Africa, including mining, textiles, electronics, agriculture, communications, 
transportation and banking. Beeson et al. (2011), however, note a skewed trade 
relationship between the two countries, since, in 2011, Chinese investment in South 
Africa remained smaller than South African investment in China. At the time, it 
served as a point of contention for China’s involvement in South Africa, as labour 
unions complained about the effect of cheap Chinese imports on the local textile 
sector. The PRC government has since ordered a quota on exports of Chinese cheap 
goods to South Africa (Beeson et al., 2011). Sautman and Hairong (2007) claim, 
however, that these inexpensive PRC-made household goods are much more 
affordable than both Western imports and many local products, and may therefore 
benefit lower-income consumers.  
 
Additionally, after a strong push from China to extend an invitation to South Africa, 
the country formally joined the elite BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) group in 
2011. The BRICS Group forms part of a growing effort by emerging economic 
powers to build alternative institutions and forums to Western-dominated ones 
(Polgreen, 2013). The acronym BRIC, coined by Goldman Sachs in 2001, took on a 
life of its own and became somewhat synonymous with an economic power shift 




Africa’s invitation followed intensive efforts by the country to gain admission, 
including high profile visits to the BRIC countries by former President Jacob Zuma in 
2010 (Bond, 2013). Zuma announced during his visit to China that the country had 
formally applied for membership of the BRIC Group (Schoeman, 2011). Officials 
from one of the BRIC countries characterised South Africa’s quest to prove its 
“BRIC-ability” as “embarrassing” (Alden & Schoeman, 2013:115). After securing an 
invitation to join, an internal review was launched in South Africa to assess the actual 
benefits of a BRICS membership, which still remains under suspicion (Alden & 
Schoeman, 2013). 
Analysts have questioned South Africa’s inclusion in BRICS because of its 
comparatively small economy, slow growth rate, territory and population size. Jim 
O’Neill, the Goldman Sachs executive who coined BRIC, believes South Africa does 
not belong in the group. “South Africa has too small an economy. There are not many 
similarities with the other four countries in terms of the numbers. In fact, South 
Africa’s inclusion has somewhat weakened the group’s power” (Polgreen, 2013:1). 
However, politically, South Africa shares the broad aspirations and objectives of the 
BRICS countries, and justifies its inclusion into BRICS on its “natural” or “obvious” 
leadership of the African continent (Alden & Schoeman, 2013:115). Perceptions have 
surfaced that South Africa’s continental leadership is under threat, with Standard 
Chartered reporting that Nigeria’s rising middle class and oil revenues are likely to 
enable them to overtake South Africa in total GDP terms by 2023. South Africa also 
seems to be torn between aligning itself with BRICS or pursuing an African agenda 
(Alden & Schoeman, 2013).  
The BRICS alliance has been challenged on whether the countries have enough in 
common and enough shared goals to effectively counter the West. They are divided 
on basic issues, have “widely divergent economies”, invest little in each other and 
have “disparate foreign policy aims” (Polgreen, 2013:1). Most importantly, India, 
Brazil and South Africa have strong democratic traditions, while Russia and China are 
autocratic. However, according to Bond (2013), BRICS countries share a common 
experience, and rejection, of the western-dominated neoliberal development model of 
the past several decades. Yet, despite the discourse of mutual benefit and sovereignty 




(Schoeman, 2013) and Bond (2013) has even accused the BRICS group of sub-
imperialism. 
The relationship between China and South Africa has become even more significant 
since the BRICS invitation, with Beijing declaring 2015 as the year of South Africa in 
China.  
 
4. Othering of Chinese in South Africa 
South African media coverage of the Chinese presence in Africa could potentially be 
influenced by the history of “othering” of Chinese in South Africa. Until 1980, the 
Chinese population in South Africa was made up almost entirely of South African-
born Chinese (SABCs). During that time an immigrant community – about 90% 
Taiwanese – began to form, and, by 1993, there were 36 000 Chinese in South Africa 
(Sautman & Hairong, 2007). A decade later more than 80 000 Chinese residents were 
reportedly living in South Africa, and, in 2004, between 100 000 and 400 000 legal 
and illegal Chinese immigrants were estimated to live in South Africa (Sautman & 
Hairong, 2007). These were mostly from mainland China, however, as the Taiwanese 
population shrank drastically as the political relationship between South Africa and 
the ROC changed. 
 
Karen Harris explores the “othering” of Chinese in South Africa, aimed at 
understanding the origins of Chinese xenophobia. According to Harris (2016:2) 
“othering” is a process that marks difference, and “secures one’s own identity by 
distancing and stigmatising an other”. Following Said’s (1978) work on Orientalism, 
Harris builds on the ideas that the Orient is constructed as the “other” in a 
“reductionist, distancing and pathologising way”, and therefore all things Chinese are 
“exoticised” (Jensen, 2011:64). The Orient is posited as the alien, inferior or negative 
counterpoint of the Occident (Mackerras, 1989:44-5). It is against this backdrop that 
the Chinese are still viewed as the “Yellow Peril” by South Africans, which might 
influence them to distrust China, and perceive their investment in Africa as 
neocolonial (Harris, 2016; Bright, 2013). “The othering of the Chinese was rooted in 
the Dutch and British Cape; it was transposed from other colonies to the mining 
metropole and beyond; it was entrenched in the jaws of apartheid and was perpetuated 




Additionally, South Africans generally perceive of “the Chinese” as a homogeneous 
entity, and have failed to distinguish between SABCs and Chinese and Taiwanese 
migrants. 
 
During apartheid the Chinese had been classified as a subgroup under the “coloureds” 
– an apartheid racial nomenclature to define a group consisting primarily of people 
from multiracial or multicultural origins. In 2008 it was ruled that Chinese people 
who lived in South Africa prior to 1994 would benefit from black economic 
empowerment in post-apartheid South Africa, providing recognition that the group 
had been previously disadvantaged by racial oppression (Harris, 2016). Prior to 
apartheid, the mineral revolution had led to an expansion of Western imperialism in 
South Africa, which saw a peak in the negative “Orientalist” approach to China. 
Mackerras (1989:44-45) claims that it was a time “when Europe colonised not only 
parts of China, but also knowledge about it”. 
 
Even earlier in South Africa’s history, the early 1900s, the fear existed that the 
Chinese would take possession of South Africa, since they provided competition to 
the West through their stereotypical “hard-work ethic.” They were referred to as 
parasieten (parasites) by the Boer Republics, fearing that they would be unfair 
competition to European traders. During this period, the physical appearance, cultural 
traditions, political structures and social lifestyle of the Chinese were belittled, with 
rhetoric that included “yellow peril”, “yellow scourge”, “almond-eyed”, “slit-eyed”, 
“pig-tailed”, and “Mongolian filth” – terms that have resurfaced in recent years 
(Harris, 2016; Bright, 2013). The first piece of blatant legal discrimination against an 
ethnically identifiable group in South Africa was, in fact, directed at Chinese 
immigrants through the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904. Therefore, this colonial 
history of China being perceived as an “alien threat” to South Africa, and the link 
with current perceptions of China as neocolonial, could influence South African 







Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
The relationship between Africa and China has grown in the past decade on several 
platforms important to soft power, including economically (trade, aid and loans), 
politically (the BRICS relationship with South Africa and the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation [FOCAC]) and culturally (China’s public diplomacy efforts and media 
engagement on the African continent) (Wekesa, 2016). In short, soft power refers to 
getting others to want the outcomes you want, by attracting them rather than using 
coercion (Nye, 2004). It differs from hard power and militarisation; Kurlantzick 
(2008) refers to soft power as a country’s “charm offensive” – the persuasion of a 
foreign country without threats or inducements. Since China’s growing significance in 
the global world order, the country has been increasing its efforts to wield soft power, 
particularly on the African continent. 
South Africa plays a crucial role in China’s Going Out policy, as well as its media 
Going Out policy. China currently distributes its state-owned media Xinhua, CRI, 
China Daily and CCTV in South Africa, and alongside Kenya, South Africa has 
become a key player in hosting those media (French, 2014; Kurlantzick, 2008). 
However, as Wasserman (2016) notes, it is important to keep in mind that there have 
been flows and contraflows in China’s relationship with South African private media. 
Whereas China now has financial investments in Independent Media (owner of large 
newspapers such as Cape Times, The Star and Cape Argus) and StarSat (formerly 
known as TopTV – a competitor to Naspers’ DSTV), South African media 
conglomerate Naspers also has a large share in TenCent, a Chinese social media 
platform company that owns services such as QQ, Weibo and Youku (Wasserman, 
2016). Overall, a substantial media relationship has developed between South Africa 
and China, and it is important to analyse the media’s role in China’s efforts to wield 
its soft power in Africa. In part, China’s soft power efforts have been aimed at 
improving its reputation on the African continent – which has strongly been 





This study looks particularly at how China’s human rights and sustainable 
development record is covered in mainstream South African media. The study also 
looks at how this coverage has been shaped, by the possible influences on South 
African journalists as set out by Reese (2001) in his explanation of the hierarchy of 
influences. Furthermore, it also delves into Chinese media activities – possible 
counter-coverage of China’s human rights and sustainable development reputation in 
Chinese mainstream media, as well as how this media coverage is shaped, in other 
words the hierarchy of influences as played out in Chinese newsrooms. The hierarchy 
of influences as model for impacting Chinese and South African coverage of China is 
further discussed in chapter four. These elements all come together as a contribution 
to the theoretical framework of soft power, which is explained below. 
 
1. China’s current reputation regarding its presence in Africa 
While China shied away from the global limelight for years, this approach has 
become impossible with its expanding global presence (Hartig, 2012). China has not 
only become increasingly visible, but it is also “vocal more than ever in the global 
arena to advance its agenda and interests” (Hartig, 2012:8). In many ways, China has 
become a more assertive (and some maintain, arrogant) actor in the international 
playing field, as it pushes to have a more significant voice on international affairs, in a 
global system that has thus far been dominated by advanced industrial economies, 
particularly the United States (Zhang, 2013).  
Since the early 2000s, China has aimed to increase its influential power in politics 
(Wang, 2011). According to Zhang (2013), China now seems more enthusiastic to 
challenge the US and other powers over discrepancies within the international arena 
than at any time since it introduced reform and opening-up policies. In 2012, Hu 
Jintao, in fact, stated that China “will never copy a western political system” (Zhang, 
2013:87). Instead, China supports other developing nations in implementing political 
systems that suit their local circumstances.  
Through its key membership in the BRICS group, China aims to challenge western-
dominated institutions. One strategy of BRICS has been to set up a BRICS bank in 
2014, countering the dominating influence of the World Bank and the International 




ultimately aligned itself, with African countries by expressing camaraderie with “the 
victimised”, and continues to identify itself as a non-western developing country to 
increase resonance with these nations (Zhang, 2013; Zhang, 2016).  
The increased involvement of China in Africa has been one of the most controversial 
geopolitical developments on the continent in recent years (Zhang, 2016). China’s 
engagement with the African continent has led to debates globally, which centre 
around the question whether China is a friend or foe, a neo-colonialist or ally, and 
what this engagement might mean for the west’s relationship with Africa (Alden, 
2007; Sautman & Hairong, 2007; Wasserman, 2016; Jijun, 2016). This engagement 
has often been met with suspicion and a lack of trust from non-Chinese points of view 
(Madrid-Morales, 2016). Zeleza (2008:172), for example, claims that “the 
commentaries swing unsteadily from the excited to the anxious, the celebratory to the 
condemnatory, and the sanguine to the suspicious”. Zeleza blatantly asked: “Are we 
witnessing a new scramble for Africa, this time not among European powers but 
between the West and China?” He notes that the responses to this question vary from 
glee to gloom,  
some reminiscent of the old rhetoric of Third World solidarity, others full of 
trepidation, recalling Africa's tragic history of external pillage, warning Africa to 
be wary of the strangers from the east bearing flashy but flimsy gifts of 
dependency and underdevelopment” (Zeleza, 2008:174).  
Overall, a variety of concerns contribute to China’s undesirable image among 
Africans, including human rights and democracy issues – such as tight control of the 
Internet and the treatment of activists, corruption, China’s rivalry with the United 
States, its particular relationship with Taiwan and Hong Kong, and disputes with the 
Philippines and Vietnam over the South China Sea (Zeleza, 2008). On top of these, 
regarding China’s impact in Africa, concerns have emerged about China’s 
environmental impact, China’s influence on media freedom in Africa, and an 
apprehension regarding China’s cheap goods sold in Africa (the term “Fong Kong” 
goods has been popularly used) (Alden & Wu, 2014; Wasserman, 2016; Rønning, 
2016). Additionally China has been accused of “neocolonialism” (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2019) – media discourses debate whether China is the “World’s New 




of African countries tend to be cosy and positive, but non-official perspectives are 
critical of Beijing’s actions and policies, resulting in fear and suspicion among non-
elite Africans. Zeleza (2008) explains that the various positive and negative portrayals 
of China in African media could fit into one of three frames: imperialism, 
globalisation and solidarity.  
Western policy makers, scholars, and media commentators are more likely to take the 
imperialist view on China in Africa (Zeleza, 2008). Zeleza argues that the west, 
accustomed to western imperialism on the African continent, clearly states that China 
cannot be good for Africa, as the west has been. “It is a discourse in which western 
benevolence and Chinese malevolence are assumed and compared, often 
unashamedly” (Zeleza, 2008:175). Furthermore, Zeleza states that the paternalism in 
western discourses places Africa as a continent in need of salvation, while the west 
sees itself as delivering that salvation while it defames its competitors and 
adversaries, in this case China, with exploitative intentions. The Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom, David Cameron, for example, cautioned citizens in Nigeria that new 
forms of “authoritarian capitalism” may be taking root on the continent, in reference 
to China’s vigorous entrance into African markets (Wasserman, Mano & Zhang, 
2016). Similar issues have been raised about the potential role China’s 
authoritarianism may play in Africa’s media sector, with critics highlighting a 
possible undermining of Western efforts to promote openness and freedom of 
expression (Farah & Mosher, 2010; Kurlantzick, 2008).  
However, some Africans have expressed their uneasiness with this form of western 
hypocrisy. Former Mozambican president, Joaquim Chissano, the winner of the first 
$5 million Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership awarded in 
October 2007, said:  
Well, if the West is concerned about China's human rights record [as a reason to 
deter increasing trade with Africa], then perhaps African countries should 
reconsider trading with America because of their war in Iraq and their torture of 
prisoners in Guantanamo… China is a country like any other, they will offer 
something that will give them benefit… but at the end of the day they have been 




weaker partners, so they know how to facilitate things. But it is up to African 
countries to be careful to protect the interest of Africans (Zeleza, 2008:177). 
Defenders of the China-Africa relationship, including many Chinese and African 
leaders and opinion leaders, perceive the relationship as rooted in solidarity, 
specifically in South-South cooperation. China is viewed as a partner to Africa when 
the west thought it was hopeless (Rønning, 2016). “Many Africans see China as an 
attractive alternative to the West that has exploited their societies ruthlessly over the 
centuries and continues to do so” (Zeleza, 2008:180). To supporters of the China-
Africa engagement, China is a developing country with no imperialist history and 
incapable of being a colonial power like the nations of the west. It is also admired for 
unlocking the secrets of rapid development that other developing countries in Africa 
can follow (Zeleza, 2008).  
Changing the perception of China 
According to Zeleza (2008), media reports decry China's growing involvement with 
Africa. However, Wasserman (2012; 2015) found that coverage of the South Africa-
China relationship in South African media has been cautiously optimistic for several 
years, although particularly when framed as a business story. Such media coverage 
has generally framed China’s involvement in Africa in economic and political terms 
as a source of development opportunities, whereas the social concerns of the 
engagement, such as human rights or media freedom, has largely been neglected as a 
news topic (Madrid-Morales & Wasserman, 2018).  
In a survey (Louw-Vaudran, 2014) of 1 056 Africans from 15 countries conducted by 
the Ethics Institute of South Africa, the majority responded negatively to Chinese 
business people in Africa, the quality of Chinese products and services, and the 
economic and social responsibility of Chinese business and their employment 
practices in Africa. Labour practices were seen in a particularly poor light. The 
negative perceptions from the survey, especially from Nigeria and South Africa, could 
be attributed to business investment rivalry and negativity in western media reports. 
Additionally, the Pew Research Centre found that China is generally seen in a 
positive light in most developing countries – even though it receives negative 




The Chinese government has consistently presented itself as a peace-loving nation, a 
victim of foreign aggression, and an opponent of hegemony. A large part of its 
narrative has also evolved from the socialist and revolutionary nation under Mao, to 
an emphasis on its role as an international co-operator and major power (Hartig, 
2012:40). Hartig maintains that, while American opinion leaders can accept China’s 
self-portrayal as a socialist, developing country and major power, it doesn’t see China 
as a peace-loving nation, a force for international cooperation or a victim of foreign 
aggression. 
China frames its engagement in Africa as mutually beneficial, rather than asymmetric, 
and often promotes the term a “win-win situation” (Madrid-Morales, 2016) alongside 
concepts such as partners, south-south cooperation, mutual respect and non-
interference (Tan-Mullins, 2016). China wants to increase its influence and build a 
positive image for itself in Africa and the rest of the world, and has aligned with 
African countries to gain their support for its domestic and foreign agendas. Through 
its public diplomacy, which includes media engagement, China seeks to be perceived 
as a stable, reliable, trustworthy and responsible economic partner and member of the 
international community. 
Rønning (2016) argues that the most important source of China’s increasingly 
positive image in Africa is linked to China’s recent economic success. The Economist 
reported in 2013 that an increasing number of Africans believe that the Chinese create 
jobs, transfer skills, and spend money in local economies (Rønning, 2016:65). China’s 
development assistance to Africa, which takes many forms – loans and direct 
economic support, health, agriculture, education, training, academic cooperation, 
infrastructure construction, culture and media – is an important element of the 
Chinese soft engagement with Africa.  
To increase its possibilities of wielding soft power, China’s media “going abroad” 
campaign has been implemented to counteract the western media portrayal of China 
as “a mystic player and rogue donor in the global community” (Shi, 2013:30). The 
western media’s portrayal of China in Africa has been linked with Orientalism (the 
image of “Yellow Peril” or the threatening Other), or as a mysterious, exotic and 
unknowable force (Wasserman, 2012). Some Chinese scholars argue that Chinese 




have exaggerated individual Chinese companies’ misconduct in Africa. This 
unbalanced coverage thus called for an intensified media engagement on the African 
continent, to make the Chinese voice heard (Jijun, 2016). 
Now that we’ve explored the different perceptions that have emerged on China’s 
engagement in Africa, it is important to understand how these views can either 
strengthen or impede Chinese soft power efforts. But first, it is important to 
understand what exactly soft power is, and how it operates.  
 
2. Soft power 
Since there is little consensus on the definition of soft power; most scholars revert to 
using Nye’s account that soft power is the ability to produce outcomes through 
persuasion rather than coercion or payment (hard power). It rests on a country’s 
culture, its political values and its foreign policies (Nye, 2004). Whereas hard power 
generally refers to using military resources to obtain the outcomes a country wants, 
“soft power” refers to the influence on a foreign country without threats or 
inducements (Nye, 2004). Kurlantzick (2008) refers to this as a country’s “charm 
offensive”.  
The key word for Kurlantzick is “offensive,” particularly in reference to China’s 
“systematic, coherent soft power strategy” and the accompanying tools that China has 
developed, which include public diplomacy through media investment, the expansion 
of Confucius Institutes, educational exchanges and official conferences (Kurlantzick, 
2008:xi). Aside from public diplomacy, attractiveness can be conveyed in many ways, 
including a country’s popular and elite culture, its businesses’ actions abroad, 
international perception of its government’s policies and the gravitational pull of a 
nation’s economic strength. This study specifically looks at the role that media 
engagements play in China’s soft power strategy. 
Nye distinguishes between soft power and hard power by referring to a spectrum. 
“The types of behavior between command and co-option range along a spectrum from 
coercion to economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction” (Nye, 2004:7). 
Soft power is at the co-option end of spectrum, whereas hard power is associated with 




have emerged in international scholarship, and these will be looked at more closely 
later in this chapter. However, this study follows Kurlantzick’s view on soft power, 
which holds that it includes everything outside of the military and security realm, 
including coercive economic and diplomatic levers, such as aid and investment 
(Zhang, Wasserman & Mano, 2016). 
While scholars continue to grapple with the concept of soft power through theories, 
such as smart power, or the soft use of power, the concept has been legitimised 
through global leaders launching soft power campaigns and charm offensives to exert 
wooing efforts. Though emerging literature calls for a critical look at the motives of 
soft power, scholars seem to agree that, to construct a favourable image of the state to 
attract allies and win support for its policies, soft means are much better than crude 
forces (Zhang, Wasserman & Mano, 2016).  
China’s soft power 
Soft power is playing an increasingly important role in China’s foreign relations 
(Bräutigam, 2009). According to Li and Rønning, discussions on the concept of soft 
power in China can be traced back to 1992, when Joseph Nye’s Bound to lead: the 
changing nature of American power was translated into Mandarin under the title Can 
the United States lead the world? (Nye, 1992). China had been using pure 
propaganda, which was unsuccessful, and then turned to tools of culture and 
diplomacy toward a more nuanced public relations strategy. Eventually the name of 
the Party’s Propaganda Department changed to the Publicity Department.  
China started the media Going Out Campaign in the 2000s, primarily because of its 
belief that its image had been tarnished by demonising western media coverage. It 
envisioned enhancing China’s prominence in international politics and 
communication in order to counterbalance this unfavourable image. China’s major 
media players, such as state-owned CCTV, CRI, Xinhua and China Daily, were called 
to collectively promote the Communist Party of China’s grand external propaganda 
(Dawaixuan) plan, disseminating key messages abroad (Jijun, 2016). Through this 
strategy, China expanded these state-owned media outlets on the African continent. 
Chinese officials have viewed soft power as a means to prepare the ground for 
China’s foreign policy. Interestingly, China has generally directed its efforts towards 




control many of the resources that China desires a share in. In this way, China has 
succeeded in securing cooperation on policies from many countries, although it has 
neglected engaging with civil societies. This could be a problem in the long-term, as 
soft power depends more than hard power on the reception of the audience.  
Some scholars note that China’s lack of engagement with civil society is not 
surprising, since the nation is new at wielding global soft power. Thus China is 
learning by doing, as promoting soft power (rather than propaganda) is outside of 
their comfort zone, and Africa, in particular, is an important testing ground for its soft 
power strategies (Zhang, Wasserman & Mano, 2016). Zhang found that some media 
professionals are more confident about China’s soft power success in Africa because 
“the level of expertise and technology are lower there”, while “in the West it is harder 
for China to compete” (Zhang, 2013).  
To understand how and why the Chinese exercise soft power, it is important to 
understand the consequences of the claims that have been made about China, 
particularly as a rival power to the west. As mentioned above, media coverage could 
both create a favourable or unfavourable image of China, which has an impact on the 
power it yields as an international player (Rawnsley, 2016). In this sense, Shi (2013) 
refers to China’s soft power strategy as a “charm defensive” – essentially the nation is 
trying to defend a reputation that has been crafted by western powers. China’s 
reputation has been a product of the USA’s “threat discourse” of the 1990s 
(Rawnsley, 2016:26). He therefore argues that it is understandable why the west’s 
claims of universalism (of pluralism, liberalism and autonomy) could have provoked 
Beijing into adopting a reactive, defensive and nationalist soft power strategy.  
The primary objective of Chinese soft power thus seems to be to change the global 
conversation about China and provide an alternative to the alleged distorted picture of 
the nation presented in the western media. China uses soft power both to promote its 
political and economic agenda, and also to react to its perceived misrepresentation in 
the current hegemony of international news (Rawnsley, 2016). President Hu Jintao 
suggested the existence of a deliberate threat from western soft power in 2012, hence 
China’s view that soft power is another international rivalry at which it is at an 




Nye (2012:4) has argued that “China is weak in its soft power”. However, critics have 
pointed out the limitations to Nye’s western definition of soft power (Wekesa, 2016). 
Kurlantzick (2008) argues that Nye’s definition excluded investment, aid and formal 
diplomacy and thus proposes a broader idea of soft power that implies all elements 
outside of the military realm. Chinese intellectuals have undertaken to redefine and 
expand the normative and western definition of soft power. “Chinese soft power is 
compatible with Confucianism and related to Chinese cultural values, such as the 
place of morality in leadership, standards of benevolence and mind over force” 
(Wekesa, 2016:136). Chinese academia goes as far as distinguishing American soft 
power, referred to it as “hegemonic assimilation and cultural imperialism,” from 
Chinese soft power, which they view as “non-aggressive but generically reflexive and 
benign” (Li & Rønning, 2013:103).  
Before we consider the role of the media in generating soft power, it is important to 
further explore what the literature reveals about this concept, particularly the criticism 
of soft power and its limitations.  
Critiques or limitations of soft power  
A range of criticism against the “charm offensive” concept has emerged. As 
mentioned above, Shi (2013) believes the “charm offensive” launched by Chinese 
media has inevitably evoked doubts, challenges and criticism across the world. He 
therefore argues for a “charm defensive” which allows China to “maintain her 
position as a respectful and respectable role model for developing countries” (Shi, 
2013:33) by countering criticism portrayed by the western and African media through 
providing its own positive representations of China. Shi views China’s activities in 
Africa’s media terrain as less of an active strategy to extend its power, and more of a 
response to existing stereotypes to win hearts and minds.  
The concept of soft power has also been criticised for its limitations. According to 
Nye (2004), some fail to see attraction as power. He argues, however, that exerting 
attraction on others often does allow you to get what you want. Other sceptics object 
to using the term “soft power” in international politics because governments are not in 
full control of the attraction. Nye refers to the USA. for example: “[M]uch of 
American soft power has been produced by Hollywood, Harvard, Microsoft, and 




not disprove its existence” (Nye, 2004:17). He adds that soft power is difficult to 
wield precisely because some of its resources are outside of government control. 
Accordingly, another limit of soft power is its primary focus on government and 
official structures and lack of impact on civil society; this, while civil society groups 
have proven their own agency by standing up to Chinese businesses and interests in 
Africa on an independent basis (Rønning, forthcoming). In South Africa, a focus on 
“soft power” as underpinning high-level, elite interests may distract from the 
informal, everyday interactions between South Africans and Chinese migrants, which 
might be more influential than formal policy in shaping public views of China’s 
involvement on the continent. Perceptions of Chinese goods as inferior (Fong Kong 
goods), of Chinese migrants stealing African jobs, and outrage at the illegal trade in 
rhino horns in which China is a key market, could more substantially influence 
China’s image in South Africa (Alden & Wu, 2014:25, 27). 
The audience, and the socio-political context in which it operates, is crucial to the 
success of soft power. It firmly relies on “receivers recognising and accepting that 
another political actor possesses power that may be used over or against them” 
(Wasserman, 2016:21). Nye’s concept of American soft power differs from that of 
China’s, which is less concerned with its attraction among the broader public than 
with impacting the opinions of government and business elites (Zhang, 2016). China’s 
focus on elites is important for audience research, as its media engagement seems to 
follow more of a two-step flow model, from elites to the masses via policy-making, 
than the bottom-up consumption of media in everyday life (Wasserman, 2016). Most 
of the current approaches to soft power focus on the actor exercising soft power and 
the instruments used. Rawnsley (2016) believes that there is a need for soft power 
research to focus more closely on China’s targets. Regarding the significance of 
audiences, the social media space could also make or break China’s soft power 
ambitions on the African continent. (Zhang, Wasserman & Mano, 2016).  
Is economic power soft? 
Soft power is relational and communicative. Chinese soft power includes an 
economic dimension that western models neglect, as they include economic resources 
in the realm of hard power. Yet China has played an increasingly influential role in 




having lifted 500 million people out of poverty, and having reached its MDGs. In 
showcasing its economic strength, China is telling the world that the China model for 
development (Beijing Consensus), works (Zhang, 2016). Notably, Nye placed 
economics in the hard power plane, and culture on the soft power plane (Wekesa, 
2016). This leads back to the debate on the distinction between hard and soft power. 
Distinguishing between the two is often not clear-cut; for example, when it comes to a 
country’s military involvement in humanitarian assistance. According to Rawnsley 
(2016:24), “the distinction between hard and soft power lies not with the instruments 
deployed but in the motivation for engagement in the label attached to such activities 
by the audience/target/recipient”.  
Zhang (2016) views Chinese engagement in Africa as soft power with Chinese 
characteristics, in which economic power plays an especially important persuasive 
role. Jijun (2016) echoes this sentiment, pointing to the crucial role concessional loans 
for major construction projects play in China’s image-building strategy toward 
African countries. China has also aimed to be perceived as a responsible country – in 
which case its aid to African countries could be a significant strategy. Through aid, 
China is showing international solidarity through development, and generally offering 
assistance without strings attached, which has made its aid popular in some African 
countries. However, China’s involvement in international aid requires mass media 
and public engagement, if it wants its soft power to gain traction, both domestically 
and internationally (Tan-Mullins, 2016). China thus offers economic power in the 
form of development assistance, grants, and loans to Africa to win hearts and minds, 
and has already made great progress among African elites.  
Beyond the dual-thinking of hard and soft power, Li (2009) has argued for the benefit 
of analysing the soft use of power. He calls for “seeing soft power within the lens of 
how a state uses its capability instead of focusing on the resources of power, as in the 
instrumentalist approach” (Li, 2009:7). Thus, Li calls for a focus on how culture, 
values and institutions are instruments of soft power, which are used against the 
backdrop of a target’s local context, as well as the motivations and interests of China. 
Additionally, Rawnsley (2016) encourages more focused studies on local and global 
discourses about soft power, rather than a pure instrumentalist approach. He notes that 
“the simple descriptor soft power fails to capture the nuances of each type of 




The motivations behind China’s soft power efforts then raise the question whether 
soft power is benign. Its aims are often unstated, unknown, and therefore, 
uncommunicated. Zeleza (2008), after all, noted that China, despite its trade and 
humanitarian assistance, was in the “business of business” on the African continent. 
Soft power has had ties to cultural imperialism, as well as propaganda (for which it 
has been viewed as a euphemism), which means, to some receivers, it could seem 
anything but benevolent. “In fact, soft power can be more insidious than hard power 
precisely because it can be embedded and hiding within cultural products and aims to 
influence both thought and behaviour” (Rawnsley, 2016:25). It is important to 
recognise that soft power was never intended as a liberal alternative to hard power, 
but rather a valuable addition to the statecraft toolbox that can be deployed in specific 
circumstances and with specific goals in mind (Rawnsley, 2016).   
Kurlantzick points to China’s soft power tools – particularly its public diplomacy and 
its growing aid and trade – that have helped China develop significant influence, 
especially in developing countries. A form of this soft power is the establishment of 
relations abroad through what French (2014:4) refers to as a “modern-day barter 
system” in which nations pay for infrastructure, such as railroads, highways and 
airports, by supplying minerals to China in long-term contracts. Support for this type 
of global trade can also be established through the use of a variety of soft power 
efforts including cultural exchange, media use and education.  
 
3. Soft power and public diplomacy 
When discussing China’s soft power, it is also important to look at its public 
diplomacy. Public diplomacy is generally a state-controlled strategy to reach the 
public of its target countries, and is used as a tool to wield soft power. China has been 
paying more attention to its public diplomacy and how it can cultivate favourability 
among foreign publics (Wang, 2008). According to Nye (2008), public diplomacy is 
thus an instrument used by the Chinese government to attract an audience beyond 
only the governments of other countries. This kind of diplomacy focuses on bringing 
about understanding for China’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well 
as its national goals and current policies. Public diplomacy is used by states, 




advance interests and values (Wang, 2006; Chang & Lin, 2014; Gregory, 2008; 
Gilboa, 2000). According to Eytan Gilboa (2000), public diplomacy has also been 
used as a euphemism for “propaganda” or “international public relations” (Gilboa, 
2000:290). Yet, public diplomacy transcends traditional diplomacy of engagement 
with diplomats and foreign correspondents by influencing public attitudes through 
strategies such as intercultural communications.  
Public diplomacy has recently been developed into a tool to influence issues relating 
to governance, economic growth, democracy, the distribution of goods and services, 
and other pressures or opportunities. It aims to attract publics through a variety of 
strategies including broadcasting, films, books, magazines, artists, festivals, 
exhibitions, overseas advertising, international public relations campaigns, and 
cultural and educational exchanges (Nye, 2008; Chang & Lin, 2014; Wang, 2006; 
Gilboa, 2000).  
On a broader diplomatic spectrum, China has been rebuilding its humanitarian cause, 
expanding economic diplomacy, and promoting Africa in China, to cultivate cultural 
and citizen diplomacy. Following the French model, China has learned how to exert 
an influence over Africa through cultural penetration (Li, 2009). Additionally, China 
has been using educational exchanges, encouraging African students to study in China 
on Chinese scholarships. Besides degree courses, frequent short-term training 
programmes and seminars remain an essential part of the so-called experience 
exchange (Li, 2006).  
The media has also increasingly played a role in promoting public diplomacy. 
Therefore, as will be discussed in more detail below, China’s media presence in 
Africa has increased in recent years. Xinhua News Agency, for example, now has 
more than 20 branches accompanying its African headquarters in Nairobi, and 
employs 60 journalists and 400 local staff. Every month Xinhua’s headquarters 
dispatch a large quantity of news releases, including around 1 800 pieces of news in 
English, 2 000 in French, 2 200 pictures and 150 video clips. Media are primary 
sources of information for most people obtaining news about global affairs (Semetko, 
2011). In forming opinions about foreign countries and international affairs, people 
often rely on news or media information, because of a lack of real-world experience 




Leaders of state and non-state actors use the media as a standard instrument for 
communication and negotiation (Gilboa, 2000:303). International relations and 
foreign policy are influenced by public opinion, which, in turn, may be influenced by 
information in the media. Mass media are a useful diplomatic tool to bypass the 
powerful elites and target the mass public directly. There is a consensus that “the 
media have transformed diplomacy”, but, according to Gilboa, the question whether 
the media have functioned primarily as an autonomous actor of influence or as a 
sophisticated tool in the hands of officials remains (Gilboa, 2000:303). 
What sets public diplomacy apart from the general propaganda that has formerly been 
used, is credibility. National credibility allows the instruments of public diplomacy to 
translate cultural resources into the soft power of attraction. Credibility is the “crucial 
resource” and “an important source of soft power” (Nye, 2008:100). Political 
struggles occur over the preservation of, and damage to, credibility, indicating the 
power of a nation-state’s reputation in the current world order. Governments compete 
for credibility with a broad range of entities including other governments, news 
media, corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), intergovernmental 
organisations, and networks of scientific communities.  
Similarly, Zhang (2016) argues that, regardless of the sophistication of a country’s 
public diplomacy strategy, it requires support from its policies. China uses a state-
centred approach of public diplomacy, and the state-owned media outlets struggle to 
spread China’s soft power through public diplomacy, precisely because of its close 
ties to the government. “It will be difficult for China to win the hearts and minds of 
foreign viewers unless it deals effectively with issues of credibility and government 
control” (Zhang, 2016:68). People still tend to perceive communication by a foreign 
government as political propaganda. This could, in turn, undermine a country's 
reputation for credibility, and is thus counterproductive as public diplomacy. “Public 
diplomacy that degenerates into propaganda not only fails to convince, but can 
undercut soft power” (Nye, 2008:108).  
Unlike the concept of public diplomacy, propaganda in modern usage generally 
carries a negative connotation that implies governmental interventions to indoctrinate 
foreign audiences. Chang & Lin (2014) found that, since the 1980s, researchers have 




indicating “a conceptual and epistemological shift from the idea of international 
propaganda to public diplomacy” (Chang & Lin, 2014:456). China’s efforts to redress 
the so-called China threat without blatant propaganda might have increased, but one 
of the obstacles Chinese public diplomacy might face is that “as long as political 
dissidents are arrested and detained for their political ideas … no public diplomacy 
will be able to change China’s image as a country where human rights are violated” 
(d’Hooghe, 2005:102). 
When talking about people as targets, it is important to differentiate between public 
diplomacy, conventional or new, and soft power. Conventional public diplomacy is 
government-sponsored programmes, such as cultural exchanges, television and radio 
programmes and movies, intended to inform or influence public opinion in other 
countries. New public diplomacy extends beyond the operations of government to the 
activities of the private sector and of the larger society and culture, in order to better 
influence the attitudes and behaviours of others. The public remains the target. While 
soft power and public diplomacy share similarities in terms of actors, soft power is 
more comprehensive in that it aims to enhance its charm at both the elite and public 
levels (Zhang, Wasserman & Mano, 2016).  
It is therefore crucial to research China’s soft power impact on both elite and public 
audiences. This will require China’s public diplomacy and soft power efforts to be 
higher up on the academic agenda (Hartig, 2012). Existing research in public 
diplomacy suffers from several weaknesses, including limited research on public 
diplomacy programmes and activities of countries other than the United States 
(Gilboa, 2008).  
 
4. Soft power and the media 
Soft power represents the ability to affect others through “the co-optive means of 
framing the agenda,” illustrating the role that the media can play in wielding soft 
power (Rawnsley, 2016:22). One of China’s official soft power instruments, FOCAC, 
has identified the media as a priority in building bilateral ties. In particular, FOCAC 
aims to facilitate knowledge of respective cultures, and counter the western bias in the 




The intention of China’s media strategy is summarised by Li Changchun, the CPP’s 
Propaganda Chief: “Enhancing our communication capacity domestically and 
internationally has a direct bearing on our nation’s international influence and 
position, has a direct bearing on the raising of our nation’s cultural soft power, and a 
direct bearing on the function and role of our nation’s media within the international 
public opinion structure” (Zhang, 2016:7). The Chinese media serve as two major 
functions: to endorse and defend the Chinese presence in Africa, and to launch the 
charm offensive in promoting a China model (Jijun, 2016). 
Chinese state-owned media in Africa aim to further strengthen the understanding 
between China and the African continent, and to provide an alternative yet authentic 
view of China in Africa. These media produce their own content for African 
consumption, which ultimately hopes to invalidate western media’s overly critical and 
biased reporting on China (Yanqui & Matingwina, 2016). To fulfil this goal, several 
state-owned Chinese media houses have established offices on the continent, 
especially in Kenya and South Africa.  
These media include the Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television (CCTV), 
China Radio International (CRI) and China Daily – aka the ‘Big Four’ official media 
outlets. These media practice self-censorship informed by domestic censorship 
guidelines, which include weekly directives from government on what to publish or 
not (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). Xinhua, the world’s largest news agency, 
has developed the most outlets of any Chinese or western news agency on the 
continent. It strategically placed its Africa Regional Bureau in Nairobi, and, in 2008, 
launched its China African News Service, and, in 2011, its mobile news services 
(Zhang, 2016).  
In 2006, CRI launched its first overseas station, and in 2012, the English-language 
paper China Daily launched its Africa Weekly edition. Chinese telecommunication 
companies Sagem, Huawei and ZTE also became more active in Africa around this 
time, providing both equipment and network construction. These telecoms provide 
low-priced products, and ultimately, low-interest loans. 
In 2012, the CCTV Africa hub in Nairobi was established, and launched its flagship 
show, Africa Live. Shortly thereafter, its mobile TV application, I Love Africa, was 




global audiences, but, to some extent, also to CCTV’s management in Beijing. It was 
a component of a bold, multi-billion dollar strategy to improve China’s image abroad, 
which Li Changchun legitimised through his visit to Nairobi in 2011. Within a few 
months, CCTV employed more than 100 staff, of whom around 70 were African and 
40 Chinese, including journalists, producers, editors, correspondents, technicians, as 
well as journalists working for the CCTV service in Chinese (Gagliardone, 2013).  
In 2017, CCTV News rebranded to the China Global Television Network (CGTN), a 
new international media organisation to integrate resources and to adapt to the trend 
of media convergence. CGTN is a multi-language and multi-platform media grouping 
consisting of six TV channels, a video content provider and a digital media division. 
CGTN aims to strengthen China’s global reporting ability and communication skills 
to provide viewers with better services, including an expansion of its mobile 
platforms and exploration of media convergence (Wang, 2016).  
CCTV has showcased that it has vast resources allocated by the Chinese government, 
to spend on running CCTV, including employing correspondents, while other 
traditional media outlets are struggling for survival in the digital media age. This 
suggests the operation is not necessarily aimed at profit, but rather influence. The 
abundance of resources also means that editorially, CCTV can include a greater 
variety of stories, as well as deploy journalists to conduct interviews in the field. This 
gives journalists a sense of opportunity, a realisation they are offered resources they 
could not find elsewhere (Wasserman, Mano & Zhang, 2016). 
However, as these resources go hand-in-hand with Chinese government ownership, 
CCTV is challenged with the suspicions about its independence and its intentions. 
Wasserman, Mano and Zhang (2016) found that CCTV Africa journalists and editors 
appear to be aware of this challenge and have accordingly tried to reduce references 
to China in their broadcasting. The researchers argue that China’s ultimate success in 
persuasion will be influenced by whether its coverage remains merely an instrument 
to improve the Chinese image abroad, or whether it also gives way to African and 
global audiences’ African news interests. “The media is a resource that helps produce 
soft power, but when it becomes a credible source of information, when it is a 




Despite China’s media industry undergoing an extensive process of marketisation, the 
state remains a crucial actor in Chinese media and communications, especially in its 
media for overseas audiences. This is evident from the fact that the industry falls 
under the Propaganda Department of the CCP. Government funding also ensures 
readership and audience, these media organisations purchase space in African 
newspapers to increase the amount of news-sharing. CCTV, for example, exchanges 
news programmes with local media organisations, such as ZBC in Zimbabwe, and 
Africa Live is broadcast in prime-time slots on Kenyan stations.  
But who is ultimately watching Chinese programmes and with what effect remains an 
open question (Thussu, 2016). A study by Tan-Mullins (2016) found that Kenyan 
journalists are not aware of or watching the main Chinese media operating in Kenya, 
and do not view CCTV as a credible source of international news. Additionally, 
Xinhua, despite being one of the largest news agencies in the world in terms of 
personnel, news bureaus, and daily output, has been disregarded by communication 
scholars as a mere source of propaganda (Madrid-Morales, 2016). Tan-Mullins argues 
that CCTV still has a long way to go before it shrugs off the negative connotation 
associated with Chinese government-owned operations in Kenya’s public sphere. She 
believes that China has managed to convince African elites, which were its initial 
intended audience, with their “Dump the West, look East” mantra (Tan-Mullins, 
2016:133), but still faces challenges to unseat the seemingly entrenched preference 
for western media products. These media tend to have a lack of knowledge of Chinese 
or Chinese society (Kupe, 2013).  
Compared to Reuters and Agence France Presse (AFP), Chinese media are not seen as 
similarly credible or legitimate, and therefore struggle to compete. Western media’s 
influence on African media public and media organisations is still strong – partly due 
to historical reasons, language dominance and also because the ‘quality’ of Chinese 
news is considered lacking. China, however, has implemented a range of strategies 
not to simply have its voice heard, but to have the power of discourse, that differs 
from the west, particularly regarding the focus on the concept of human rights (Zhao, 
2011). China is aware of its lack of experience as a global power, and of its lack of 
discourse that is strong enough to counter the hegemony of a US-led western 
discourse. With its own platform in Nairobi, China is not only able to deflect western 




Returning the gaze of the west  
Africa Live on CCTV aims to present an image of Africa that differs from what is 
projected by the west. This strategy enables Chinese media to brand the west as the 
“other” for harming Africa’s image. Africa Live provides Africans with a platform to 
tell their stories, instead of using traditional propaganda. Local participants have in 
this way publically stated that “the democracy practised in their own countries is far 
superior to that of the West” (Zhang, 2013:98). 
China is thus promoting its positive image by being highly critical of the west. As 
such, it highlights western intervention and interference in African affairs, 
condemning international structures for targeting and harming the image of Africa, 
leading to disinvestment in Africa: it accuses the international system of not 
respecting the African Union in dealing with African affairs; it challenges the World 
Bank for awarding the presidency to an American rather than an African, which raises 
questions of merit and transparency in the selection process; and it questions US 
intentions in sending troops to a relatively stable Uganda, where oil has been found. 
These programmes aim to educate the African public that the west is to blame for 
many of Africa’s failures. 
While Chinese media have largely been defending the China-Africa friendship, it has 
expressed opposition to hostility and criticism, especially from the USA. A variety of 
Chinese media, such as the Global Times newspaper, have been fighting accusations 
of exploitation, neo-colonialism and fighting western hegemony, as seen in the story 
headlined “African media bashing Western countries for cautioning Africans against 
China” (Global Times, 10 November 2009). The stories briefly recap the accusation, 
and then refute it, either directly from China or via an authoritative African source. 
Also fighting western demonisation, the market-driven press interviews similar 
official sources, with headlines such as “Countering Western demonization with 
communications that African people understand” (South Metropolitan Daily, 21 
November 2011). Chinese state media have followed through on their condemnation 
of the west and the west-led international system, but have failed to be clear on the 
alternative discourse China can offer to the world. Thus far its challenge to the west 
has culminated in the concept of an international system that allows the co-existence 




Chinese media’s expansion on the African continent is part of a broader international 
media presence in Africa. Both internationally and in African media, there have been 
critical reports on China in Africa, and China has had a clear need to establish 
alternative images of its African presence (Rønning, 2016). However, a limitation to 
fully mobilising soft power strategies using the media is that perceptions do not 
entirely rely on the media, as people base their views on more than media reports. 
Additionally, Zeleza cautions that China’s “hardnosed superpower ambitions” should 
not be concealed under the veil of “soft power” (Zeleza, 2008:181). He claims that 
“the Chinese are not coming to Africa for philanthropy but to make money. They are 
in the business of business” (Zeleza, 2008:181).  
When scholars discuss whether or not China’s role in media and telecommunications 
in Africa has replaced the west, they often ignore African agency. Africa's own self-
interest is also at stake (Zeleza, 2008). Regarding media approaches, CCTV Africa 
could offer an opportunity for African journalists to learn alternative traditions to gain 
new perspectives on the debate on freedom vs control. It is still unclear, however, 
whose partner CCTV is going to be in the long run. Furthermore, African journalism 
could also impact Chinese journalists, which could eventually shape their reporting at 
home. 
Whatever the future holds regarding China’s engagement on the African continent, 
Africa needs to know more about China, coordinate its policies on China, and define 
its interests and relations with China realistically. Knowing more about China 
includes studying its languages, history, and culture. Both African and Chinese 
governments and businesses in Africa and China need to be transparent and held 
accountable in this relationship (Zeleza, 2008).  
Wekesa (2016) argues that Africa is, however. more the receiver than the giver of aid, 
indicating a power dynamic, where China is on a mission to achieve her goals through 
soft power, rather than vice versa. Yet, although Beijing is powerful, its power over 
its image is limited by other points of power. In some cases, China is unable to reap 
benefits from its soft power efforts because of local challenges to its image.  
 




China’s recent direct investment in South African media is considered a new phase in 
the expansion of its media across Africa. Besides expansion of Chinese state-owned 
media in South Africa, China has also invested in local media. For example, 
StarTimes has invested in the subscription satellite television network, StarSat 
(formerly TopTV), a more affordable rival to Naspers-owned DSTV. StarTimes is 
held in high esteem by the CCP, which is why it conducts inspections of its 
subsidiaries in Africa by high-level party officials, including Li Changchun. 
More controversially, CCTV, backed by the China-Africa Development Fund, is 
believed to be behind the Chinese consortium that provided 20 per cent of the 
financing for the Sekunjalo Group to purchase Independent News and Media, one of 
SA’s most powerful media groups (previously owned by the Irish magnate Tony 
O’Reilly) (Harber, 2013; Wasserman, 2016). Sekunjalo is headed by Iqbal Survé, who 
has close ties with the African National Congress (ANC) government (which could 
limit editors and journalists in the group’s criticism of government). Surve fired Alide 
Dasnois, editor of the Cape Times, for allegedly running a front-page story about 
corruption involving a Sekunjalo subsidiary (Evans, 2014). From the South African 
side, as mentioned above, Naspers owns 34% of TenCent, the owner of Chinese 
social media platforms, such as QQ and Weibo.  
China’s heightened interest in African and South African media has raised questions 
about its intentions (Wasserman, 2016). Compared to Chinese investments in other 
African nations’ media, South Africa has not been a major recipient of China’s media 
assistance, partly because its media industry is relatively robust (Wu, 2012). Some 
scholars argue that increased Chinese involvement in South African media could 
threaten the freedom of the press (Harber, 2013). The Chinese government does not 
support free and critical media, but rather has a firm hand on its media to serve its 
national interests. South Africa illustrates great concern for its freedom of expression 
human right through the vigorous opposition to the Protection of State Information 
Bill by the civil society organisation Right 2 Know. In South Africa, serious doubts 
are cast on any media content that is perceived as propagandistic, which again points 
to the credibility Chinese media need to be successful as instruments of soft power. 
Zhu (2012:7) remarked that “perceived openness and transparency are keys to 




China’s attempts to use media to exert soft power in South Africa will continue to be 
met with considerable challenges. The local media’s reception and portrayal of 
China’s relationship with South Africa could be influenced by their stance towards the 
South African government. Currently, the default stance towards the ANC-led 
government falls between scepticism and antagonism (Wasserman, 2016). The 
Chinese government’s comfortable relationship with the ANC could instil distrust and 
criticism towards China among the South African media. Generally, Chinese media 
may compete with local media outlets that may provide contesting frames of China’s 
involvement in Africa. China hopes that its media platforms, Xinhua in particular, 
could serve as a source of news for local news organisations, which raises the chances 
that the Chinese perspective might be considered. 
To some extent, South African journalists have started referring to Chinese media 
sources, and some reports showed that exposure to these media helped journalists 
form a nuanced understanding of China’s involvement on the continent and of South 
Africa’s place in the BRICS group (Wasserman, 2016). In his study, Wasserman 
(2016) found that South African journalists did not use Chinese media as a source and 
only very rarely consumed it. The lack of trust in the credibility of Chinese media is 
caused partly by their government ownership and control. The South African media 
operate within the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, transparent 
routines, and editorial independence, whereas the Chinese media culture is controlled 
by the state. South African media believe in their ability to withstand political 
pressures, either from their own government or influences from Chinese-owned 
media. Resistance will be strong if there is pressure from Chinese investors to try and 
shape the media sphere (Wasserman, 2016:18). 
There is a lot to be understood about how South African media have responded to 
China’s media push on the continent. As Wasserman (2016) asks:  
[D]o South African journalists use Chinese media as a source, and if so, where do 
Chinese media rank on the ‘hierarchy of influences’ (Reese, 2001) on South 
African news agendas? To what extent do the South African media amplify 





Wasserman’s study found that journalists recognised the importance of providing 
coverage regarding this geopolitical alignment. In general, the journalists 
characterised the South Africa-China relationship as “important,” “strong,” and 
largely based on economic concerns. The journalists also remarked on the unevenness 
of the relationship and China’s dominance of it. The study found that South African 
journalists are critical of the media’s ability to portray the complexities and nuances 
of the growing China-Africa relationship, and generally offer “shallow” 
representations based on second-hand sources (Wasserman, 2016:14). Most South 
African media do not have correspondents in China, which can increase xenophobic 
attitudes. South African journalists also believe it is not their responsibility to create a 
better image of China. These journalists tend to focus on political and economic 
stories or big news events (the “upstairs” dimensions) instead of ongoing coverage on 
China (the “downstairs” dimensions).  
Though China’s media expansion is comparable with channels such as Russia Today, 
Al-Jazeera, the BBC, and CNN, it is seen as less transparent and open than these 
media channels. South African journalists are unclear about Chinese intentions on the 
continent, and have therefore practised cautious reporting. Wasserman (2016) 
summarises the major challenges to Chinese soft power exercised through the media 
as follows: Journalists do not access Chinese media or see no reason to prefer Chinese 
media to western sources.  
Chinese media are not used as a source because they are not seen as credible, 
particularly because of state control. Relying on Chinese media sources could 
compromise journalistic integrity. The “China story” does not satisfy news values, 
and Chinese media do not yet seem able to present their content such that it is 
either credible or appealing to local journalists (Wasserman, 2016:15). 
There are huge limitations to South African media improving its coverage on China. 
Few South African journalists have been to China, and use sources from international 
media organisations. Resources thus limit journalists’ coverage, and with the current 
financial crunch of local media, newspapers tend to focus more on local stories than 
on providing nuanced coverage of China. Wasserman’s study also found that Chinese 




Chinese TV channel and news agency mean to the man in a shack in Gugulethu? 
Probably not much,” (Wasserman, 2016:13).  
Chinese media face the challenge of acting both as a mouthpiece for the CCP, and 
trying to be trusted news sources. The Chinese government has prioritised the need to 
reach out to civil society; however, the absence of alternative and independent media 
inside China means the nation has a lack of experience in engaging with civil society. 
China tries to influence its image abroad not only by directly offering an alternative 
image of itself, but also by encouraging new ways of looking at Africa, especially via 
its CCTV Africa programmes (Maweu, 2016). This kind of “positive” or 
“constructive” reporting is a key characteristic of Chinese state-owned media’s 
coverage. “Positive reporting encourages an emphasis on collective achievements 
while overlooking divisive issues” (Wasserman, Mano & Zhang, 2016:26).  
Moeller (1999) has noted that western media tend to represent issues as either positive 
or negative, leaving few grey areas to fulfil its “watchdog role”. Traditional media 
approaches have been proven to have a negative emotional impact on both audiences 
and media practitioners. The Chinese media have thus adopted a different role that is 
more in line with what Wasserman and Berger call “development communication”, 
which is associated with “positive psychology” (Yanqui & Matingwina, 2016:96). 
Such “constructive journalism” differs from watchdog journalism as it focuses the 
public attention on a problem only long enough to stimulate discourse, which would 
lead to a solution. It does not avoid controversial issues but is solutions-based, which 
means reporters aim to understand and engage with both problems and possible 
solutions. 
Constructive journalism conducts reporting in a way that empowers people, and 
information can be used constructively to tackle the problems that plague society 
while remaining accurate and critical. Central to this journalistic approach is to follow 
up on solutions – how a problem was solved, by whom, and what lessons can be 
learned from that. That also means evoking a positive emotion by celebrating the 
achievement in order to inspire others in a similar situation. This approach has a 





Some of the criticism that constructive journalism has received, is its lack of 
objectivity. In watchdog journalism, communication workers are expected to provide 
only facts, without a deliberate focus on solutions. Constructive journalism’s nation-
building approach could lend itself to slanted and biased reporting. In other words, 
this type of reporting can result in an institutional and uncritical style, which 
marginalises alternative narratives (Lull, 1991; Zhang, 2006). While CCTV’s positive 
reporting may be interpreted as a new way of telling African stories and a way of 
promoting a Chinese form of journalism, it might not appeal to African audiences, 
which, in large part, consist of politically and critically interested publics. African 
media, in general, align more with the western style of watchdog journalism.  
Most literature assumes that negative news or watchdog journalism is good, while 
positive news is viewed as propaganda. However, Christians et. al. (2009) explains 
that western media itself makes use of several styles of journalism, that sometimes 
contain elements of positive journalism. Chinese journalism should thus be 
distinguished from propaganda or just positive reporting. Western media, in 
particular, voice scepticism of Chinese media because of its government-ownership. 
Accordingly, concerns about whether China will be critical of the operations of 
Chinese companies in Africa have been expressed.  
Finally, Africa Live might have declared its goal to put forward a new narrative, yet 
seems to fall back on more traditional frames. Zhang’s (2013) sample of CCTV’s 
Africa coverage between January and April 2012 found the majority of African news 
items to be either neutral or negative. Instead only news stories involving Chinese 
actors were given a positive spin.  
The abovementioned positive reporting approach has been promoted by China in 
Africa in many forms, which includes training. China sends the message that Africans 
have also fallen victim to the western-dominated international media’s negative 
publicity. Such portrayal has focused on stereotypes of Africa as the hopeless 
continent, plagued by ongoing conflicts, HIV and poverty. China therefore 
encourages Africa to correct these perceptions, using African voices.  
To assist with African nations’ efforts to improve their image, training sessions and 
workshops for African journalists and editors have emerged under the FOCAC 




media in China, attended by about 300 African media officials from 48 African 
countries (Shinn & Eisenman 2012:209). These workshops were also held in the hope 
that African information officers and journalists would cover China stories at home 
from a better understanding of China’s perspective because few African journalists 
have first-hand information regarding China’s policies (Jijun, 2016).  
China has come to better understand that its image in the foreign media partly stems 
from the bias of reporters covering China. Thus, training of journalists could help 
reduce the prejudice of media professionals. However, CCTV Africa’s editors and 
journalists are aware that portraying China in a positive light will not necessarily 
improve African audiences’ attitudes towards the country. Instead, quality reporting 
on African issues could more likely begin to erode some negative perceptions on 
China.  
Ultimately, for China to influence communication workers in Africa, it has to address 
current perceptions on its lack of freedom of expression. Zhang (2013) found that 
Chinese state-owned news media are perceived to have little to no criticism of 
government. It has also blocked Facebook and Twitter in China, which is challenging 
to CCTV Africa’s social media strategy – which has become crucial in recent years. 
CCTV Africa currently benefits from the online presence of individual staff members 
who have been informing the social media sphere, and, in this way, they have 
developed a more interactive relationship with its audience. 
Against this theoretical backdrop, this study looks at the media’s role in China’s 
pursuit of wielding soft power, specifically in the midst of China being perceived as 






Chapter Four: Methodology  
 
This study investigates Chinese and South African media coverage of a central source 
of China’s perceived notoriety on the African continent: its human rights and 
sustainable development impact. The study also explores the potential influences of 
both Chinese and South African journalists’ coverage of China. The methodology of 
this study consists of two parts. Firstly, to answer RQ1 and RQ3 about the 
representation of China’s sustainable development and human rights record in South 
African and English-language Chinese media, a framing analysis will be conducted. 
Secondly, to answer RQ2 and RQ4 on journalists’ and media practitioners’ attitudes 
towards China’s sustainable development and human rights reputation, semi-
structured interviews will be conducted. 
 
1. Framing analysis 
To answer the questions about South African and English-language Chinese media 
representations of China’s human rights and sustainable development records, a 
qualitative framing analysis will be conducted of the coverage of China in both South 
African and English-language Chinese print media.  
Frames can craft audience perceptions through the way a news story is presented. 
Media framing research is interested in, among other things, how media represent a 
specific topic, how they selectively pay attention to specific issues at the expense of 
others, the various factors and actors that may influence this selection process, as well 
as the potential impact news framing may have on audience perceptions and actions. 
Robert Entman’s simple definition of framing refers to “selecting and highlighting 
some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote 
a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Entman, 2004:5). He claims 
that news cannot escape framing, particularly regarding foreign affairs: “Few people 
have direct data, and most information originates in media reports even if it is passed 
along selectively (or framed) in conversation with informants who themselves saw the 




A large and growing body of literature in framing studies has emerged in recent years 
from a range of disciplines and academic domains (Entman 1993; D’Angelo, 2002; 
Giles & Shaw, 2009; Sieff, 2003). However, most researchers express a concern 
about the lack of clear conceptualisations and operationalisations of framing (Entman, 
1993; Scheufele, 1999; Borah, 2011). Entman (1993) has been one of the most 
influential scholars researching framing, and his explanation of the framing process 
has been widely quoted:  
 
Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, 
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described 
(Entman, 1993:52). 
 
He argues that most framing research is based on inconsistent meanings of its core 
terms: “frame”, “framework”, and “framing”. These inconsistencies in the use of 
terminology in the research have inhibited “a general statement of framing theory” 
and have led to a “fractured paradigm” of framing research (Entman 1993:51). 
According to Entman, the standardised use of a framing theory could help media 
scholars “accomplish their mission to bring together insights and theories that would 
otherwise remain scattered in other disciplines” (Entman, 1993:51). On the contrary, 
Paul D’Angelo has responded by claiming “that there is not, nor should there be, a 
single paradigm of framing” (D’Angelo, 2002:870). He believes instead that 
“theoretical and paradigmatic diversity has led to a comprehensive view of the 
framing process, not fragmented finding in isolated research agendas.” (D’Angelo, 
2002:870).  
Because framing analysis is currently one of the most widely used methodologies in 
communication studies, many authors have called for some form of continuity – 
conceptually and methodologically (D’Angelo, 2002; Entman, 1991, 1993; Gamson 
& Modigliani, 1989; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Scheufele, 1999, 2004). The major 
premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of 




considerations. Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular 
conceptualisation of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue. From a socio-
cognitive perspective, framing is viewed as placing information in a unique context so 
that certain elements of the issue get a greater allocation of an individual's cognitive 
resources (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).  
Framing research has often been grouped with agenda setting and priming (Borah, 
2011). According to Entman (2004), priming refers to “activating an association 
between an item highlighted in the framed text and an audience’s thinking about a 
related concept.” Thus framing “is to prime values differentially, establishing the 
salience of the one or the other” (Entman, 2004:27). In the past, some researchers had 
considered framing to be the second dimension to agenda-setting. However, “agenda 
setting occurs due to the frequency with which an issue is discussed in the mass 
media. It does not involve how the issue is treated in the media and is not relevant to 
framing” (Borah, 2011:250).  
Severin and Tankard (2001) have explored the concept of framing’s usefulness for 
studying certain aspects of the media coverage of news. To some extent, the concept 
of media framing at the time of its emergence presented a new paradigm to replace 
the older paradigm of studying the “objectivity and bias” of the media. Where bias 
studies have focused on whether a news article is positive, negative or neutral towards 
someone or something, framing considers the subtler ways in which the presentation 
of news contributes to the social construction of reality.  
Media framing often manifests itself by the choice of some keywords, key phrases 
and images that reinforce a particular representation of the reality and a specific 
emotion towards it, and the omission of other elements that could suggest a different 
perspective or trigger a different sentiment. It can also be observed in the journalist’s 
selection of whom to quote, what to quote and where this quotation is located in the 
story. 
Framing is both a macrolevel and a microlevel construct (Scheufele, 1999). This does 
not mean, of course, that most journalists try to spin a story or deceive their 
audiences. As mentioned earlier, the production of a news article is influenced by 




influences shape the way journalists make decisions when framing news articles. 
Shoemaker and Reese’s “hierarchy of influences” model locates the individual 
journalist within a web of organisational and ideological constraints. Reese (2001) 
argues that this media sociology approach addresses the structural context of 
journalism, and more broadly focuses on how media power functions rather than 
narrowly focusing on text production. The importance of the sociology of media 
concept will be discussed further below, in the section on this study’s in-depth 
interviews method.  
The media sociology approach is ultimately concerned with the forces that set the 
media’s agenda (Reese, 1991). Framing, therefore, can be a necessary tool to reduce 
the complexity of an issue, given the constraints of their respective media related to 
news holes and airtime (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Entman states that “frames 
have at least four locations in the communication process: the communicator, the text, 
the receiver, and the culture” (Entman, 2004:52). This study will look closely at the 
location of, firstly, the text, and then the communicator. 
What are frames? 
In its most basic form a frame can be defined as “a central organizing idea for news 
content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of 
selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (Severin & Tankard, 2001). 
According to Entman (2004), scholars have used the term “frame” interchangeably 
with such closely related concepts as schemas, heuristics, scripts or even news topics. 
Entman’s study applies the term “schemas” (as defined by Goffman below) to 
interpretive processes that occur in the human mind, and applies frames to texts. 
“What differentiates a frame from a script most clearly is this: framing directly 
promotes interpretations that lead to evaluations” (Entman, 2004:26). Furthermore, 
frames are often reduced to story topics; however, a frame does much more 
“organizing” and “structuring” work (Reese, 2007). De Vreese (2004) also makes an 
important distinction between frames and what he refers to as the core news facts – 
the answers to the questions of where, when and who.  
Within sociology, Erving Goffman coined the term “frame analysis” to describe the 




1974:11). Goffman’s aim was to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of 
understanding available in our society for making sense of events and to analyse the 
context of frames. Goffman presents framing as a day-to-day sense-making technique; 
individuals create and rely on frames to make sense of daily interactions, conventional 
rituals, discourse, advertising, and other elements of social experience. He calls 
frames the “schemata of interpretation”, a framework that helps in making an 
otherwise meaningless succession of events into something meaningful (Goffman, 
1974:21). Thus, the dual nature of framing research—frames in the news versus 
frames in the individuals’ minds—is evident (Borah, 2011). 
Gitlin (1980) defines frames as devices that facilitate how journalists organise 
enormous amounts of information and package them effectively for their audiences. 
He sees frames as “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of 
selection, emphasis, and exclusion”, organising the information for both the 
journalists and their audiences (Gitlin, (1980:7).  
 
Gamson has developed the concept even further. To Gamson, a frame is a “central 
organizing idea or story line that provides meaning” (Gamson & Modigliani, 
1987:143). Gamson and his fellow researchers describe frames as underlying 
structures or organising principles that hold together and give coherence to a diverse 
array of symbols and idea elements. He explains that frames, similar to the idea of a 
“picture frame” or “window frame,” define boundaries and direct our attention to 
what events and texts are relevant for our understanding of an issue or situation 
(Creed, Langstraat & Scully, 2002:36). 
For Gamson, a frame is a necessary property of a text—where text is broadly 
conceived to include discourses, patterned behavior, and systems of meaning, policy 
logics, constitutional principles, and deep cultural narratives. All texts, regardless of 
how clear or abstruse they may be, are comprised of packages of integrated idea 
elements held together by some unifying central concept, called a frame (Creed, 
Langstraat & Scully, 2002:37). 
Through selection and salience, framing therefore promotes a particular definition, 
interpretation, and evaluation of a topic. Frames are more than topics, they include 




certain elements of the issue get more of the individual’s attention. Framing considers 
the subtler ways in which the presentation of news contributes to the social 
construction of reality, through considering discourses, patterned behavior, and 
systems of meaning, policy logics, constitutional principles, and deep cultural 
narratives. This study therefore examines the frames that have been created through 
the use of language by South African and Chinese media to represent China’s 
sustainable development and human rights. 
Framing devices 
The motivation to study the framing of China’s sustainable development and human 
rights is strong. “Choices of words and their organization into news stories are not 
trivial matters. They hold great power in setting the context for debate, defining issues 
under consideration, summoning a variety of mental representations, and providing 
the basic tools to discuss the issues at hand” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993:70). Because of its 
underlying attention to context, standing, and power, Creed, Langstraat & Scully 
(2002) argue that frame analysis provides us with a linked theory and methodology to 
guide communication research. Using frame analysis as a methodology generally 
refers to the identification of “framing devices” that carry the themes of news stories 
(D’Angelo, 2002; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). “The content of the frame 
amalgamates textual items (words and images) with the contextual treatment that they 
receive from framing devices” (D’Angelo, 2002:881). He adds that beyond 
pinpointing words and images, researchers must identify news values, discursive 
structures, and content formats that integrate the words and images of a news story 
into a frame.  
The literature reveals a wide spectrum of framing devices that go beyond identifying 
headlines, introductions, pull-quotes and lead-outs (Severin & Tankard, 2001). 
According to Pan and Kosicki, the signifying elements of a theme (which they use as 
a synonym for a frame) are that they are structurally located lexical choices of codes 
constructed by following certain shared rules and conventions. “They function as 
framing devices because they are recognizable and thus can be experienced, can be 
conceptualized into concrete elements of a discourse, can be arranged or manipulated 
by newsmakers, and can be communicated in the ‘transportation’ sense of 




through the news media. Pan and Kosicki classify frames in the media discourse into 
four categories, representing four structural dimensions of news discourse: syntactical 
structure, script structure, thematic structure, and rhetorical structure. 
In a syntactical structure, which is quite a common structure for news framing, 
framing is achieved by drawing attention to the article via a strong headline, and 
through use of the “inverted pyramid style” to focus on pertinent issues. News stories 
have traditionally used the inverted pyramid convention to emphasize the most 
important facts in a newspaper story first (Bolsen, 2011). Thematic structures, which 
are used less frequently, suggest hypotheses or causal sequences. “These structures 
pull together events, sources and propositions that flow together with logical 
reasoning to form a hypothesis or state a causal relationship. Rather than following 
the inverted pyramid style, thematic structures attempt to capture human interest or 
resonate with a particular theme through the use of vivid imagery” (Bolsen, 
2011:264). 
Gamson and Modigliani have popularised framing devices such as metaphors, 
exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and visual images (Borah, 2011). The five 
elements – metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, visual images – 
“accentuate a given frame, making it noteworthy, vivid, memorable, and easily 
communicated.” The three reasoning devices – roots, consequences, and appeals to 
principle – “serve as argumentative devices to justify or support the preferred 
perspective of the speaker or frame sponsor” (Creed, Langstraat & Scully, 2002:40). 
Entman (2004) suggests that “defining effects or conditions as problematic, 
identifying causes, conveying a moral judgment and endorsing remedies or 
improvements” as the functions of framing devices (Entman, 2004:5). Furthermore, 
Fairhurst and Sarr (1996) recommend identifying metaphors, stories (myths and 
legends), traditions (rituals and ceremonies), slogans and jargon, artifacts (symbolic 
value), contrast and spin as framing devices.  
Other framing elements include the attribution of statements to particular individuals; 
calling on experts or officials to increase the validity of a claim or trivialisation 
through the use of comments made by less desirable individuals (Bolsen, 2011). 
Finally, researchers Giles and Shaw (2009) from the field of psychology have 




reader identification, narrative form, analysis of language categories, and 
generalization. Scheufele (1999) refers to the dynamics of how speakers, such as 
media outlets, choose among frames to communicate issues to the public as frame 
building. 
Framing analysis can be quantitative (Tankard, 2001) and qualitative (Maher, 2001). 
This study employs a qualitative framing analysis. In qualitative analyses, categories 
are not predefined, which allows categories to emerge as the researcher becomes 
immersed in the data. According to D’Angelo (2002), framing researchers are 
encouraged to use all available unitising techniques found in content analysis and 
discourse analysis in order to defend the existence of different framing devices and 
provide the means to detect frames in news. Gamson and Lasch (1983) provide a 
basic and accessible way of approaching frame analysis by laying out a “signature 
matrix” for sorting the specific idea elements of a set of texts into categories (Gamson 
& Lasch, 1983:399). 
Carragee and Roefs expressed some criticism towards content analysis framing 
studies “that do not differentiate between story topics, themes, or frames”, and “the 
reduction of frames to story topics, attributes, or issue positions” (Carragee & Roefs, 
2004:218). This ignores how frames construct particular meanings. Successive 
authors have attempted to refine the analytic procedures necessary for the 
identification and interpretation of frames (Giles & Shaw, 2009). These authors have 
aimed to develop framing methodology further, but have also been critiqued for the 
number of important aspects of the process that are in danger of being lost through 
further reduction of media material to basic, usually countable, elements. While some 
researchers may be concerned with increased precision in measurement, other authors 
have urged against further reductionism, arguing that simple attempts to quantify 
media material are in danger of missing the subtleties of framing (Van Gorp, 2007). 
Even though the majority of studies have used a quantitative framing analysis, Hope 
(2010) views frame analysis as a type of discourse analysis. He states that frame 
analysis as a discourse analysis is “principally concerned with dissecting how an issue 
is defined and problematised, and the effect that this has on the broader discussion of 
the issue. He argues that frame analysis shares many of the building blocks of critical 




as socially shaped) but returns to its linguistic and textual roots to some extent. It 
shares the same principles of the construction of meaning, and the potential for 
discourse to affect action beyond the text (Entman, 1993; Gonos, 1977), while 
retaining its methodological roots in detailed linguistic analysis.  
This study takes a qualitative approach to framing analysis. Qualitative research is a 
situated activity that locates the observer in the world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical 
materials – case study; personal experience; introspection; life story; interview; 
artifacts; cultural texts and productions; and observational, historical, interactional, 
and visual texts that describe routine and problematic moments in individuals’ lives. 
“The word qualitative implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on 
processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured (if 
measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency” (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005:10). Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of 
reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the 
situational constraints that shape inquiry. They seek answers to questions that stress 
how social experience is created and given meaning.  
Qualitative research often brings up the question of objectivity in the research. 
According to Hope (2010), “the problem of subjectivity is dealt with through the 
theoretical grounding – that is, it is perfectly acceptable for the study to be seen as 
subjective as there is no such thing as ‘objective’.” Creed, Langstraat and Scully 
(2002), add that, “although respected scholars in this genre have at times employed 
such quantitative measures of reliability, these are often the wrong questions for this 
endeavor, because they assume that the project is one of converging on an objectively 
right answer” (Creed, Langstraat & Scully, 2002:48). They argue, however, that there 
are better or worse frame analyses in terms of how richly researchers capture a frame; 
how deeply they peel away the layers; whether they initially move to present frames 
in ways that are recognisable and ring true to sponsors of the frame; whether the 
researchers’ interrogation of their own perspective informs the analysis and gives 
readers further understanding and assurance that the analysis is not packing an 
ideology covertly; and, sometimes, whether the frame analysis is a gateway to 




some framing analyses is that the coding and interpretation processes themselves are 
subject to the same selective bias as the media material they are examining. Taking a 
social constructionist position, it is argued that all research involves some element of 
framing (Giles & Shaw, 2009).  
As mentioned above, this study will firstly focus on media content – specifically, how 
South African and English-language Chinese media cover China’s sustainable 
development and human rights. It aims to take a descriptive approach using a 
qualitative framing analysis. The study aims to identify frames that emerge from a 
close reading of South African and English-language Chinese media reports. These 
frames will be analysed through the identification of framing devices, with the 
guidance of the several suggested devices mentioned above, including the 
identification of the speaker, the structure of the news article and other linguistic 
techniques, such as word choice. Similar to the critical discourse analysis approach, 
this study will focus on the meaning, organisation and social construction of frames. 
 
2. In-depth interviews as triangulation 
Whilst the framing analysis can provide an understanding of South African and 
Chinese media’s coverage of China’s human rights and sustainable development role 
on the African continent, it is limited to studying media content. To explore 
journalists’ and media workers’ perceptions, triangulation is achieved by including 
qualitative, in-depth interviews with both South African and Chinese journalists, 
about what and how their media coverage is potentially influenced within their 
newsrooms. As mentioned in chapter three, using Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy 
of influences (2001) as a guide, these interviews address influences on media 
workers’ news coverage from an individual, routine, organisational, extra-media and 
ideological perspective.  
Hierarchy of influences 
The influences on journalists’ coverage of China could shape how China’s sustainable 
development and human rights record is framed in the media. Reese (2001) views 
journalists and journalism as important research topics because of the “crucial role it 




journalism’s implicit normative and theoretical assumptions, Shoemaker and Reese’s 
hierarchy of influences model locates the individual journalist within a web of 
organisational and ideological constraints. Reese (2001) argues that this media 
sociology approach addresses the structural context of journalism, and thus more 
broadly focuses on how media power functions. The media sociology approach is thus 
concerned with the forces that set the media’s agenda (Reese, 1991).  
The hierarchy of influences’ levels range from the most micro to the most macro: 
individual, routines, organisational, extra-media, and ideological, with each 
successive level viewed as subsuming the one before. These forces are thus 
anticipated to operate simultaneously at different levels of strength in any shaping of 
media content. Higher-level factors are assumed to exert more influence than lower-
level ones. The job of the researcher, then, has been to discover under which 
conditions different levels become more influential and how the different levels 
interact with each other (Fahmy & Johnson, 2012).  
At the individual level, the attitudes, training and background of the communication 
worker are viewed as influential. “Whether political or academic, power to shape 
news is held by the individual journalist, and journalist studies attribute great 
importance to individual characteristics in shaping the news product” (Reese, 
2001:180). The interview sample, in this study, purposeful sampling of South African 
beat journalists and Chinese English-language journalists, is therefore significant at 
this level, as it describes the characteristics of the group. Reese (2001) expresses 
criticism, however, to the implicit normative assumption that journalists should be 
socially representative, reflecting the beliefs of the public.  
Next, the routines level of analysis considers the constraining influences of 
journalistic work practices. This level looks at the “ongoing, structured, deeply 
naturalized rules, norms, procedures that are embedded in media work” (Reese, 
2001:180). Individuals have to operate within a multitude of limits prescribed by 
technology, time, space and norms. The routine structuring of the newsgathering task, 
which is more visible to researchers, provides important clues about how the media 
have chosen to deploy their resources, which also tells us something about the rest of 




The organisational level considers the larger social structure and how power is 
exercised within it. It focuses on the requirements that give rise to the 
abovementioned routines and how individuals are obliged to relate to others within 
that larger normative structure. Keeping in mind the economic goals of the media, the 
organisational level reveals a great deal about editorial policy, and particularly what is 
considered news, the importance allocated to different stories, and how they are 
framed. This level encompasses several layers that needs exploring, including the 
news organisation itself, the larger company to which it belongs, and the still more 
complex ownership network of firms (media and otherwise) that may subsume both. 
At this level, power is often not overtly expressed. For example, a journalist 
anticipates organisational boundaries, the power of which is manifested in self-
censorship by its members. 
At the extra-media level, influences originating primarily from outside the media 
organisation are analysed. The power to shape media content is thus shared with a 
variety of institutions in society, including the government, advertisers, public 
relations, influential news sources, interest groups, and even other media 
organisations. In many ways the media are subordinated to elite interests in the larger 
system. At this level, then, we assume that the media operate in structured 
relationships with other institutions that function to shape media content. 
According to Reese (2001), each of the preceding levels subsumes the one before, 
suggesting that the ultimate level should be an ideological perspective. This level 
considers how media symbolic content is connected to larger social interests, how 
meaning is constructed in the service of power. The ideological analysis considers 
how a system of meanings and common-sense understandings is made to appear 
natural through the structured relationship of the media to society. 
The hierarchy of influences model is useful in considering effects of various factors 
on the press agenda as well as on how issues are “framed” (Reese, 2001:186). 
Unfortunately media sociology has tended to focus more on British and US national 
media systems, hence Reese’s encouragement to do comparative research across 
geographical or historically defined systems. Benefits to comparative research include 
making researchers cautious to assume that the meaning of basic concepts is self-




Not all studies have supported this hierarchy-of-influences model, however. For 
instance, when Weaver et al. (2007) explored the factors influencing support for 
controversial reporting practices, they found that personal perceptions of the 
journalistic role had the strongest impact. Those who viewed the media’s role as 
getting the news out quickly and accurately did not support controversial reporting 
practices, but those who believed journalists have to interpret or to analyse problems 
and to investigate government claims, as well as those who perceived reporters as 
adversaries of the government and businesses, supported the use of controversial 
practices. 
Furthermore, in Fahmy and Johnson’s (2012) study on embedded journalists’ 
performance in Iraq, it was found that the difference between the higher-level factors 
and lower-level factors of influences were not that significant. Journalism routines 
were perceived as most influential before and during the occupation of Iraq, while the 
cultural (ideological and extra-media influences) level was the second most important 
factor after the ground war (Fahmy & Johnson, 2012:35). Among the individual-level 
factors influencing perceptions of embedded reporting were professional roles or 
norms and journalistic routine roles (embeds did not go anywhere without the military 
and the relationships with the unit they embedded with). Fahmy and Johnson 
concluded that their study could not measure what effect each level of influence had 
on embedded journalists’ performance because results were limited to just what 
embeds perceived as factors that had the greatest effect on their work. Therefore, 
journalists might have underestimated the influence of extra-media and cultural forces 
on attitudes toward censorship and press freedom. “The hierarchy-of-influences 
model, thus, may be better suited to explain journalists’ values and how they cover 
news events rather than their assessment of performance” (Fahmy & Johnson, 
2012:37). 
Interviews: A qualitative approach 
According to Bonnie Brennen (2013), qualitative research is “interdisciplinary, 
interpretive and theoretical in nature” (Brennen, 2013:4). Qualitative researchers 
study alternative notions of knowledge, and their understanding is that reality is 




meanings and values created in media. These researchers attempt to understand the 
many relationships that exist within media and society.  
One qualitative method that is practical and valuable to media research is conducting 
interviews. Interviewing has been used as a research method for centuries. Jensen 
(2012) states that “common sense suggests that the best way to find out what the 
people think about something is to ask them” (Jensen, 2012:270). Because people 
speak from a variety of different backgrounds and perspectives, interviewing is a 
valuable method that may be used to gather a large amount of important information. 
According to Brennen, “simply stated, an interview is a focused, purposeful 
conversation between two or more people” (Brennen, 2013:27). On a more complex 
level, Lindlof (1995) states that “interview talk is the rhetoric of socially situated 
speakers, not an objective report of thoughts, feelings, or things out in the world” 
(Lindlof, 1995:165). 
Qualitative interviewing strives to understand the meanings of information, opinions 
and interests in each respondent’s life. Through face-to-face, in-depth guided 
conversations using semi-structured interview questions, qualitative interviewing 
explores respondents’ feelings, emotions, experiences and values within their deeply 
nuanced lives. Qualitative interviewing is influenced by a constructivist theoretical 
orientation, which considers reality to be socially constructed; from this perspective, 
respondents are seen as important meaning-makers rather than passive conduits for 
retrieving information. Interviews are valuable because they “provide opportunities 
for interviewees to respond in their own terms, through their own linguistic structures. 
Verbal answers can be longer and more complex, and so more rich and interesting 
than written answers” (Bertrand & Hughes, 2005:74). Being able to ask a person 
follow-up questions helps to clarify what has been observed.  
According to Bertrand and Hughes (2005), the interviewing process is never 
completely objective, as the interviewer is always implicated in the interview 
situation. Interviewing involves the exercise of a power differential, usually with the 
interviewee less powerful than the interviewer. “At the very least, the interviewer 
assumes the right to ask questions and to expect answers from the interviewee” 
(Bertrand & Hughes, 2005:165). Jensen (2012) echoes this idea, saying that “all 




interviewer and interviewee” (Jensen, 2012:270). With this, Jensen suggests that 
statements from individual interviews are not simply representations of what people 
think. “Interview discourses are, in a strong sense of the word, ‘data’. They become 
sources of information through analysis, and of meaning through interpretation” 
(Jensen, 2012:270).  
Interviews for this study were conducted in English by a fluent English speaker. 
Though the Chinese journalists interviewed are employed by English-language 
Chinese media, their command of the English language varied. Language might have 
created a power differential, that the author tried to counter through the use of 
technology such as iPhone language applications to ensure that both the questions and 
answers were both understood and interpreted accurately. The author often read the 
Chinese journalists’ responses back to them until they agreed to the correct 
understanding of their responses. Furthermore, because most Chinese journalists 
requested anonymity, this also created a power differential, which the author tried to 
counter by removing all identifiable information in the results and analysis of this 
study. 
Data collection 
Data collection for framing analysis 
For RQ1, the news articles will be sampled using the purposive sampling technique, 
which in this case refers to selecting articles covering China’s human rights and 
sustainable development over a six month period from South African mainstream 
media news sources, the Mail & Guardian, Cape Times and News 24. All of the 
above-mentioned publications are privately owned, and therefore not state news 
outlets. News 24 offers timely, instant news updates to one of the largest online media 
audiences in South Africa, while Cape Times is a South African daily that offers day-
to-day news. News 24 is owned by Naspers, which acquired a 47 percent interest in 
May 2001 in Tencent Holding Limited, the operator of what has become the leading 
instant messaging platform in China (called QQ). The Cape Times is currently owned 
by Sekunjalo, of which 20% is owned by the Chinese company Interacom, and uses 
copy from the Chinese newswire Xinhua. The weekly Mail & Guardian provides 
more in-depth, investigative and critical coverage on political and economic issues. 




articles written with both informative as well as investigative objectives. These 
publications are chosen because their combination reflects the South African media 
discourse.  
The keywords to define my sample will include environment, sustainability, climate 
change, rhino poaching, logging, labour, labour rights, human rights, and others. 
These key words represent the human rights and sustainable development aspects that 
I will focus on in this study. After entering the above-mentioned key words, all 
articles related to how China is framed or perceived in terms of sustainable 
development and human rights will be selected and entered into a data collection 
document. A close reading of every selected article will then be conducted to get an 
idea of the overall themes that emerge – more specifically, to determine the frames 
that have been constructed for China. Once the frames have been identified, the close 
reading will be continued to determine how China has been framed in a specific way, 
particularly looking at the connotations of language use, article structure and who has 
been interviewed or quoted. The analysis will then include a setting out of all these 
elements, as well as their relevance to the political and social South African context. 
The relevant articles will be selected within a six month period, starting August 2015, 
up to February 2016. This is a sufficient period to generate an adequate sample of 
articles, and to account for potential events or occurrences that would lead to heavy 
coverage of one news element. News24 will be accessed online, while Cape Times 
and Mail & Guardian will be accessed via hard copy.  
To answer RQ2 on Chinese media coverage, another qualitative framing analysis of 
English-language Chinese media will be conducted, using a similar process to the one 
mentioned above. This time Chinese news sources will be sampled through the 
purposive sampling technique. News bulletins from China Central Television Africa 
(CCTV Africa) and Xinhua News will be sampled and analysed because of these two 
media companies’ increased presence and expansion on the African continent 
(Kurlantzick, 2008). For CCTV, its Africa Live platform will be accessed to watch its 
daily bulletins and then the relevant news bulletins transcribed and kept in a data 
document. The transcriptions will then be analysed according to their related human 
rights and sustainable development features to determine which frames emerge. The 
news articles on Xinhua will be selected through a key word search on its general 




change, rhino poaching, logging, labour, labour rights, human rights, and others. Both 
of these samples will also be sourced for a six-month period, from August 2015 to 
February 2016, during which these sites will be consulted on a regular basis. Both 
Xinhua and Africa Live will be accessed online, as the latter is available on CCTV’s 
website, which provides all the daily news broadcasts of Africa Live in its archives.  
Xinhua and CCTV were selected because they form part of China’s media Going Out 
strategy, and are English-language Chinese media, that can provide data on how 
China is portrayed to its African audiences in particular. This comparability of the 
two media is complicated by the fact that Xinhua is a global online news platform, 
while Africa Live provides television news broadcasts aimed specifically at African 
audiences. This sampling method thus excludes daily and weekly mainstream print 
media that are included in the South African sample, and instead includes television 
broadcasts, which are generally use a different format than print media.  
Data collection for interviews 
This study will be making use of semi-structured interviews to answer RQ 3 and 4. 
Semi-structured interviews are usually based on a pre-established set of questions that 
are asked to all respondents, but they allow for greater flexibility than structured 
interviews (Brennen, 2013). “Interviewers may vary the order of the questions and 
may also ask follow-up questions to delve more deeply into some of the topics or 
issues addressed, or to clarify answers given by the respondent” (Brennen, 2013:28). 
Thus, acting as moderator, the interviewer guides the interview, but permits the 
various aspects of the subject to arise naturally, in any order, and can allow 
digressions if they seem likely to be productive. 
The semi-structured interviews of this study will focus on a set of key questions that 
relate to Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of influences. Essentially, this 
hierarchy builds on the concept of news as socially constructed, and thus influenced 
by a journalist’s beliefs, deadlines, media ownership, editors’ involvement and the 
ideology of society, among other things. According to Jensen (2012), news is a social 
artifact; it is the result of particular work practices, and is socially patterned. “The 
production of news takes place in institutional and organizational settings in which 




technology, and market considerations influence how news reporters work and, 
therefore, the kinds of stories they produce” (Jensen, 2012:87). 
 
These questions will therefore revolve around the individual, routine, organisational, 
extra-media and ideological influences on news content. The first set of interview 
questions is designed to be broad, to get to know the interviewee and making them 
comfortable with the interview setting. These questions aim to provide background on 
the interviewee, and therefore will focus on their work experience, educational 
background and current position at their media institution. This is followed by a set of 
questions regarding the interviewee’s knowledge of, or interest in, the China-Africa 
relationship. These questions are meant not only to determine the interviewee’s 
personal relationship with the topic, but also how or why it is placed on the news 
agenda. Furthermore, these questions, particularly relating to their knowledge of soft 
power, will indicate how aware the journalists are of the significance of promoting 
China’s favourable image on the African continent.  
The next set of questions will focus more closely on the actual topics of news 
coverage, and particularly on the interviewee’s attitudes towards China and 
sustainable development, and China and human rights. The journalists’ personal 
attitudes towards China and issues such as climate change or poaching can contribute 
to the knowledge of what influences their news coverage. The final set of questions 
will relate more specifically to Reese’s hierarchy of influences. These questions focus 
on daily routines in the media environment, media ownership, relationship with the 
editor, relationship with sources such as government and NGOs and also issues such 
as target audiences. Such questions aim to shed light on the influences on the 
journalists’ coverage by taking into account that news is a product of particular work 
practices, and explores how these practices operate. 
This study uses interviews with the aim of getting personal insights into South 
African and Chinese journalists’ lives to determine what possible influences could 
guide them in their media coverage. The South African journalists were selected 
because they had either been environmental or human rights beat journalists at either 
the Mail and Guardian, or any Media24 or Independent-owned publications. The 
Chinese journalists were selected because of their employment at the English-




a portal into the personal thoughts and lives of journalists, and therefore could 
contribute to the knowledge of what shapes their coverage. This study aims to do so 
through semi-structured interviews, to allow for more flexibility in the interviewee’s 
responses, but also to provide clear guidance through a list of structured, open-ended 
questions. Through these interviews this study hopes to find insights into the 
workings of the journalistic process and how this process possibly influences media 
coverage of China’s human rights and sustainable development reputation. Ultimately 
these interviews hope to inform the question of whether China’s soft power efforts are 






CHAPTER FIVE: SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIA 
COVERAGE OF CHINA’S SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
This chapter presents a qualitative framing analysis of South African media coverage 
of China’s sustainable development and human rights impact on the African 
continent. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the study explores six months of coverage from 
Mail & Guardian, the Cape Times and News24. A framing analysis was conducted 
via manual and online searches to find any articles featuring China alongside other 
keywords, such as poaching, climate change, environment, and sustainable 
development.  
Regarding sustainable development, five dominant frames emerged: China as key 
perpetrator in poaching; superpowers China and USA; China’s role in climate change 
mitigation: COP coverage; China as source of green technologies, renewable energy 
and green investments; China as polluted country itself; and India and China compete 
for Africa. Regarding human rights, four themes were present: disasters in China; 
Chinese neocolonialism; the pragmatism of human rights neglect; improvement of 
China’s human rights. This chapter presents a deeper insight into each of these 
frames. 
 
1. Sustainable Development 
 
1.1. China as key perpetrator in poaching 
A framing analysis of six months of South African mainstream media coverage found 
poaching to be a dominant frame in the media sampled. China features prominently in 
the poaching issue, often portrayed as “the world’s largest ivory market” (News24, 
2015/08/04). The homogenising concept of “China” as an entity is generally used, 




motivation for “China” to acquire these poached goods is reported to be because of its 
medicinal properties, art and jewellery (News24, 2015/08/06).  
Poaching is a highly emotional issue in South Africa, and an increase particularly in 
rhino poaching has increased the topic’s salience on the news agenda. A large number 
of articles highlight an urgency to address poaching. News24 (2015/08/06) reports, 
“poaching of rhino and elephants in African countries has reached critical levels in 
recent years, leading to the possibility of extinction.” The words “critical” and 
“extinction” illustrate a desperate situation.  
Poaching is also a controversial topic in South Africa – it implicates complex issues 
of race and class against a historical background of race and class segregation. On-
the-ground poachers have often been portrayed as black, poor and of rural 
backgrounds. The World Wildlife Fund has referred to poachers as “often poor 
locals”, and The Guardian described poachers as “usually poor and black” (WWF, 
2018; Smith, 2015). On the other hand, concerned anti-poaching activists have been 
depicted as middle class and white. This leaves a gap in the representation of the 
syndicates responsible for leading and managing poaching efforts. The media often 
place the Chinese in that gap.  
China is not only portrayed as leading poaching syndicates, but has also often been 
blamed for creating a demand for illegal trafficked goods. One news article states: 
“The bad news is that, like drugs, if there is someone willing to buy, there is always 
someone willing to sell. That’s why policymakers and conservation groups are now 
targeting the demand side of the problem. A crucial component of that strategy is 
gaining a deeper understanding of who buys ivory and why” (News24, 2015/09/03). 
However, surprisingly few articles thoroughly detailed the who and why of the illegal 
wildlife market. South African media coverage has not been supportive of creating a 
nuanced understanding of China’s involvement in illegal wildlife trade. In this 
sample, there were no in-depth articles or individual profiles of Chinese individuals 
involved in poaching. Accordingly, few articles distinguish Chinese involvement as 
consumers, middlemen or poachers. Instead, coverage presents the concept of 
“China” in its entirety as poaching perpetrator, regardless of specific identities, 




However, some articles complicate the essentialist concept of China as poaching 
perpetrator. The article, Kenya: Race against time to save the last white rhino 
(News24, 2015/09/22), explains how poaching forms part of organised crime. Instead 
of “China” the article specifies involvement of “criminal syndicates, primarily in 
Vietnam and China”. By firstly mentioning “syndicates”, and only then focusing on 
their potential nationality, the article distinguishes between Chinese nationals who are 
involved in organised crime, and those who are not. This distinction gives visibility to 
Chinese citizens not involved in poaching or actively opposed to it. Nuanced 
representation of Chinese individuals is crucial to China’s reputation. The word 
“criminal” links poaching with crime in China, therefore challenging the notion that 
the Chinese government accepts, or is indifferent to, poaching. The Chinese 
government’s efforts to curb poaching are important to their representation as a leader 
in sustainable development. Researcher Yu-Shan Wu stated in the Mail & Guardian 
that, in the “contentious issue” of illegal wildlife trade, “perceptions are important” 
(M&G, 2015/12/04). 
Yang Fen Clang, a 66-year old Chinese businesswoman, was reportedly caught with 
19 tons of ivory in Tanzania (News24, 2015/10/9). According to US non-profit 
organisation, Elephant Action League, her arrest is “the news that we all have been 
waiting for, for years”. “We” and “all” suggest that the NGO represents a broader 
view than its own, implying a large group of supporters of poaching justice have been 
awaiting Yang’s arrest. The article withholds the name or any other identifiers of the 
accused, referring to her only as “a Chinese woman” – emphasising her citizenship. 
Furthermore, Yang’s gender is highlighted, perhaps because men are stereotypically 
involved in poaching, making this contradiction newsworthy. She was dubbed the 
“Chinese Ivory Queen” (News24, 2015/10/13). The four articles in the sample 
covering Yang had an antagonistic tone, but one provided China with the opportunity 
to defend their commitment to conservation: “In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Hua Chunying…said she did not know about it but asserted that China 
is committed to protecting endangered wildlife” (News24, 2015/10/13). 
China’s anti-poaching efforts 
A sub-dominant frame of China’s anti-poaching efforts emerged in one article. The 




Switzerland, where Chinese poachers were reportedly detained, “they face Swiss fines 
of up to $41 000 each”, but according to News24, they “would likely face more 
severe punishments in China” (News24, 2015/08/04). This quote highlights strict 
punishments in Chinese legislation aimed at preventing poaching, which challenges 
stereotypical criticism of the government’s indifference to poaching. Highlighting the 
Chinese government’s strict anti-poaching policies contributes to the sub-dominant 
frame that “China” in its entirety is not a poaching perpetrator; in fact its government 
strongly opposes poaching.  
While South African media reports that China’s financial contributions attempt to 
curb poaching, the USA received negative coverage for allowing poaching in South 
Africa. This difference in frames illustrates the significance of poaching coverage in 
wielding soft power. China’s anti-poaching support in Zimbabwe was reported during 
a flood of articles covering Cecil the lion, killed by an American dentist. One article 
(News24, 2015/08/06) suggests a correlation between the negative publicity of the 
USA following Cecil’s death, and an increase in Chinese conservation efforts. “The 
funding came after Zimbabwe's wildlife became the focus of global attention with the 
killing of Cecil the lion, a well-known animal among tourists, by an American trophy 
hunter.” This correlation implies a strategy by China to appear heroic, contributing to 
conservation, at a time when the US is framed as villainous for its involvement in 
Cecil’s death – a symbolic destruction of Zimbabwe’s wildlife.  
The symbolism around Cecil suggests the destruction of conservation in Africa, 
specifically by the USA. This frame is strengthened by the article’s explicit reference 
to the poacher’s nationality, “an American trophy hunter” without using his name or 
other identifiers. He is described only as a “trophy hunter,” which is negatively 
associated with greed, destruction and a disregard for wildlife. South African media 
portrays this incident in the familiar good-bad duality frame. While the USA is 
posited as bad, China is automatically associated with good, for responding to the 
incident. Contradictory to the stereotypical depiction of China as environmentally 
destructive, the country is portrayed in this article as a conservationist, offering 
support and allegiance to Africa.  
The article emphasises Chinese-Zimbabwean cooperation. According to Chinese 




to co-operate with our Zimbabwe friends to ensure that all of Africa's wildlife can 
survive.” China is one of the few influential countries that have remained “friends” 
with Zimbabwe, despite criticism of bad governance and authoritarianism by current 
president Robert Mugabe (News24, 2015/08/06). In this article, Zimbabwe is 
portrayed as a victim of poaching, while the USA is not only depicted as one of the 
countries that has abandoned ties with Zimbabwe, but has also exploited its wildlife 
through the poaching of Cecil. Alternatively, China is portrayed as the loyal ally 
showing solidarity with the victim, Zimbabwe. China recently awarded Robert 
Mugabe the Confucius Peace Prize (China’s version of the Nobel Peace Prize) 
because of his “strong support of Pan-Africanism and African independence” 
(News24, 2015/10/22). 
Despite the article from News24 highlighting the anti-poaching stance, South African 
media tend to portray China as key poaching perpetrator, even in articles about its 
curbing efforts. One article leads with “China, which is accused of fuelling the trade 
in elephant ivory and rhino horn, on Thursday pledged equipment worth $2m to curb 
poaching in Zimbabwe.” Though the article’s focus is on China’s anti-poaching 
assistance, the introductory sentence redirects the focus to China’s position as key 
poaching perpetrator. Thus media coverage of China’s anti-poaching efforts indirectly 
puts China’s poaching reputation in the spotlight. 
China is even portrayed as key poaching perpetrator in articles on other countries’ 
poaching activities. The article 700kg rhino horns, elephant tusks seized in Vietnam 
(News24, 2015/08/14) focuses on the seizure of tusks in Vietnam, yet emphasises 
China: “but the trade has flourished in recent years, particularly thanks to demand 
from Vietnam and China with devastating results for Africa's rhino populations”. 
Though the article provides no contextual link between Vietnam and China in this 
particular case, it does highlight China as a key market for illegal wildlife goods. 
China is implicated here in illegal activity that is “devastating” for the rhino 
population. Along with the phrase “thanks to”, the article implies that Vietnam and 
China are directly responsible for the rhino population’s decline. This emotionally 
valued language could portray China as antagonistic. Even in articles that focus on the 




Coverage on the Chinese government’s policy development on illegal wildlife trade is 
struck through with skepticism. “In fact, both China and the U.S. recently announced 
new laws that, if enacted, could limit significantly the amount of ivory in circulation” 
(News24, 2015/09/03). While China’s anti-poaching policies could “significantly” 
impact the industry, the parenthesis “if enacted” depicts a lack of faith in the 
implementation or priority of Chinese policies. The implied skepticism of the Chinese 
government’s policy implementation, portrays it as untrustworthy.  
Articles on China’s anti-poaching efforts often use information sourced from Chinese 
state news organisations. The article titled, China seizes 620 turtles, tortoises 
smuggled from Vietnam, refers to Chinese “state media” saying “the official Xinhua 
News Agency said…” Chinese media has increasingly become available to South 
Africans through its African expansion. This could have increased the availability of 
information to South African media on China’s anti-poaching efforts. If that 
information is published by South African media, it could improve China’s 
environmental reputation. However, according to Madrid-Morales and Wasserman 
(2018), South African journalists rarely use official Chinese news sources, or treat it 
as propaganda.  
Colonial stereotypes 
The South African media in the sample studied focus strongly on China’s 
multinational relationships. While the USA features alongside China in articles on 
sustainable development, the involvement of the United Kingdom is central to 
wildlife trade coverage. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2015 visit to the UK, 
Chinese state media framed the event as beneficial to a healthy China-UK 
relationship. This is illustrated by the Bangladesh Institute of International and 
Strategic Studies (BISS) Chairman Munshi Faiz Ahmad’s statement in Xinhua that 
“any indication that bilateral relations between China and Britain are getting better 
and better every day will send a positive signal to the rest of the world” (Karim, 
2015).  
Simultaneously, South African media focused on the wildlife conservation speech by 
the UK’s Prince William, delivered on a popular Chinese show called “Let’s Talk.” 




as Prince William appeals to Chinese to save elephants (News24, 2015/10/20), 
seemingly because the South African public is concerned about poaching, but also 
potentially because of South Africa’s historical relationship with Britain. Thus, 
exploring how China’s involvement in wildlife trade is framed in South African 
media, requires an examination of how the UK’s position on wildlife trafficking is 
portrayed. 
Princes Harry and William are devoted to wildlife conservation in Africa. Harry has 
joined “the war against rhino poachers” by assisting with three months of night 
patrols in South Africa’s Kruger National Park. “The fight has already proven to be a 
deadly one,” as the force had reportedly killed 300 poachers before 2015’s end 
(D’Souza, 2015). Additionally, according to a satirical piece in The Guardian, it 
occurred to Prince William “that a romantic affinity with a distant landscape could be 
elevated into a job,” and that “William appears immediately to have found a 
replacement for conventional work: protecting African wildlife.” Prince William is 
accused of “adopting a whole continent,” illustrating a neocolonial attitude by a 
patronising prince who “loves Africa. It’s where he proposed to Catherine, it’s where 
he spent his gap year and it’s where he found himself” (Bennett, 2013).  
It is therefore unsurprising that Prince William assumed responsibility to plead for 
Africa’s wildlife, especially to a Chinese audience, since “China is a major consumer 
of ivory, with demand for the tusks threatening dwindling elephant populations with 
extinction” (News24, 2015/10/20). Through emotive words such as “threatening”, 
“dwindling” and “extinction,” China is presented as responsible for apocalyptic 
consequences of Africa’s wildlife. While China is depicted as dangerous to the future 
of African wildlife, the UK, through its royal representatives, is portrayed as the 
saviour of Africa.  
The article does not discuss the implications of the British royalty’s sense of 
responsibility in approaching conservation in Africa. Firstly, it augments the idea of 
Africa’s dependency on developed countries for assistance, which might affect the 
perception of both African competency and agency. Secondly, it creates the idea of 
ownership of Africa, which creates a sense of colonial entitlement to Africa’s 
wildlife. If British royalty are perceived to be the “true owners” of Africa, then 




perceived to essentially protect its own wildlife in Africa. China is then portrayed not 
simply as a threat to African wildlife, but to the property of British royalty. The royal 
responsibility to chastise China, then also stems from a fear that Africa is not 
fulfilling its role as wildlife custodians – again questioning African competency.  
Additionally, the frame emerges of a paternalistic figure (Britain) encouraging an 
infantilised China to do better. “I am absolutely convinced that China can become a 
global leader in the protection of wildlife” (News24, 2015/10/20). William’s 
confidence, being “absolutely convinced,” reassures the audience, affirming that he is 
in control of a dangerous situation. William’s encouragement of China, through 
highlighting its potential to lead in conservation, further supports the concept of 
paternalism – he tries to push for China’s cooperation through affirmation and 
validation. This portrays China as lacking leadership to reach its conservation 
potential, and through William’s speech, western leadership is presented as a 
necessity for China to do so. This portrayal neglects mention of wildlife trafficking 
policies and campaigns China has created and participated in without input from 
western countries. 
The paternalistic frame is further cultivated through William’s perceived self-
reflexivity on his colonial legacy. “William, who is second in line to the throne, noted 
that his own ancestors had collected animal trophies, but said that the prospect of total 
extinction meant traditions had to change” (News24, 2015/10/20). William 
acknowledges western cultures’ history of trophy hunting, but aligns this history with 
past, unacceptable behaviour from an embarrassing heritage. His insight into the 
wildlife extinction crisis positions this as a “developed” attitude, while those 
perpetuating this crisis, including China, are comparatively “undeveloped”. Because 
China is perceived as lacking the understanding William has gained, he is obliged as 
protector of Africa to teach China. Now seemingly culturally superior, William is in a 
position to pressure China, illustrated by the implied necessity of the word “had” in 
“traditions had to change.” This contributes to the image of William as a paternalistic 
figure – the protector or saviour of Africa.  
Where the frame of Britain is condescending to China, this strengthens China’s 
alliance with Africa as members of “the rest” (Zakaria, 2008) – developing countries 




China’s image in two ways. Firstly, China is framed as inferior and untrustworthy, in 
contrast to a reliable Western country. Secondly, the patronising role of the UK aligns 
China with the African continent. The continuing infantilisation of China, alongside 
the patronisation of Britain, could stimulate an increasing solidarity with China by the 
“rest”, and importantly, potentially distract from China’s negative image as poaching 
perpetrator. 
The section has found that one of the dominant frames emerging in coverage of 
Chinese sustainable development in South African media is China as a key 
perpetrator in poaching. Sub-dominant frames have also emerged, acknowledging 
Chinese policy and anti-poaching efforts, but these are met with skepticism. It also 
found that China as perpetrator is juxtaposed by the UK, British royalty in particular, 
as protectors of Africa.  
1.2. Superpowers China and USA: Who leads? 
South African media coverage of Chinese sustainable development often mentions 
China and the USA together – either pitted against each other, or highlighting their 
similarities – especially as two of the biggest contributors to global carbon emissions. 
The USA is essentially portrayed as the global climate leader, pushing for cooperation 
on sustainable development from China in particular. A paternalistic attitude towards 
China, similar to the one of the UK mentioned above, emerges. However, rather than 
the infantilisation of China, the USA-China relationship tends to be framed in a more 
competitive light. 
China and the USA are often described as “top emitters” of carbon. “Top emitters 
Beijing and Washington both say their [carbon reduction] plans are ambitious. China 
plans to peak greenhouse gas emissions around 2030 while the United States aims to 
cut greenhouse emissions by 26-28% by 2025, from 2005 levels” (News24, 
2015/10/19). The publication explains to readers that China’s plan is “ambitious”, 
which, in contrast to China as top emitter, presents China’s carbon-reducing 
commitments as remarkable, and even newsworthy. The article sets a tone of 
progress, an improvement to previous approaches of the USA and China to climate 




of the Global Green Growth Institute in Seoul, commenting that “both the United 
States and China were more engaged this time” (News24, 2015/10/19). 
Most articles featuring China and the USA adopt an official US government 
perspective. Coverage of a speech by then US Secretary of State, John Kerry, affirms 
a portrayal of USA’s climate leadership. Kerry claims that “scientists are 
‘overwhelmingly unified’ in concluding that humans are contributing to global 
climate change” (News24, 2015/08/31). Countries who are not proactively responding 
to climate change are described as “irresponsible”. He adds: “Skeptics who stand in 
the way of action to respond to climate change will not be remembered kindly.” The 
words “will not be remembered kindly” comes across as threatening. This implies that 
countries not following the USA’s preferred route of “action” could have their 
legacies destroyed by the USA. China would then be pressured into following the 
USA’s lead, or risk reputation damage and soft power failure. Kerry’s comments are 
ironic, as the USA had failed to ratify any international commitments on carbon 
emissions at the time (Milman, Smith & Carrington, 2017). This coverage highlights 
the USA’s global power and influence, in particular their ability to wield their soft 
power efficiently to be able to divert attention from their own inaction on climate 
change, and still be portrayed as a climate leader.  
It is therefore crucial to the USA’s image to appear as a climate leader, to enable their 
lack of accountability to remain unquestioned. This portrayal creates space for the 
representation of a scapegoat, which has often been China. This, in turn, illustrates 
China’s unsuccessful wielding of its soft power, particularly in comparison to the US. 
Coverage of the US further distracts from its inaction, by focusing on its redemption 
of China. “China is taking the issue seriously... We've been urging other countries all 
around the world to do so” (News24, 2015/08/31). The USA’s leadership position is 
affirmed through its reassurance to the public that China is cooperating, and further 
“urging” global cooperation. The USA’s leadership is portrayed as being patronising 
towards China, confirming its cooperation on its behalf, which suggests a need for 
western leadership and supervision. The article offers no response from China to 
defend itself, or to challenge US leadership. This suggests an approval by South 




The USA’s leadership is established so firmly that a challenge by China seems 
unlikely or impossible. American leadership exudes confidence, which offers China 
only one place – as follower. Obama is quoted as saying “If we [USA] don't do it, 
nobody will. The only reason that China [is on board is] they saw we were gonna do 
it, too... When the world faces its toughest challenges, America leads the way 
forward.” (News24 2015/08/04). Not only is USA leadership reaffirmed, this suggests 
that China lacks agency in allowing the USA to determine its decision-making. It also 
suggests that the USA is the only country with the power to lead in sustainability. 
The article lauds the US with “visionary leadership” as a subheading, further reifying 
the leadership frame. Obama’s plan was “applauded by environmental groups 
including the World Wildlife Fund for Nature and the Centre for Climate and Energy 
Solutions”. These endorsements by renowned non-profit organisations award the US 
leadership with credibility. The endorsements also associate the USA with goodness 
and representative of civil society, which connotates righteousness. This could justify 
both its watchdog attitude towards China, and its self-appointed climate leadership. 
Subdominant frames have also emerged. The Cape Times (2015/08/06) reports that 
“Beijing recently announced that it was closing its four coal-fired power plants 
because its leaders recognise that dirty air is harmful to the business environment and 
public health.” This highlights China’s agency in portraying its responses to climate 
change without western leadership.  
This section found that China and the USA are often portrayed alongside each other 
in climate change coverage. The USA’s climate leadership is firmly established in the 
South African media sample studied, despite its lack of carbon-reduction 
commitments. Its ability to remain portrayed as a climate leader illustrates its soft 
power success, in contradiction to China, who becomes the climate change scapegoat, 
depicted without agency or sufficient competition to the US for leadership.  
1.3. China’s response to climate change: COP21 coverage 
Climate change coverage during the sample period mostly centred on the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) 21st Conference of 
Parties (COP21) in Paris. Many of these articles referred to China as the “world’s 




awards it more leniency to mitigate carbon emissions, compared to already developed 
nations. However, South African media challenge the clemency towards developing 
nations because of their severe environmental impact. The BRICS nations are accused 
of leaving “the world on a path toward 3.5°C of warming compared with pre-
industrial times” (News24, 2015/09/28). Among them, China’s carbon emissions are 
often singled out as critical. 
One article reports that “fundamental divisions remain over how to share out carbon-
emissions cuts between rich nations, which have polluted for longer, and emerging 
giants such as China and India powering fast-growing economies and populations” 
(News24, 2015/09/04). China is portrayed as an “emerging giant,” with “giant” either 
implying China’s large size and population, or connotating intimidation and power. 
This is evocative of danger and uncontrollability. Alongside “emerging,” which 
suggests growth and expansion, China seems increasingly dangerous and unstoppable. 
This coverage reflects a potential fear of China’s growth, which might be associated 
with accusations of China as a neocolonial force in Africa. 
Additionally, “powering” not only implies driving force, but also strength and 
success, potentially evoking admiration, especially from fellow BRICS countries and 
allies. Since reports of China’s slowing economic growth caused panic among South 
African economists in 2015 (McCurry, 2016), the words “powering” and “fast-
growing” are reassuring. Sustained economic growth presents China as both a 
powerful and also reliable South African ally. However, “fast-growing economies” 
and “population growth” somewhat associates China with carbon emissions and 
potential environmental destruction given that China’s carbon emissions are 
reportedly “still rising fast” (News24, 2015/09/28). This illustrates the tension within 
the portrayal of China’s growth as signifying either economic benefits or danger to 
sustainability.  
Some articles focus on the environmental impact of cheap, imitation products created 
in China. The Cape Times (2015/10/02) reported on a study claiming these products 
“are not good for the environment as they have significantly higher carbon emissions 
than the same products made in other countries.” Its heading, Chinese products 
accelerating climate change, directly blames China for a changing climate. The 




increasing problem. The article acknowledges the benefits of these cheaper goods to 
developing countries and boosting the world economy, but explains “all this has come 
at a substantial cost to the environment.” Cheap, fake goods from China have become 
common across the globe and are generally perceived to be below quality and 
wasteful. The word “cost” (CT, 2015/10/02) creates a sense of loss - China’s impact 
on the environment seems unable to be redeemed. 
The article attributes China’s high production emissions to the fact that “their 
manufacturing technologies are less advanced and they rely primarily on coal for 
energy.” “Less advanced” portrays China as lacking the innovative technology to 
reduce their carbon footprint. This suggests that they lack the capability, rather than 
the motivation, to reduce emissions. Ironically, South African media also frame China 
as a leader in green technology, which will be further discussed below. Scientists 
suggest that “developed countries could help reduce China’s carbon pollution by 
improving manufacturing processes in these areas” (CT, 2015/10/02). China is 
depicted as needing “help” from “developed countries,” that again contributes to the 
concept of China as less developed and therefore dependent on developed countries. 
For the most part, China’s science and innovation advancement lacks recognition in 
South African media.  
The Mail & Guardian paid more attention to the African perspective at COP21, 
focusing on African agency in the Africa-China relationship. An article titled, Africa 
seeks better deals with China (M&G, 2015/12/04), focuses on the African position at 
COP21, which is suggested to be strong, implied by the proactivity of “seeks.” The 
subtitle, “but the continent does not speak with one voice when meeting and dealing 
with the Asian giant” (M&G, 2015/12/04) emphasises African agency’s failure in 
reaching a COP21 agreement. China is again portrayed as a “giant”, but this time in 
direct relation to Africa. While China is presented as a strong and powerful force, 
Africa is portrayed as weak, predominantly because of its divisiveness. However, 
despite the portrayal of China as powerful, the article’s focus on the African 
perspective is empowering to African representation. Highlighting African agency 
implies that China’s influence on the continent is limited. The focus on African 





Another M&G article titled, Africa will burn after timid talks (M&G, 2015/11/11), 
critiques the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) negotiating bloc. BASIC 
countries are accused of stifling COP negotiations and resisting the termination of 
coal plants. They are described as wanting “to avoid responsibility for their growing 
emissions, while still getting funding from developed countries to adapt to climate 
change”. China is positioned as the leader of BASIC, who “sank COP15 in 
Copenhagen in 2009 – the last time an agreement to lower emissions was on the 
table” (M&G, 2015/11/11). The word “sank” portrays China as uncooperative, 
detrimental to the goals, and even rebellious. China is also held partly responsible for 
the failure of agreements at COP21, because of its “just politicking”. Additionally, 
China is placed in direct opposition to Europe, who is “loath” to fund BASIC 
countries’ carbon reductions, “because China and India will have access to it” (M&G, 
2015/11/11). This illustrates developed nations’ reluctance to accept China’s 
developing nation status. 
China’s climate change mitigation efforts 
During COP21, China reportedly pledged “that its emissions would peak by 2030” 
(News24, 2015/09/29). Some articles indicate enthusiasm about China’s climate 
change mitigation drive, which is evident in the subheading “China brightens 
projections”. China’s commitments seem hopeful through the word, “brightens.” The 
article describes China’s emissions peak as “a huge factor”, and carbon reduction in 
China is portrayed as crucial. While South African media displayed a lack of faith in 
China’s anti-poaching efforts, China is framed as more trustworthy and committed to 
climate mitigation and adaptation.   
Enthusiasm for China’s climate change commitment emerges in coverage that “China 
was doing more than its fair share, for instance, counting its emissions since 1950” 
(News24, 2015/10/19). The term “fair share” is used to allocate different 
responsibilities to developing and developed countries to curb their emissions. China, 
as a developing nation, is reported to be “outperforming” what is expected from them. 
China’s policies and funding are portrayed as generous, beyond what has been agreed 
upon as “fair” for developing countries. This enthusiasm diverts attention from 
China’s position as one of the world’s biggest polluters. The article’s optimism about 




groups”. The inclusion of these organisations associates China with goodness and 
representing “civil society”.  
The abovementioned USA-China relationship emerges again, but in this article China 
is lauded for its climate change efforts, in contrast to criticism of the USA for its 
inaction. The article leads with: “The United States and other rich nations are doing 
less than their fair share to fight climate change under a UN accord due in December 
while China is outperforming.” The USA is placed in direct comparison with China, 
and found to be underperforming. While the USA is portrayed as part of the “rich 
nations,” symbolising an underperformance of developed countries as a whole, 
China’s position as a developing country is reaffirmed, even though developed 
countries are loath to accept this position.  
This sample also shows that media acknowledge China’s policies that have “increased 
their renewable energy targets” (CT, 2015/09/22). The Cape Times (2015/10/05) calls 
China one of the “renewable investment ‘champions’ awarding China the number one 
position in renewable energy investment in 2014”. “Champions” and “first place” 
illustrate triumph, but also suggest something to compete for. While the USA’s 
climate leadership has been established, the competitive tension between China and 
the USA continues. However, the USA and China are perhaps unfairly compared – 
expectations of the USA in this particular case are high, due its developed country 
status, while expectations of China are low as a developing country – yet they 
compete for global leadership regardless of their development status. The portrayal of 
admiration for China as victor in this article indicates its potential to lead in 
sustainability.  
Some articles challenge the homogenisation of China as an environmentally 
destructive country by featuring voices of Chinese environmentalists. “‘Our concern 
is that we will end up with a lowest common denominator, where everybody just 
agrees on the least ambitious options,’ said Li Shuo of Greenpeace China.” (News24, 
2015/09/05). Greenpeace is a renowned global environmental organisation, and 
Greenpeace China’s inclusion is crucial to the representation of Chinese 
environmentalism. China’s reputation as environmentally unethical tends to 
overshadow Chinese environmental activism. Little is known about environmental 




audiences. Greenpeace China’s visibility symbolises a potentially lesser known broad 
network of Chinese environmentalism and conservation. Ultimately, this coverage 
contributes to a more nuanced image of China, highlighting the presence of 
environmentalism in a country that is often stereotyped for its lack of environmental 
concern; however, these nuanced articles are few and far between. 
Another nuanced article includes China’s chief delegate, Su Wei’s, quote on the 
progress of negotiations before COP21: “We need to work faster” (News24, 
2015/08/31). This affirms China’s commitments to the climate agreements, despite 
News24’s report that “enforcement of environmental rules has long been a problem in 
China” (2015/08/30). Su’s statement counters the stereotype that China lacks 
commitment to climate change mitigation, and instead creates the perception that the 
Chinese government – essentially represented by the broader “we” – is aware of the 
urgency of mitigation commitments, emphasised by the word “faster.” 
Much of the coverage around China’s climate change role centred on the UNFCCC’s 
Conference of Parties (COP21). Articles strongly focused on China as top carbon 
emitter, but frames of China’s proactive policies, climate leadership, and its solidarity 
with developing nations in the climate negotiations also emerged.  
1.4. China as polluted country 
South African media portray China as a polluted nation itself, through its coverage of 
the Tianjin blast and smog warnings in Beijing. 
Tianjin blast coverage 
In August 2015 in Tianjin, “giant explosions killed dozens and left residents in fear of 
being cloaked in a toxic cloud” (News24, 2015/08/14). About 140 people were killed 
by the blast and “thousands of tonnes of hazardous chemicals were stored at the site, 
officials have said”, including “highly poisonous sodium cyanide, a white powder or 
crystal which can give off lethal hydrogen cyanide gas” (News24, 2015/08/23). The 
Tianjin blast coverage is characterised by the use of emotive language and a reliance 




The blast was frequently labelled a “disaster” and dubbed “among the deadliest 
industrial accidents in China in recent years” (News24, 2015/08/17). Dramatic 
descriptors such as “giant explosions,” “toxic cloud,” “walls singed,” “windows 
shattered,” “devastated” and “suffering” (News24, 2015/08/17; 2015/08/19; 
2015/08/14) were used throughout the coverage to illustrate the severity of the blast. 
Citizens reportedly demanded clarity on their families’ “fates” but were hampered by 
state security (News24, 2015/08/15). Additionally, Greenpeace declared the situation 
“critical”, and “scores” of people died. 
An article reported that “there was a rare moment to cheer on Friday morning when 
rescue workers pulled a 19-year-old firefighter from the rubble”. While the article 
focuses on a hopeful “moment,” the word “rare” in fact highlights the overall dire 
picture of the blast’s aftermath. Emotive language also created the image of fear. 
Articles reported “heightening fears about toxic contamination” (News24, 
2015/08/18), as well as “fear of the unknown”. One article led with a description of 
the victims as “furious, frustrated and fearful” (2015/08/15). The “f”-alliteration 
strengthens the fear imagery, and suggests an antagonistic attitude towards Chinese 
authorities.  
A focus on personal experiences further evokes emotion in the coverage of the blast. 
Liu, a father who had not heard from his firefighter son was described as speaking in 
“flat tones,” his voice “trembling with emotion” – indicating the emotional impact of 
the blast on Chinese citizens (News24, 2015/08/15). Liu is implied to be from a lower 
economic background, signified by the emphasis that he was “wearing a blue worker's 
cap typical of the Maoist era”. The article thus creates an image of the traumatic 
impact of the blast on the poor, hard-working Chinese citizens, essentially associated 
with vulnerability. These accounts might evoke emotion from the reader – creating 
empathy with the victims, and consequently, sympathy for their antagonism towards 
the Chinese government. 
Local officials were reportedly “unperturbed” as security increased to prevent anti-
government protests (News24, 2015/08/15). This image juxtaposes the powerful with 
the powerless – the powerless represented by the working class, vulnerable locals, 
while the local government commanding security is presented as the powerful. Local 




Chinese government’s treatment of its own vulnerable communities reflects how it 
could potentially treat vulnerable African communities. This type of coverage could 
fuel skepticism of the Chinese government’s human rights impact in Africa, which 
will be further discussed below. 
Another element adding to the image of the community’s vulnerability is the young 
age of the firefighter, a 24-year-old. Youths often symbolise the most vulnerable 
members of society. Highlighting the firefighter’s age could strengthen the 
demonisation of the powerful. A vulnerable individual becomes collateral damage to 
poor governance that could have prevented the blast. The article concluded: “But he 
still clung to a sliver of hope” (2015/08/15). Within the image of powerlessness, the 
word “hope” also portrays the resilience of vulnerable communities, which could 
challenge the extent of the Chinese regime’s power.  
The Chinese state is central to the Tianjin blast coverage. Official Chinese news 
sources such as Xinhua were consulted for updates on the blast: “…fifty people are 
still missing and 624 are still in hospital a little more than a week after the blasts, the 
official Xinhua news agency reported, citing local officials” (News24, 2015/08/23); 
and “Niu Yueguang, deputy director of the fire department of the Public Security 
Ministry told China Central Television” (News24, 2015/08/18). According to Madrid-
Morales and Wasserman (2018), the use of official Chinese media is unusual for 
South African media. Chinese officials were referred to either using the collective 
“officials” or quoting an individual: “…said Tianjin Deputy Mayor He Sushan” 
(News24, 2015/08/18); or sourcing official organisations, such as the Tianjin 
Environmental Protection Bureau (CT, 2015/08/21). Coverage of the Tianjin blast 
saw an overlap in official sources quoted in News24 and the Cape Times – suggesting 
they consulted similar Chinese or international news sources, or relied on similar 
press releases, though these were not acknowledged.  
In addition to official Chinese sources, South African media also relied on western 
official sources for factual reporting on the blast. News24 (2015/08/18) reported on 
the prolonged impact of chemical exposure, “according to the US Environmental 
Protection Agency”. The USA’s EPA is consulted, even though the event occurred in 
China. Additionally, the US embassy in China was mentioned as a credible source 




western sources could imply a mistrust in the credibility of Chinese sources compared 
to a deeper trust of US-based sources. However, US sources could simply be easier 
and more comfortably accessed by South African journalists.  
The Chinese government was reportedly proactive in its response to the blast. While 
South African media acknowledged the impact of the blast, it focused on the 
government responses. Chinese authorities “confirmed” the presence of toxic 
chemicals, but News24 reported that to prevent leaks, the Chinese government had 
“sealed all waterways leading into the sea from the blast site” (2015/08/17). 
Furthermore, “Tianjin officials have ordered a citywide check on any potential safety 
risks and violation of fire rules.” Focusing on how the problem is addressed by the 
state, is an example of how Chinese media practices constructive journalism.  
Coverage of the Chinese government’s proactive response to the blast is characterised 
by accountability. The local Tianjin government was reportedly “under pressure from 
China’s leaders in Beijing to improve industrial safety” (CT, 2015/08/27). Keeping 
local governments accountable awards the national government with credibility. 
Furthermore, Yang Dongliang, director of the State Administration of Work Safety, 
and other detained officials were frequently in the spotlight, highlighting the 
consequences of their negligence. The Cape Times reported that “China has sacked 
the head of its work safety regulator for suspected corruption, state news agency 
Xinhua said yesterday” (2015/08/27). Additionally, The Cape Times (2015/08/27) 
mentioned “the ruling Communist Party’s graft watchdog” launched an investigation. 
This creates the image of an active regulatory body, illustrating the Chinese 
government’s zero tolerance of corruption and misconduct.  
Some terminology was harsher, such as a “crackdown” by the Chinese government 
(News24, 2015/08/18). President Xi Jinping even reportedly vowed that “authorities 
would learn the lessons paid for with blood” (CT, 2015/08/28). This implies a threat 
of violence – which portrays the Chinese president as powerful, but also potentially 
dangerous. While it highlights Xi Jinping’s personal intolerance of bad governance, it 
might harm the charming public persona he has tried to create.   
Chinese state media openly critiqued local government involved in the blast. The 




facility's construction “clearly violated” safety rules (News24, 2015/08/14). News24 
reported that Chinese state media “lambasted officials” for a “lack of transparency” 
(2015/08/17). Some news agencies found access to information challenging. The 
Global Times tabloid, “which has close ties to the ruling Communist Party” (News24, 
2015/08/17) was quoted saying there had been “scant information offered by Tianjin 
authorities”. It accused the government of frequent inadequate disaster-response 
work. This type of reporting contradicts the expectation of Chinese state media to be 
uncritical of government. 
Unofficial sources critical of the Chinese government also featured in South African 
media, including online sources such as Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post and 
Beijing News. Several quotes were sourced from online forums, and specifically the 
online microblog service Weibo. News24 (2015/08/18) referenced “numerous social 
media reports” and the large amount of criticism from online users and protesters led 
to censorship. A Beijing News post reportedly became a “quickly deleted article”. 
According to Beijing News, “the report was no longer available on the newspaper's 
website on Friday, giving rise to suspicions that the Chinese government was 
clamping down on sensitive information relating to the tragedy” (News24, 
2015/08/14). Furthermore, “many posts were quickly deleted from China's highly 
censored Twitter-like microblog service Weibo”. News24 reported that Chinese 
authorities suspended dozens of websites and hundreds of social media accounts 
(2015/08/17). The Chinese government’s lack of transparency and censorship could 
lead to a deeper mistrust by South African journalists. 
Censorship further fueled public outrage. News24 (2015/08/14) reported that “online 
commentators expressed fury at authorities, who are regularly accused after disasters 
of cover-ups”. Online commentators urged transparency, and one claimed that “every 
time when disaster happens, state media always spread heroic acts…nobody asks the 
cause of the accident to explore the truth”. Another commentator reportedly accused 
Chinese authorities of muzzling victims’ families, and “ensur[ing] that domestic 
media focus on positive aspects: rescuers' heroism or miracle rescue” (News24, 
2015/08/15). This illustrates the local perception of the Chinese government’s control 
of the narrative, as it forces state-owned media to focus on proactive government 




Offline protests of the blast were also covered. “‘We victims demand: Government, 
buy back our houses,’ said a banner carried by the residents at a protest” (News 24, 
2015/08/17). Sourcing Al Jazeera, one News24 article (2015/08/17) reported that 
soldiers did not intervene in the protest, nor obstruct coverage by local journalists. 
Though the dominant frame reflects Chinese censorship, this coverage indicated a 
contradiction to that frame: “China's government is normally uneasy about even 
small, spontaneous protests. It’s very rare for authorities to allow this to happen.” 
Ultimately the overall frame of the Tianjin blast, as part of environmental damage in 
China, focused on the Chinese government’s proactive response to the blast. 
Smog coverage 
Coverage of China’s smog was often linked to the UNFCCC’s COP21. Greenpeace 
called for “a cap on coal use” in China to bring back “healthy, breathable air” to 
Chinese cities. News24 (2015/10/15) published Greenpeace’s report that Chinese 
cities’ pollution levels are four times the maximum exposure to harmful particles 
recommended by the World Health Organisation. Sourcing the Associated Press 
newswire, the article referred to smog as one of “China's severe environmental 
challenges” (News24, 2015/10/15).  
Similar to the Tianjin blast, the smog coverage also contains emotive language. 
China’s smog was described as a “heavy haze,” “choking grey haze” (News24, 
11/30), “monotonous gray” skylines and “extremely severe air pollution” 
(2015/12/01). China’s cities were referred to as “the world's dirtiest” with 
“notoriously foul air” (2015/10/15), which is linked to “hundreds of thousands of 
premature deaths each year” (2015/10/15). The dramatic impact of Chinese smog was 
highlighted via specific headings and subheadings: “Unhealthy and unsafe” 
(2015/10/15); “Beijing air pollution reaches hazardous levels” (2015/12/01); 
“Choking smog” (2015/12/02) and “China smog climbs to perilous levels on eve of 
climate talks” (2015/11/30). These portray China as dirty, reckless, and dangerous to 
the environment. 
A dramatic heading exclaims “Toxic smog brings nightmare ‘white Christmas’ to 
Beijing” (News24, 2015/12/25), painting a gloomy picture of their Christmas. It even 




family, and joy during Christmas are placed in opposition to the Chinese context – 
unhappy, depressing and unsafe. Another Christmas-themed article referred to the 
“white Christmas” in Beijing “obscured by thick toxic smog rather than snow” 
(News24, 2015/12/25). This contributes to the image of an unsafe and depressing 
environment created by smog. The strong focus on smog almost anthropomorphises 
it, shaping it to be a villain – a grinch – that disrupts Chinese society. 
The coverage also included the portrayal of smog as a threat to vulnerable people. An 
article reporting on Beijingers wearing masks outside, focused on the impact on 
children, stating that “schools in the Chinese capital kept students indoors and parents 
brought their kids to hospitals with breathing ailments on Tuesday” (News24, 
2015/12/01). The children’s hospital was reportedly “packed.” Parents and 
grandparents complained about “the smog's impact on small children” (2015/12/01). 
Liu Feifie, a “36-year-old mother and Internet company employee” (2015/12/01) 
reported her own health problems but explained she was “more concerned about the 
health of my 7-year-old kid”. The smog’s impact is emphasised by descriptions of 
sick children, but also through the image of the sacrificial mother, further demonising 
the pollutant. 
While villianising the smog, journalists humanised interviewees by describing their 
occupations, living circumstances, and providing a personal account of how they are 
affected by the smog. One article described office worker, Yinan Zhang Li, becoming 
“very depressed” and suffering “serious eyelid swelling” from the smog (News24, 
2015/11/30). As with the Tianjin blast, Chinese citizens used Weibo to complain 
about the smog. Again it is unclear whether these testimonies were obtained through 
interviews, or South African journalists consulting Weibo themselves, or whether the 
information had been packaged by a newswire. 
The smog’s impact is widespread, as seen through the coverage of international sport 
events in Beijing. According to News24 (2015/08/04) Beijing “often enacts pollution 
controls ahead of major events such as the 2008 Olympic Games”. Articles reported 
fans wearing masks, and that the Tennis Centre was “swathing” in a “hazardous” and 
“musty haze” (News24, 2015/10/07). Additionally, one player reportedly said the 




Rafael Nadal was interviewed during the China Open tennis tournament. However, 
Nadal “insisted he’d seen worse pollution in Beijing” and he thought “the pollution 
this year better than other years” (2015/10/07), especially after having had a “blue 
sky” day two days prior. Nadal attributed the smog to Beijing being a “big city” and 
that’s “what you can expect”. Nadal’s comments contradict the perception of 
Beijing’s unique heavy pollution, suggesting that pollution is a characteristic of large 
and developing cities worldwide. Similarly, other articles reflected the perspective 
that smog results from “explosive economic growth” that led to construction of 
“hundreds of coal-fired power plants”. This portrays China’s pollution as a product of 
development and not unique, rather than from a lack of environmental concern. 
Similar to the Tianjin blast coverage, South African media’s smog coverage 
incorporated Chinese government sources. Chinese officials and media often 
confirmed Beijing’s “highest smog alert of the year” and advised citizens to “stay 
indoors” (News24, 2015/11/30). One article quoted an announcement from the 
Chinese government’s Weibo account, about temporary efforts to stop construction 
and coal (News24, 2015/08/04). State sources again focused on the Chinese 
government’s response to the smog. South African media covered the Chinese 
government’s “emergency response plan”, quoting “an official from the Beijing 
Municipal Commission of Economy and Information Technology, who declined to be 
named,” but who had “told AFP” (News24, 2015/12/21). This illustrates South 
African journalists’ trust of western newswires: despite their use of an unnamed 
source, South African media still found AFP credible enough to quote. In contrast, 
they are more reluctant to quote Xinhua. 
Similar to the Tianjin blast coverage, articles contained references to western sources 
of information. A recurring example is the reference to the US embassy’s 
“independent readings” of air quality. “Jason West, a University of North Carolina 
environmental sciences professor” was quoted on the large percentage of global 
deaths caused by exposure to air pollution. The same article sourced Jos Lelieveld at 
the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Germany echoing this, and providing 
statistics of China’s air pollution fatalities (News24, 2015/09/16). This further 
illustrates the credibility South African media awards to western information sources, 




According to Greenpeace China’s Li Shuo, China’s carbon reduction commitments 
had already been embedded in Chinese policy, but reportedly “had not been widely 
publicised”. This suggests that Chinese carbon-reduction efforts, including its 
standards for coal plants, which “are in some respects stricter than the corresponding 
standards in the EU”. are not well known. This can be due to a lack of coverage, or 
adequate messaging from government, as Li explains: “[I]t’s probably not been 
framed that way before. They chose to frame it a little more explicitly” (2015/12/02). 
This section showed that South African media coverage focused closely on China as a 
polluted country, drawing specifically on two events: The Tianjin blast and Beijing 
smog alerts. For coverage on China as a polluted country, South African media 
consulted official Chinese sources and state media, and used emotive language to 
illustrate the severity of the impact of China’s pollution. 
1.5. China as source of green technology and renewable energy 
While the South African media coverage of China’s sustainable development contains 
pessimistic frames about China’s environmental impact – such as its role in wildlife 
trafficking or pollution – optimistic frames also exist, such as China’s growing 
climate leadership. Another optimistic frame emerging in South African media is 
China as a source of green technology and renewable energy investment.  
Central to the coverage of China and green technology is the controversial topic of 
nuclear energy. China is entering what News24 (2015/08/02) calls a “nuclear energy 
boom” that could lead to China building about 100 reactors in the coming decade. 
“Boom” contributes to the portrayal of China as a growing, unstoppable, developing 
nation. China is also portrayed as a friend to Africa through coverage of nuclear 
energy: through its cooperation with China, Kenya will be able to “obtain expertise 
from China by way of training and skills development, technical support in areas such 
as site selection for Kenya's nuclear power plants and feasibility studies” (News24, 
2015/10/09).  
Additionally, according to News24, South Africa sent 50 people to China for training 
in nuclear power-plant operations to prepare for a South African nuclear-build 




cover capability and technology in areas of nuclear power plant engineering, 
procurement, manufacturing, construction, commissioning, operation and 
maintenance, and project management” claimed the South African Department of 
Energy. Coverage of cooperation on nuclear power between China and South Africa 
portrays a close relationship between the two governments. The South African 
government revived its nuclear expansion plan as it “seeks to address energy 
shortages that are already causing blackouts and to reduce its reliance on coal”. South 
Africa’s situation appears desperate: it needs development, but particularly 
sustainable development, which its friendship with China could provide. 
China’s involvement in nuclear is mostly celebrated by officials – both Chinese and 
African. None of the articles sampled sourced Chinese or African citizens’ opinion on 
nuclear power. Thus, China and South Africa’s nuclear relationship is portrayed as 
political – and excludes civil society. 
A contentious issue around nuclear energy is a lack of employment opportunities for 
unskilled labourers, which is the largest unemployed group in South Africa. News24 
reports that “50 people” were sent to China, and they were selected from the “major 
role players” in the industry. “Major role players” is vague, and does not reveal much 
about the demographics of this group. “Major” likely implies engineers or skilled 
workers that are already employable. If the nuclear expansion does not employ 
unskilled workers, China’s engagement with Africa could be perceived as benefiting 
richer, educated and skilled populations. 
Fun with climate change (News24, 2015/08/12) is an optimistic article that counters 
the negativity around climate change by focusing on solutions in a light tone. 
Covering its contribution to renewable energy growth in Africa, China is included in 
that hopeful frame: “China has begun construction on the planet’s biggest solar power 
plant (200 megawatts) in the Gobi Desert.” Despite being the biggest polluter in the 
world, China is portrayed as a key actor in climate change mitigation. China’s role in 
renewable energy is further highlighted through its reported building of the “biggest 
solar power plant.”  
South African media portrays China as a frontrunner in the field of renewable energy 




“hotbed” for “environmentally friendly investments” (M&G, 2015/11/06). Despite 
pessimistic frames about China’s sustainable development, a strong optimistic frame 
in South African media coverage emerged of China as source of green technology and 
renewable energy investment. China’s green innovation and investment contribute to 
the larger frame of China shaping itself to be a leader in the field of climate change. 
China’s capacity and resources to promote green technology illustrate the country’s 
ability to challenge the current environmental leadership of western countries, as 
mentioned in sections above.  
1.6. India and China compete for Africa 
As mentioned above, China is often covered alongside western countries such as the 
USA in South African media, and this section shows that China is also often 
mentioned with India. The two are predominantly portrayed together as the biggest 
developing country polluters, but frames of India challenging China’s leadership in 
Africa also emerged.  
During COP21, China and India were often covered together because China’s Xi 
Jinping and India’s Narendra Modi were two of the world leaders opening the UN 
Summit. They were mentioned together as “emerging giants” who are “powering fast-
growing economies and populations” and part of the “Like Minded Developing 
Nations bloc” (News24, 2015/09/04). China and India are part of the G77 group of 
developing nations, who insist that “rich nations must bear bigger responsibility for 
cutting emissions, since they have been polluting for longer”. These mentions of their 
negotiating blocs highlight their developing country status. However, developed 
nations refer to them in these articles as “giants like China and India”, emphasising 
that they are ultimately heavy polluters (News24, 2015/11/03; News24, 2015/09/28).  
While articles credit China for its carbon emission cuts, India is reported to not have 
committed to cuts in its “rapidly rising” emissions (News24, 2015/10/02). An article 
referencing the journal Nature Climate Change, states “thanks mainly to changes in 
China, the worldwide growth in emissions… is set to drop slightly.” However, “the 
study showed” that “a key contributor to projected future emissions is India” 
(News24, 2015/12/07). China thus seems to progress towards sustainable 




In these articles, China potentially offers leadership to India’s sustainable 
development. “As the giant of the G77 group of emerging economies, Beijing is well 
placed to put pressure on its partners at the conference, particularly India, the world's 
fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases” (News24, 2015/11/01). Additionally, 
China is lauded for its progress, while India seems uncooperative. “Obama met 
Monday with President Xi Jinping of China, which has started taking aggressive 
action to curb emissions, and with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has 
argued repeatedly that climate change isn’t India's fault” (News24, 2015/11/30). India 
also seems to strongly support shifting the blame of climate change from developing 
to developed countries: “Delhi has pointed the finger at wealthy developed countries 
as mostly to blame for global warming” (News24, 2015/11/01).  
Ironically, those developed countries assume the role of leading India’s sustainable 
development. “As he sat down with Modi, Obama said he agreed that India has the 
right to pursue economic development and fight poverty, but said those priorities must 
also reflect ‘serious and ambitious action by all nations’ to curb its carbon pollution” 
(News24, 2015/11/30). Similar to portrayals of China, India is infantilised, and a 
frame of the paternalistic USA develops. The USA essentially provides India with an 
ultimatum for its development: Obama’s perceived authority to tell Modi what India 
“has the right” to do, highlights this paternalistic attitude. The article implies China 
and the USA’s cooperative leadership of India, as Obama “credits U.S. and Chinese 
leadership with leading 180 nations to make their own pledges”. Xi responded that it 
was “important for the U.S. and China to work together” (News24, 2015/11/30). 
Contrary to this paternalistic frame, India is also portrayed as having potential as a 
climate leader, through its role in the renewable energy industry. “Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi's government is banking on increasing solar capacity fivefold to help 
cut crippling blackouts and bring power to 300 million Indians currently living 
without” (News 24, 2015/09/29). Here, India is portrayed as competitive in the 
renewables industry, attracting even Chinese investment: “With the cost of 
manufacturing panels falling and consumer demand rising, foreign firms are also 
turning to India. Japan's SoftBank, US-based SunEdison and China giant Trina Solar 
have all pledged investments in recent months.” An Indian official was quoted saying 




“a green energy enthusiast who helped create solar parks in his home state of 
Gujarat”. This awards Modi with credibility as the leader of a sustainably developing 
country. Modi also responded to Obama that “development and protection of the 
environment go hand in hand”, indicating that he advocates for sustainable 
development (News24, 2015/11/30).  
Significantly, India is sometimes depicted as a rising leader in Africa, capable of 
competing with China. According to News24, Prime Minister Narendra Modi “seeks 
to challenge China's dominance” (2015/10/26). India is reportedly honing “its soft 
power and historical ties to Africa” in contrast to “China's focus on resource 
extraction and capital investment”. According to the article, Modi wants to capitalise 
on China’s economic slowdown to highlight India as an alternative partner for trade 
and investment in Africa. India is financially unable to challenge Beijing, but 
according to an Indian foreign policy commentator, “we can't match the Chinese in 
terms of resources – but any engagement we do with the Africans at least gives them 
a choice”. In contrast, the Chinese economy “sucks in oil, coal and metals to feed its 
industrial machine”. An Indian official explained: “[O]ur partnership is not focused 
on an exploitative or extraction point of view, but is one that focuses on Africa’s 
needs and India’s strengths.” India is portrayed here as offering a partnership with 
Africa, while China is presented as exploitative.  
In some articles, India seems able to provide a closer solidarity with Africa than 
China. News24 reports that “India and Africa are on the same page” in what is termed 
a “development partnership” (2015/10/16). Modi singles out Africa and India as “two 
bright spots of hope and opportunities in the global economy”. He also urges African 
nations to support reform of the United Nations, who risk “becoming irrelevant”, 
since “neither India nor any African country has a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council”. Modi also draws on India’s colonial history to strengthen solidarity with 
Africa: “Our global institutions reflect the circumstances of the century that we left 
behind, not the one we are in today” (News24, 2015/10/29). 
Modi reportedly called for a “‘comprehensive and concrete’ agreement on climate 
change” as he addressed leaders from all 54 African countries at a summit in New 
Delhi, where he invited them to “join an alliance of solar-rich countries” (News24, 




India and Africa” (News24, 2015/10/29). India is placed firmly in solidarity with 
Africa. Modi gathered “the highest number of foreign dignitaries to descend on India 
since 1983” because India wants to improve ties with Africa for “a greater share of 
the continent’s natural resources”. Thus, despite the solidarity frame, India and China 
are seemingly working towards the same goal – to access Africa’s natural resources. 
However, India’s bilateral trade with Africa seems currently insignificant because its 
“economic presence in Africa is dwarfed by China”. The article furthermore reports: 
“China has faced criticism for using foreign labour to build infrastructure and 
extracting Africa's natural resources.” This illustrates how China’s environmental and 
human rights reputation might negatively impact its influence in Africa, and allow for 
an economically weaker India to become more significant in its presence on the 
continent.  
However, this study finds that India is not exempt from scrutiny in South African 
media. Coverage includes human rights groups’ criticism of India’s invitation to 
Omar al-Bashir, the former president of Sudan, who was at the time wanted by the 
International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes. For India, “business comes 
first” (News24, 2015/10/26). The article claims that its state-run oil company, which 
has fields in Sudan and South Sudan, is “on the hunt” for foreign assets, which are not 
necessarily sustainable development investments. Coverage of India’s business 
priorities challenges the idea that its relationship with Africa is necessarily based on 
solidarity. 
This section has found that the sampled South African media portray India and China 
as the biggest developing nation polluters, but include frames that suggest that India is 
challenging Chinese influence in Africa. This is based on the portrayal of India as 
offering more genuine solidarity to Africa than China, which was also found to 
potentially be a fallacy. 
Sustainable development summary  
The following frames have emerged from this framing analysis of South African 
media coverage of China’s sustainable development: China as key poacher; the 
climate leadership struggle between the USA and China – including the significance 




through the Tianjin blast and smog coverage; China and India’s competing influences 
on the African continent, and finally, an optimistic frame of China as source of green 
technology and renewable energy investment. A substantive conclusion follows at the 
end of the human rights section below.  
2. Human Rights 
Compared to sustainable development, Chinese human rights issues received limited 
coverage in South African media during the same period. This could be because 
COP21, the Tianjin blast and Beijing smog alerts mentioned above were important 
sustainability events that increased its coverage. There are overlaps in the human 
rights and sustainable development frames of the two topics, illustrating their 
interconnectedness. For example, during the Tianjin blast, essentially an 
environmental disaster, articles also reported on the emerging protests – a human 
rights issue. The following frames emerged in South African coverage of China’s 
human rights: disasters in China, Chinese neocolonialism, pragmatism of human 
rights negligence, and improvements in China’s human rights. 
2.1. Disasters in China 
Human rights coverage of China in South African media often focuses on disasters, 
both natural and man-made. South African media relied on Chinese state media 
sources to cover the events. An article on a mine collapse in Shandong stated that “the 
official Xinhua News Agency said” (News24, 2015/12/26), and another article stated 
that “Yulin city’s propaganda department says…” This was done “in a statement”, 
illustrating the use of government press releases (News24, 2016/01/07).  
These articles followed coverage of a landslide in Shenzhen that “killed one person 
and left another 75 missing and presumed dead” (News24, 2015/12/26). China is 
portrayed as creating unsafe work environments, as News24 suggests: “Authorities on 
Friday ruled that the landslide was not a geological disaster but a work safety 
incident, adding to China's list of major man-made disasters in recent years.” 
Mentioning China’s “list” of man-made disasters implies a regular occurrence, 
suggesting that unsafe work environments are common practice in China. “Man-




emphasising the extent of the danger posed by China’s environmental 
mismanagement. It also suggests that this disaster could have been prevented, had 
China invested in workers’ safety. The article acknowledges safety improvements, 
which have “drastically” reduced the number of people killed, but also emphasises 
that “China’s mines have long been the world’s deadliest.” China is portrayed as one 
of the worst offenders of labour rights protection, through a lack of prioritisation of 
safety. Chinese prioritisation of profit over labour protection was a predominant 
frame in the natural disaster coverage on South African media. Implying that man-
made disasters are a regular occurrence creates the idea that mining in China is a 
hazardous occupation. 
2.2. Chinese Neocolonialism 
This section suggests that South African media portray China as a neocolonial force 
in Africa, which is characterised by its lack of respect for human rights. The Chinese 
neocolonialism frame is strengthened by the use of human rights groups and 
grassroots interviews as sources. Amnesty International features in a News24 article, 
saying “cobalt mined dangerously by children in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
could end up in the lithium batteries of smartphones and electric cars made by Apple, 
Samsung or Sony” (2016/01/19). The article describes “children” working in 
“tunnels” with “rudimentary tools” in a “clandestine” environment. Not only is this an 
emotive description of a horrific work environment, but the fact that “children” – 
symbolic of vulnerability and innocence – are employed in such an environment, 
portrays the employers as particularly villainous. The report’s title, “This is what we 
die for: Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo power the global 
trade in cobalt”, underlines this deadly working environment.  
The employers are not specified, but “the firms contacted by the report were 
identified as clients of Asian battery manufacturers” that acquire cobalt from the 
Chinese-owned Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, who owns a subsidiary in the DRC. 
Furthermore, “once processed, the cobalt is sold to battery component manufacturers 
in China and South Korea, which supply the multinationals”. While the article 
specifically emphasises the Asian and Chinese involvement, it does not name any 
other nations that featured in the report, or are involved in electronics production. 




“Lenovo” or “Microsoft”, who were “unable to declare the origin of the cobalt used in 
their lithium-ion batteries”. China features from the beginning of the article, while the 
USA’s involvement in “blood minerals” appears only as a sidenote in the final 
paragraph. While the article mentions existing USA policies, China seems to have no 
human rights policy framework at all. 
Along with this human rights framework, another article portrays Chinese influence 
in Angola as directly neocolonial. The Mail & Guardian article emotively describes 
the working conditions in Angola: “Then came the talk of rice paddies, followed by 
Chinese overseers, the threats to shoot trespassers, the hiring of teenagers for wages 
paid in part in cigarettes, plus word that all the rice to be grown would be for export 
and not for local consumption.” In fact, China is accused of neocolonialism in the 
discourse: “It pointed to the project as a clear example of neocolonialism in action, 
and made noises about Chinese investment being worse for the people of Angola than 
Portuguese settlement had ever been, to the considerable embarrassment of the 
government” (M&G, 2015/08/28). Here, it seems as if China’s neocolonialism in 
Africa is worse than western colonialism.   
This frame is carried by the interviewee, essentially a soundboard for his community 
– a local Angolan called Capalandanda. “They had neither been consulted nor 
compensated, the people of the area told Capalandanda”, the article claims, 
suggesting a powerlessness against the Chinese influence. Angolans express concern 
about employment of “Chinese workers they strongly suspected to be sentenced 
criminals sent to work the land in lieu of prison time” (M&G, 2015/08/28). These 
quotes might fuel suspicion around the stereotype of Chinese prisoner employment in 
Africa. Similar perceptions are emphasised through inclusion of the interviewee’s 
opinions, with few counterarguments from other sources. For example, “according to 
Capalandanda, on June 20 human rights activists and journalists were imprisoned in 
Angola, accused of planning a coup”. However, in response, “Angola and China both 
describe such suspicions as ludicrous”. The Angolan government argues that “what 
those citizens actually see, however, is what by some estimates may top 300 000 
Chinese migrant workers in Angola already…in a country with a population of 24.3 
million” (M&G, 2015/08/28). However, the Angolan government’s counterargument 




This illustrates the ineffectiveness of government responses in comparison to an 
individual voice, which suggests accusations of neocolonialism might not be 
effectively challenged by the Chinese government. 
The article ends with a rhetorical question: “Does it court the displeasure of Luanda 
and, more importantly, Beijing by giving Capalandanda a fresh start in this country, 
with the tacit acknowledgement that there is trouble in Angola because of China?” 
(M&G, 2015/08/28). The technique is emotive, and the open ending also places China 
in a position in which it is unable to respond. The reader answers for themselves, 
based on their existing beliefs of China. China is directly blamed for Angola’s 
problems. Finally, the title suggests that South Africa and China are remarkably close: 
“Angolan asylum seeker set to test SA’s love affair with China” (M&G 2015/08/28).   
As seen above, articles focusing on a human-interest angle can evoke powerful 
emotions. For example, Mokoena is “one of hundreds of thousands” of Vaal residents 
preparing for “the worst” after ArcelorMittal SA announced a closure of some of its 
steel plants (News24, 2015/08/01). China seems to put Mokoena’s livelihood at risk, 
due to “cheap Chinese imports” affecting the profitability of the company. The 
situation is depicted as unfair and unjust, through emphasising its impact on 
ArcelorMittal employee Tsietsi Phiri as a “father of four” who “has been with the 
company for 14 years”. Management reportedly told Phiri that “the dumping of steel 
from China made it difficult for them to compete”. China is blamed for this negative 
impact on Phiri, a loyal employee, and his vulnerable dependents. Along with 
dramatic captions such as, “we will slowly die of starvation”, China is further 
demonised for negatively affecting livelihoods in Africa (News24, 2015/08/01). 
China is accused of neocolonialism in Africa, a frame the South African media create 
through the use of grassroots interviews. Coverage also excludes specific mention of 
other neocolonial, especially western, players, which suggests that China’s 
neocolonialism is extraordinary.  
2.3 Pragmatism of human rights negligence 
This section shows a frame of China’s lack of human rights legislation and 
implementation. Coverage even implies that China’s legal system enables human 




system” (News24, 2015/12/10) suggests that human rights violations are not only 
normalised but a fundamental part of Chinese governance. The UN Committee 
against Torture is reportedly “seriously concerned” about torture in China, which is 
compounded by a failure in “transparency and accountability”. Additionally, 
“international rights groups welcomed the UN report on Thursday, also Human 
Rights Day”, suggesting that there is a broad, influential network of concerned groups 
criticising human rights violations in China. The plural “groups” suggests this 
criticism is substantial and widespread. 
The article further portrays China trying to hide these accusations: “The observations 
‘send a clear message that the international community sees through China’s denial of 
documented facts’, said Sharon Hom, head of the group Human Rights in China.” 
While China denies the claims, human rights groups are depicted as airing a more 
credible truth. The article reports on China’s “ongoing” human rights violations 
existing “in China’s courts and prisons”, again suggesting the legality of human rights 
violations in China. Kai Müller, Executive Director of The International Campaign 
for Tibet (ICT), Germany, expresses “alarm at China's attempts to subvert criticism of 
its record on human rights and to distort ... reality”. ICT is committed to the 
accountability of “Chinese authorities” for the “suffering” they have caused. China 
seems to avoid accountability for its human rights violations in this portrayal. 
Despite the focus on the UN report, the article also awards the Chinese government’s 
defense significant space: “China on Thursday dismissed a United Nations report” 
that was written “despite legislation outlawing torture in the country”. According to 
the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, “in recent years China has been promoting the 
rule of law and has made great efforts in every aspect, including fighting torture” 
(News24, 2015/12/10). This response implies the Chinese government’s zero 
tolerance of torture, which it is actively “fighting” against. The article highlights the 
fact that Chinese anti-torture legislation is overshadowed by NGOs’ publicisation of 
its monitoring of China’s human rights violations. 
Coverage suggests that human rights violations are legal or government-approved in 
China. One article focuses on the Communist Party’s police crackdown on civilians 
that led to “hundreds detained and dozens sent to prison” (News24, 2015/12/14). USA 




Mr Pu and call upon China to uphold fundamental civil rights.” China seems to 
violate civil rights while the USA promotes and even enforces it, illustrating a moral 
authority. Here, the USA is the innocent promoter of good, while China is further 
demonised through the coverage of Chinese impoliteness: Chinese “officers and 
unidentified plain-clothes policemen shouted at senior US diplomat Dan Biers and 
pushed him as he tried to read a statement condemning the trial”. Biers accuses China 
of “continuing repression” of human rights lawyers which hinders building a “stable 
China”. China’s perceived human rights violations thus contribute to a frame of an 
unstable, and potentially dangerous, country. The image of China lacking respect of 
the law also implies that it is a risky trade partner for Africa. 
Western authority to scrutinise China’s human rights practices is emphasised through 
coverage whereby “a diplomat speaking on behalf of the European Union was also 
shouted down as she delivered a statement outside the court criticising the process” 
(News24, 2015/12/14). The coverage of western criticism again infantilises China, 
implying either its unwillingness to promote western-approved human rights, or its 
incompetence to create and implement adequate policies. Furthermore, “analysts” 
reportedly predict Pu’s conviction, yet the article does not clarify who they are, who 
they work for, or their expertise. “Analysts” implies a knowledgeable, authoritative 
opinion, and strengthens the idea that a logical outcome will be China violating Pu’s 
human rights. A lack of respect for human dignity is thus an expected response from 
China. 
The article features international journalists and newswires, such as Al Jazeera’s 
Adrian Brown and AFP. Brown reported that “one elderly woman told me that some 
of her friends were taken away by police. ‘There are no human rights in China,’ she 
said” (News24, 2015/12/14). “Elderly” again creates the image of the vulnerable. It 
also implies that the interviewee has enough life experience for her comment on 
China’s lack of human rights to be credible. Brown describes people being “dragged 
away” by police, contributing to the image of vulnerable and powerless citizens. 
According to Brown “the trial of Pu is extremely sensitive. There were extraordinary 
glimpses of defiance by a small group of supporters.” Describing “defiance” of the 
Chinese government as “extraordinary” suggests activism or protesting is uncommon 




article specifically highlights Zhiqiang’s support of globally-renowned artist, Ai 
Weiwei. This both increases the article’s news value and supports South Africans’ 
existing perceptions of China’s human rights violations.  
China’s economic success reportedly comes at the cost of “such niceties as 
environmental and worker protection” (M&G, 2015/08/21). Chinese environmental 
and human rights are thus not perceived as needs, but privileges. China sacrifices 
human rights “to do something about [poverty]”, which illustrates China as merely 
pragmatic. This suggests that China is pursuing a greater good, the reduction of 
poverty, at the cost of human rights, which are portrayed as less important. According 
to Davies, South Africa is “lost in these theoretical, ideological conversations”. He 
adds: “You know what the Chinese are doing? They’re doing business” (M&G, 
2015/08/21). This implies China’s economic competitiveness is due to the fact that it 
is not hindered by a concern for rights. The interviewee calls for non-interference in 
China’s human rights approach: “We can’t expect them to do what we do and they 
can’t expect us to do what they do.” This quote sets a tone of approval for China’s 
pragmatic approach to rights, which potentially counters the demonisation of China’s 
lack of human rights prioritisation. 
In this sample, the predominant frame is that China lacks adequate human rights 
legislation. Coverage suggests that human rights violations in China are legal, or 
government-approved. Chinese environmental and human rights are portrayed as 
privileges, not needs. China seems to sacrifice human rights to achieve potentially 
greater ends, such as reduced poverty and economic growth. South African media 
promote the stereotype of Chinese prison labourers and extraordinarily efficient 
Chinese labourers. Finally, the US and Europe are presented as promoters of human 
rights, with the authority to scrutinise China, a violator of human rights. 
2.4. Improvements in China’s human rights 
An optimistic frame about China’s human rights improvements also emerged. 
Journalists at the Cape Times wrote a series of articles on visits to China. One article 
focuses on Xinjiang’s efforts to use “agriculture as a way of taking care of minority 
groups” (CT, 2015/08/13). China seems concerned about its minorities, who are 




represent the most oppressed groups in a society, and China appears to support their 
well-being. The article comes across as promotional rather than journalistic, however. 
It promotes Chinese sustainable agriculture as beneficial to the minority labourers: 
“Delicious walnuts are grown in an environmentally friendly way and the quality of 
the nuts is so good they were voted the best nuts enjoyed by athletes who took part in 
the 2009 Olympics held in Beijing”. “Delicious”, “so good” and “best” carry a highly 
optimistic tone, yet the journalist did not conduct any interviews with actual 
minorities. (CT, 2015/08/13). 
China has also been lauded for its humanitarian efforts in the sample. “As workers at 
Western companies fled West Africa during the world’s worst-ever Ebola outbreak, a 
state-owned Chinese company carried on” (M&G, 2015/10/02). China enabled the 
provision of Guinea’s human rights by ending power shortages in the country. “‘The 
Chinese saved us,’ Lansana Fofana said.” Here, China is portrayed as heroic and 
selfless. However, according to a Chinese worker that stayed during the Ebola crisis: 
“‘We were scared, but we stayed,’ Liu said with a nervous laugh. ‘We had to do our 
jobs’” (M&G, 2015/10/02). Liu’s “nervous laugh” insinuates that they had no choice 
but to stay during the outbreak. Chinese workers seem expendable, as their “jobs” 
outweigh their own well-being. China’s portrayal as humanitarian is thus clouded by 
its apparent lack of respect of the rights of its workers. 
While the article highlights “the positive role China can play in Africa”, it also alludes 
to China’s bad reputation in Africa: “Chinese companies have been accused of 
treating workers poorly, building substandard infrastructure and damaging the 
environment.” The article covers “bare-chested Chinese workers” in Guinea who are 
heaving “rocks into a metal frame” while “huddled under a makeshift shelter at the 
site’s entrance” while “a dozen Guinean men looking for jobs watch enviously as 
Chinese workers drive trucks and work on the roads”. This image illustrates local 
Africans’ resentment of Chinese labour, even though Chinese workers are reportedly 
working in terrible conditions. According to Yejoo Kim at Stellenbosch University’s 
Centre for Chinese Studies, the Chinese government is reaching out to residents to 
reduce Africans’ resentment of Chinese employers: “They know about the outcry on 
the ground level and they are trying to rectify that” (M&G, 2015/10/02). This 




proactively try to improve their reputation, they are aware that “the perception is 
slowly changing. It’s not going to happen overnight.” This suggests that China is 
playing the long game, and so seems strategic and patient.  
Articles focusing on China’s efforts to redeem its poor human rights reputation often 
hone in on the human rights violations themselves: “China has released a scholar and 
human rights advocate detained for almost a year, a rights group said on Tuesday, 
though his lawyer continues to be held” (News24, 2015/09/15). The Hong Kong-
based advocacy group, Rights Defence Network, says, “China's ruling party under 
president Xi Jinping has tightened a crackdown on intellectuals, lawyers and activists 
critical of the government, with scores detained and dozens jailed.” The article 
suggests human rights violations have worsened under Xi Jinping’s leadership. It also 
implies that China released the activist only to ease China-US relations: “The 
scholar's release comes ahead of a visit by Xi to the US later this month. China's 
detention of dissidents is often a source of contention between Washington and 
Beijing.” The USA is again depicted as human rights defender, in opposition to China 
as violator, which is affirmed by the article’s mention of Chinese lawyer, Chen 
Guangcheng, who “dramatically sought refuge in the US’ Beijing embassy” (News24, 
2015/09/15). 
Though few articles emerged on this frame, it is significant to mention that a 
counterframe of China improving its human rights policies is present. China is 
portrayed as respecting its minorities, offering humanitarian assistance to African 
countries, and also presented as aware of its human rights reputation and proactively 
responding to it, for example, by releasing prisoners.  
Human rights summary 
South African media coverage of China’s human rights record revealed the following 
frames: human rights as a natural or man-made disaster issue; China as neocolonial 
influence in Africa due to a lack of respect or policies for human rights; human rights 
violations as pragmatic for development; and an optimistic frame about China’s 





In this framing analysis of South African media coverage of China’s sustainable 
development, one of the dominant frames used is China as poacher and key 
perpetrator in the illegal wildlife trade industry. Frames affirming Chinese anti-
poaching policy and actions have also emerged, but they often include skeptical 
undertones. China as perpetrator is also juxtaposed with the western protectors of 
Africa, specifically the UK, via the coverage of British royalty. China and the USA 
were often framed in competition with each other, but the USA’s climate change 
leadership was clearly established. However, references to the USA’s lack of 
credibility as climate leader, particularly due to its own disregard of international 
environmental law, also emerged. Climate change articles focused heavily on China 
as top carbon emitter, especially in light of the Conference of Parties (COP21) 
coverage, but frames of China’s proactive policies, growing leadership, and its 
solidarity with developing nations in the climate negotiations also emerged.  
South African media coverage focused closely on China as a polluted country, 
drawing specifically on two events to characterise that – the Tianjin blast and 
Beijing’s smog alerts. South African media relied on official Chinese sources and 
state media to report on these events, and used emotive language to illustrate the 
severity of the pollution in China. However, a strong optimistic frame also emerged – 
China was positioned as source of green technology and renewable energy 
investment, particularly to the benefit of the African continent. China’s innovation 
and increasing commitment to solutions for sustainability contribute to the larger 
frame of China shaping itself to be a leader in the field of climate change, and its 
ability to challenge current western environmental leadership. Finally, India as key 
climate leader and future African partner also emerged. South African media portray 
China and India as developing nations with the highest carbon emission record, but a 
continuing discussion of their influence on Africa diffuses this ecological frame. India 
appears as a challenge to Chinese influence on the continent, based on a seemingly 
more genuine solidarity with Africa than China.  
Regarding human rights coverage, compared to sustainable development, human 
rights received limited coverage in South African media during the same period. 
South African media coverage of China’s human rights often focuses on natural or 




sources, including the Chinese government, human rights groups, individuals on the 
ground, and South African and international journalists. This section showed that 
China is often accused of neocolonialism in Africa, characterised by its lack of 
respect for human rights. China is furthermore portrayed as currently lacking human 
rights legislation, and that its legal system allows or encourages human rights 
violations. An optimistic frame about China’s human rights improvements also 
emerged, mostly through a series of promotion articles written on journalists’ visits to 
China. Finally, some articles lauded China for its humanitarian efforts, but this 






Chapter Six: Influences on South African Interviewees 
 
This chapter explores journalists’ perceptions of China and other potential influences 
on their coverage of China’s sustainable development and human rights records, 
through an analysis of 11 qualitative, semi-structured, in-depth interviews with South 
African journalists. Using Reese’s hierarchy of influences (2001) as a guide, these 
interviews explore influences on journalists’ news coverage on individual, routine, 
organisational, extra-media and ideological levels.   
South African journalists were selected based on their environmental and human 
rights beats. However, it was found that few beat journalists are still employed at 
South African publications. This in itself is indicative of the current changes within 
newsrooms – as the number of full-time employed journalists declines, beat 
journalism is virtually impossible to maintain, and the opportunities for freelance 
work increases.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4 on methodology, all the South African interviewees work 
or have worked for either News24, the Independent Media Group or the Mail & 
Guardian, which together represent a key part of mainstream South African media. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the framing analysis of South African media was also 
based on these three publications (in the case of the Independent Group, the Cape 
Times was analysed). As such, interviewees were sampled purposively to ensure a 
link between the interviews and the framing analysis. This chapter reviews the results 
of interviews with South African journalists, while Chinese journalist interviews are 
in Chapter 7.  
As noted in Chapter 4, news items are the products of the interplay of routines, norms, 
values, organisational constraints and dominant ideologies that exist in a particular 
historical and social context (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Drawing on in-depth 
interview responses, this chapter analyses these various levels of influence on the 
coverage of China’s sustainable development and human rights. The interview 
questions (Appendix I) were formulated with Reese’s (2001) five influences as 
guidelines, to determine how elements such as personal opinions of China, 




commercialisation might influence journalists’ coverage. The responses were 
analysed within the hierarchy of influences framework.  
 
1. Individual influences 
The individual level points to the attitude, training and background of the journalist 
and considers factors such as education, age, gender, ethnicity, personal values and 
beliefs of the individual journalist (Reese, 2001). This study coded the interviewees’ 
responses according to the strongest themes that emerged – essentially journalists’ 
personal perceptions of China. This section discusses how these values operate and 
how journalists experience these influences, particularly in light of covering China. 
 Perceptions of China’s sustainable development record 
According to Reese (2001), personal views can affect journalists’ coverage of a 
certain topic. Interviews with South African journalists explored their perceptions of 
China’s sustainable development and human rights records. Many journalists 
hesitated to provide an opinion on China’s sustainable development, because of their 
limited knowledge about the topic.  
Journalists mostly cover China as it becomes relevant to their existing sustainable 
development or human rights beats. South African journalists trained in sustainable 
development or human rights are not necessarily knowledgeable of China itself. This 
could lead to misunderstandings about Chinese perceptions of sustainable 
development and human rights. Though few journalists have experience covering 
China, according to Interviewee 11, “if you’re working on the [African] continent, 
you’re only a couple of steps away from a Chinese story”.  
The journalists generally believe that China is exploitative, extractionist, careless and 
harmful towards the environment. The interviewees commented that China fuels this 
skepticism through a lack of transparency: “Not keeping accurate data, or refusing to 
release accurate data, there being massive discrepancies between official state data on 
things like air or water pollution, and independent checks and balances on those kinds 
of things” (Interviewee 9).  
Journalists draw on what they consume in the media or hear from peers to inform 




I’m a bit reluctant to… I mean they don’t have a good reputation. I mean obviously 
what I see in other media about things like air quality – they’ve got some massive 
environmental problems” (Interviewee 7). Media reports on China can reach 
journalists indirectly, through hearsay or conversations with peers. “I think, I’m not 
sure if I’m imagining it, but I heard that sometimes when the pollution is too bad they 
basically halt production for a few days. But I’m not sure if this is true” (Interviewee 
5). This could lead to journalists’ coverage reflecting such rumours about China.  
Few journalists have directly engaged with China. Interviewee 9 was sent to China to 
write motivational pieces about economic opportunities for Africans in China, which 
revealed the country’s complexities to her, especially regarding its population size. 
Interviewee 10 experienced health problems in China due to air pollution. She 
developed a mistrust of the Chinese government and their environmental policies: 
“How things work there is, because they have a lot of international pressure, from the 
United Nations and all these groups concerned about the citizens, they’re making a lot 
of promises and setting a lot of deadlines that I know they’re not going to keep.”  
Few journalists reported firsthand encounters with Chinese companies, government or 
industry in Africa. Interviewee 7’s encounter negatively influenced him. “When I 
went to Lesotho two and a half years ago, they were building the Roof of Africa 
route…we were actually appalled at the way it was being done. I mean they’re just 
using drills and dynamite, sort of blowing it up, it was a mess. If that’s the way they 
are doing big projects you know, I think there’s a real problem” (Interviewee 7). 
These experiences create a critical outlook on China.  
Some South African journalists view China’s environmental impact in Africa as a 
logical side-effect of development. Development itself is considered the problem, not 
necessarily Chinese failure at sustainability. “You know, development means death. 
Any development initiative is necessarily going to cause an enormous amount of 
environmental damage” (Interviewee 11). This perspective acknowledges China’s 
environmental impact, but links it to a sacrifice for development, rather than 
intentional disrespect for the environment. 
While China is often singled out as environmentally destructive, some journalists 
perceive them to be on par with other nations operating in Africa. “I would say that 




Australians or anyone else working in that sector” (Interviewee 11). Interviewee 11 
highlights developed nations’ large-scale environmental destruction. “This was true of 
the United States, this was certainly true of the British during the Industrial 
Revolution, and right now that’s exactly the problem that the Chinese are dealing with 
at home.” China doesn’t have a “premium” on environmental destruction, and some 
journalists are aware of its essentialisation in Western media (Interviewee 11). China 
is considered the “big bad of this century” (Interviewee 3) and is therefore scrutinised 
more often. Some South African journalists are thus not highly critical of China’s 
environmental impact in Africa as they perceive China’s impact as similar to 
developed countries’. The perception that China does not necessarily intentionally 
disregard the environment, can complicate how journalists incorporate the terms 
“environmental destruction” or “sustainable development” when covering China.  
In the interviews with these journalists, Africa emerges as the victim in its 
relationships with other countries. “But no-one cares about Africa. Because you can 
walk away from it. And that’s what the colonial Europeans did, that’s what America’s 
been doing, that’s what China does. When it comes to Africa everyone’s bad. 
Everyone is just here to get land for agriculture and take stuff out of mines” 
(Interviewee 3). The general consensus among the journalists, whether they regularly 
cover China-Africa or not, is that Africa is exploited by this relationship. This 
perception, likely influenced by preconceived ideas of the China-Africa relationship, 
might distract from focusing on African agency and governance in China-Africa 
coverage. This could increase a critical outlook on China. While some South African 
journalists are highly critical about China’s environmental destruction, others see it as 
a logical side-effect of development. China’s environmental impact is perceived as on 
par with that of Western countries. 
Perceptions on China’s human rights record 
South African journalists perceive China as negatively impacting human rights in 
Africa. Some are critical of “eternal economic growth” that generally leads to 
exploitation (Interviewee 4). Some journalists blame capitalism, rather than China’s 
impact on human rights in particular. “It also comes down to consumerism – because 
cheap stuff is made in China, they have cheap factories where people’s human rights 




Capitalism also seems to fuel a lack of accountability. According to Interviewee 3, 
“no company cares about human rights and the rights of its workers unless it’s a threat 
to their profit”. He explains that Western corporations and mining companies, such as 
Anglo American, are only concerned about human rights as far as it affects their 
reputations. These corporations experience no consequences at home for “workers 
getting silicosis from poor safety equipment”. According to Interviewee 11, while 
“the Chinese are certainly not kind at all”, even South Africa is guilty of mistreating 
its workers. This contributes to the view that China is not worse than other countries 
regarding exploitation.  
Interviewee 9 argues that China’s careless human rights record is an automatic side-
effect of economic growth. “I think that it’s well-acknowledged that there’s [sic] 
many brilliant things that the Chinese have done; they’ve revolutionised themselves in 
a way that other countries can’t, but I think that it is also fairly commonly accepted 
that their lax relationship [with human rights] has allowed them to be so competitive. 
Whether a country like South Africa could ever achieve that kind of success while 
maintaining its human rights record is quite doubtful” (Interviewee 9).  
Interviewees also contrast China with South Africa, which is perceived as respecting 
human rights. However, this respect is perceived to impede South African economic 
success.  The human rights concept appeals to individual journalists in different ways. 
The interviewed journalists raised topics ranging from political prisoners, such as Ai 
Wei Wei (Interviewee 5), to censorship (Interviewee 10). However, many journalists 
have little knowledge on these topics, and again demonstrate a reliance on hearsay. 
“Wasn’t there recently a woman – they said she was released but her husband has not 
heard from her yet. Something like that” (Interviewee 5). 
South African journalists perceive Chinese company human rights violations in 
Africa as common. Interviewee 9 perceives the Chinese labour situation as “the 
classic story of the sweat shops”. Labour violations, however, are linked to the 
definition of human rights, which is culturally determined.  
South African journalists identify closely with Western approaches to human rights, 
but some are aware that this is in conflict with other ideologies. Interviewee 11 
explains the normalisation of labour practices in China: “What a Chinese 




[unacceptable]”. In contradiction, Chinese tend to view South Africans as “lazy” and 
“unwilling to make sacrifices for the future of our citizens” (Interviewee 11). South 
African journalists’ conditioning might influence them to monitor human rights 
according to the Western approach, thus reporting anything outside of that rights 
framework as a violation. 
Some journalists critiqued Chinese civil society’s reluctance and inability to question 
their government. However, Interviewee 10 acknowledged Chinese citizens might not 
regard this as a violation: “I think that one of the most fascinating things for them, is 
say for a country like America where the individual freedom is everything, it’s like 
wow, how does America even function day to day? With all that freedom?” Many 
South African journalists are aware of the cultural differences in interpreting human 
rights violations. “Of course there’s also a very big cultural difference – so some type 
of behaviour might seem oppressive to me, but it could be something that’s merely a 
cultural difference” (Interviewee 9). This understanding might influence journalists to 
incorporate terms like human rights and violations more contextually. “We would 
consider freedom of speech to be a human right”, says Interviewee 9, who also 
believes that culturally, the Western and Chinese approaches to human rights are 
incompatible because of “the way that Chinese society has evolved”.  
According to Interviewee 11, many African countries subscribe to a Western human 
rights approach: “Most African nations, what we’ve adopted, is effectively a Western 
paradigm for enshrining individual rights.” However, Interviewee 11 argues that these 
policies are challenging to implement, and in countries with high unemployment 
rates, labour is easily exploited: “You know time off is not fairly given, time off is not 
fair, and most importantly, pay isn’t fair. Now, that’s kind of what happens in a 
surplus labour market” (Interviewee 11). 
The journalists’ alignment with the Western definition of human rights is affirmed 
through their references to “we” and “our” when talking about South Africa’s 
Western-based human rights practices. Journalists’ approach is thus influenced by 
their nationality. This could further the “us vs them” ideology when covering China, 
because of their conditioning that South African and Chinese human rights are 
fundamentally different. Again, anything outside of the Western human rights 




Interviewee 1 views China’s human rights reputation as “propaganda”. He accuses 
South African audiences of believing China does not respect human rights, while their 
approaches are merely misunderstood. These misperceptions are influenced by the 
West: “Academics, etc use Western media as their main sources of information. 
Western media is slanted, and they don’t understand China.” Western media 
especially misrepresent the issue of “individual vs social or collective freedom”.  In 
China, “the Communist Party is more important to them than individual rights” 
(Interviewee 1). 
Interviewee 1 blames the “western colonial history” and “neoliberalism” in Africa 
that he has witnessed firsthand, for fueling misperceptions of China. “China wants 
Africa’s natural resources and minerals, but they pay for it.” A sense of solidarity 
emerges from Interviewee 1’s perception that China is “not neocolonial”. “I am also 
critical about China, but I know where they come from” (Interviewee 1). Interviewee 
1 prioritises staying informed about China through the consumption of South African, 
global and Chinese media. This practice might influence his perception on China’s 
development.  
This section discussed the individual influences from Reese’s (2001) framework, 
including the influence of journalists’ educational background, work experience, and 
journalists’ perceptions on China’s sustainable development and human rights. The 
following section moves on to examine routine influences. 
 
2. Routine influences 
“As a social practice, routines are the ways of working that constitute that practice, 
including those unstated rules and ritualized enactments that are not always made 
explicit” (Reese, 2016:399). Routine influences on journalistic coverage focus on 
newsroom dynamics, including aspects such as deadlines, and the constraints and 
challenges that journalists experience.  
Deadlines  
According to Wits’ State of the Newsroom 2017 report (Finlay, 2017), South African 
newsrooms are contracting, due to financial instability and a digital transition. The 




now even fewer than originally” (Interviewee 5). This means quicker and more 
pressured deadlines, involving multitasking, which leads to “basically just churning 
the stuff out” (Interviewee 2). The developing churnalism (Davies, 2009) culture 
pushed Interviewee 2 to leave, as she perceives it doing “more harm than good”. Her 
idea of “proper” journalism requires time and resources, which most journalists are 
not granted.  
Interviewee 3’s deadlines are in a transitional phase. His publication is “daily online, 
but a weekly paper. And we’re still figuring out how that works.” Interviewee 3’s 
editorial team prioritises what is perceived as quality journalism instead of 
churnalism. His editorial team does not have a strong influence on his content, but a 
lack of funding does. 
Challenges and limitations 
According to Reese’s (2001) model the challenges, constraints and limitations 
journalists deal with, especially in the newsroom, form part of the routine influences 
that can impact journalists’ coverage.  
Financial constraints are the key challenge South African journalists face when 
covering China-Africa. Interviewee 11 explains that the “I want it free” mentality of 
news consumers forces “reconceiving our models for how we build our news 
gathering institutions”. The coverage of China-Africa is particularly under-resourced. 
Interviewee 11 describes being unable to pursue a China-Africa story past threatened 
arrest from the Chinese government, because of a frustrating lack of resources. 
Financial limitations can restrict investigative journalism, particularly in cases where 
journalists or publications require legal backing. 
To get around this challenge, some publications experiment with reconceptualising 
their financial situation. Interviewee 3’s publication has increasingly sought outside 
funders. To underline their impartiality, the publication adds a disclaimer to 
acknowledge their financial contributors. However, they have no space to elaborate 
on the funders, their agenda, or why they agreed to the funding. Interviewee 3’s 
publication protects its journalistic integrity because, if it is ever compromised, “it can 
never be rebuilt” (Interviewee 3). Individual journalists also team up with extra-media 




Greenpeace. Donor funding could influence journalists’ angles, depending on their 
own agenda. 
Additionally, South African journalists struggle to push environment stories onto the 
news agenda. This, according to the interviewees, is partially due to editors’ implicit 
or explicit lack of understanding, interest or concern about sustainable development. 
South African newsrooms generally see a quick turnover of news editors. “It’s a high-
pressure job, so they will be there for about a year and then burn out” (Interviewee 6). 
This compounds the problem, as journalists find it challenging to continually explain 
the importance of environmental stories to new editors.  
Journalists complain that South African audiences suffer from what Interviewee 11 
calls “an inbred parochialism” or a lack of interest in the outside world – and other 
African countries, in particular. “It’s a pervasive intellectual tendency that is quite 
endemic throughout the entire press corps in this country.” This illustrates the 
difficulty for journalists of pushing China-Africa onto the news agenda. Interviewee 1 
found it challenging that his editors and colleagues view China through a Western 
framework with “Western standards and criteria”. This has led to adapting interesting 
or sensational angles on China.  
The routine influences of journalists (Reese 2001) highlighted in this section include 
deadlines, challenges, limitations and the impact on coverage of China’s sustainable 
development and human rights. The following section examines organisational 
influences in a similar manner. 
 
3. Organisational influences 
“The walls of these organizations have become more fluid as they enter into 
collaborative relationships, and they take on a range of new emerging forms from the 
large-scale enterprise of daily news gathering to the small-staff, minimalist blogging 
operation” (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016:400). The organisational influences in this 
study are defined by journalists’ perception of objectivity, target audiences, and their 





South African journalists generally believe objectivity is impossible. People are 
shaped by their background, upbringing, work environment, identity and values that 
influence how they cover a story. Some journalists are strongly opined that all 
journalists are subjective (Interviewee 1; Interviewee 9).  
Journalists draw on the conceptual framework taught in South African journalism 
training institutions to discuss the concept of objectivity – a search for “truth” through 
“neutral”, “balanced,” “nuanced” reporting via the “right of reply” (Interviewee 3; 
Interviewee 5), all of which is not necessarily a tangible goal, but rather “an attitude” 
or a “lifetime attempt” (Interviewee 2). Journalists were taught to use multiple sources 
to improve objectivity. However, “the journalist already knows this is my angle, this 
is what I want my reader to think about once they’re done reading the story” 
(Interviewee 10). 
Journalists are taught the inverted pyramid type of journalism which focuses on the 
facts of an occurrence. Interviewee 3 calls it “as dispassionate as possible.” This is a 
typical Western, liberal-individualist normative value linked to “professionalism” and 
what Tuchman (1972) terms a “strategic ritual” of objectivity – essentially relying on 
the appearance of impartiality. Interviewee 3 disapproves of the learned notion of 
objectivity in particular. His rejection of his formal journalistic education might affect 
his journalistic style.  
Rejecting so-called “watchdog” journalism might open some journalists up to 
constructive journalism, an approach that China favours. Constructive journalism 
differs from watchdog journalism in the sense that, in the latter framework, journalists 
are expected to simply provide facts, without focusing on solutions. Moeller (1999) 
suggests that, unlike traditional media approaches, constructive journalism 
deliberately leaves grey areas in coverage in an attempt to avoid negative emotional 
impact on both audiences and journalists. Chinese constructive journalism aligns with 
the concept of “development communication” (Christians et al., 2009), which is 
associated with “positive psychology” (Yanqui & Matingwina, 2016:96). 
Constructive journalism has received criticism for its lack of objectivity – particularly 
its nation-building approach could lead to slanted or uncritical reporting that 




Journalists strive to achieve objectivity as part of journalistic professionalism, 
regardless of their views on its achievability, again reflecting Tuchman’s (1972) 
“strategic ritual” of objectivity. “Listen, I try very, very hard to be an objective 
journalist” (Interviewee 4). “I try, as much as objectivity exists, which is relative” 
(Interviewee 6). Some journalists admittedly avoid covering environmental or human 
rights beats because they find it impossible to remain objective (Interviewee 5). 
Editorial policies can limit objectivity: publications requiring a “juicy angle” 
(Interviewee 5) might lead to potentially slanted stories. Interviewee 10 believes a 
quote “covers your base as well, and your objectivity – this is what somebody said, 
you know, this is not just because I believe [it], this is what that person said”. 
Journalists tend to compare their own objectivity with other journalists as a measuring 
stick of how successfully they are able to achieve it. “I write from my own experience 
and I think I understand both China and Africa. So I would say that I am more 
objective than 99.9% of journalists” (Interviewee 1). The comparative and 
competitive measurement of objectivity and accordingly, professionalism, might lead 
journalists to strive for less subjective coverage of China. However, their motivation 
might stem from being fairer than their peers, rather than intending to give China fair 
coverage. 
Blurring lines of journalism vs activism 
Some journalists disregard objectivity because they consider their journalism to be a 
form of activism. These journalists submit to the righteousness of their subjectivity. In 
fact, objectivity might interfere with their advocacy of ideas. Interviewee 3 uses his 
journalistic platform to critique capitalism. Interviewee 4’s colleagues have pointed 
out her biases in environment stories, and Interviewee 7 openly promotes 
sustainability in his articles. “So in that sense I did write from a green point of view. I 
always understood the need for balance in reporting, but it also depends on how it’s 
presented. You have to weigh up the seriousness of the other arguments. For me in all 
of those there was absolutely no question, in terms of biodiversity conservation, to 
protect what we have” (Interviewee 7). 
Interviewee 11 perceives himself as practicing objectivity through disrupting the 
status quo or the main ideologies of “mediated” society. “I feel like it’s my job to 




description to make it better. I want my readers to understand that reality is a 
construct.” He is not an activist, but perceives himself as a journalist producing 
knowledge to encourage critical thinking. He believes his role is to improve the 
current simplistic coverage of the China-Africa relationship. “How can an 
engagement between 1.1 billion Africans and 1.4 billion Chinese be summed up once 
every two months by the New York Times? In some bullshit article about elephant 
tusks? I would think not very well at all” (Interviewee 11). 
The blurring lines between journalism and activism, and how journalists perceive 
their role in society is a key influence on how China-Africa is covered. Their 
perception that China might be a threat to sustainable development or human rights in 
Africa might reflect in their coverage, as these journalists aim to achieve a perceived 
greater good of advocating for conservation and labour rights, which cannot 
necessarily be achieved through objective reporting. These journalists might give 
more weight to environmental or human rights NGOs critical of China, as it aligns 
with their activism, than Chinese government responses.  
Some journalists, however, do not want to be associated with activism. “I’m an 
environmental reporter and I try not to be an environmental activist” (Interviewee 6). 
This is based on the belief that activism in the journalistic role is not professional, and 
as environmental reporters they need to report the facts, as told by science. “Based on 
the scientific evidence, this should not be happening. That’s not a bias; that is fact” 
(Interviewee 4). The pitfall of science-based journalism is the belief that science is 
automatically objective. Science journalists argue their reporting is accurate because it 
does not reflect personal opinion, but they often blindly trust scientific information. 
Ownership 
Most South African journalists agree that ownership does not play a direct role or 
have an explicit influence on their editorial content. However, the ownership changes 
in South African mainstream media in recent years have had an impact on newsrooms 
and, accordingly, news coverage. Journalists are acutely aware of the developments in 
media ownership. Ownership shifts give journalists a sense of the direction the 
company is heading in. Interviewee 6 is aware that her publication’s owners “do very 




Many journalists experienced ownership influences as big shifts in their publications’ 
ownership or management occurred. In 2013/14, Chinese investors participated in the 
acquisition of South Africa’s second-largest publishing group, Independent Media, by 
Sekunjalo Independent Media Ltd., from its previous Irish owners (Madrid-Morales 
& Wasserman, 2018). Sekunjalo is owned by Dr. Iqbal Survé, a doctor and 
businessman with close ties to South Africa’s ruling party, the African National 
Congress. “The Chinese capital came from the China–Africa Development Fund, a 
government-led investment group, and China International Television Corporation, 
the overseas arm of China’s state-run broadcaster” (Madrid-Morales & Wasserman, 
2018:6). 
During “the sale” (Interviewee 9), Interviewee 4 witnessed changes at her publication, 
that made the ownership shift obvious – including splash articles about new 
management with close ties to the owners. However, she views Iqbal Survé’s editorial 
interference as insignificant: “He wanted the newspaper for ego purposes, and when 
he did interfere, it was mostly to pump himself up, not to interfere in political 
reporting” (Interviewee 4). Survé’s firing of Alide Dasnois sent “shockwaves” 
(Interviewee 9) through the company, however.  
“The sale” led to resignations due to the organisational rework, which created “a 
culture of fear, of speculation, of uncertainty” (Interviewee 9). This was also followed 
by tighter budgets because of the insecurities during the transition. “Financial 
uncertainty is probably, I would imagine, the biggest censor of journalism in South 
Africa or globally. Because if newsrooms don’t have the resources to do certain 
stories, you know people are often not even going to pitch them, because they feel 
that they know that there won’t be space or there won’t be time” (Interviewee 9). 
Interviewee 4 recalls prominent editorial influence from the Independent Media at the 
China-Africa summit in 2015, during which they were “pumping China on the front 
page, in a huge way, above and beyond actual news stories”. Journalists at the 
Independent were embarrassed by the positive angle on China, an “agreement” that 
was “very much pre-planned” (Interviewee 4). The journalists’ powerlessness at 
having to cover a topic with prominence and angles they were dissatisfied with, 





The commercial interests of South African publications have little influence on 
journalists’ editorial content. The firm separation of newsrooms and their advertising 
departments creates a “healthy tension between the sections” (Interviewee 3). 
Interviewee 3 believes his publication’s journalistic freedom attracts advertising, 
because advertisers are then granted credibility themselves. “And you imagine, if 
you’re advertising in the Mail & Guardian, you are also advertising because of that.”  
South Africa’s global multimedia brand, Naspers, has invested in Tencent, a leading 
Chinese online media company (Harber, 2013). Journalists from Media24 are 
generally aware of this close relationship, and claim they are not encouraged to write 
positive articles on China. Interviewee 1’s former publication pulled his article on 
China because it was too pro-China. “I wrote about Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International – they receive most of their funding from the USA, as well as 
the National Endowment for Democracy – to which the Dalai Lama is connected. 
This article was too much against the West” (Interviewee 1). He claims that South 
African newspapers generally have a Western bias, and journalists are unaware of the 
strong Western influence on them. South African journalists are not critically 
consuming Western media: “But the problem with our journalists is that time is 
against them – deadlines, so they Google something and take that as the alpha and 
omega” (Interviewee 1). The Western influence on journalists’ and editors’ 
perceptions of China might outweigh their companies’ ownership and commercial 
interests. 
Audiences 
Most journalists have a keen awareness of who their audiences are. Audience research 
containing information about the Living Standards Measure (LSMs) and other 
characteristics of their target audiences are conveyed by their editors. They referred to 
“the decision-makers,” “the Ruperts,” “influential people,” (Interviewee 1); 
“national,” “Afrikaans,” (Interviewee 2); “conservative Afrikaners,” “Christian” 
(Interviewee 5); “the affluent new black diamonds that have emerged” (Interviewee 
6); and “(speakers of) Kaaps-Afrikaans,” “my auntie” (Interviewee 10) to distinguish 
their audiences. The interviewed journalists mostly write for educated, middle class, 
white, black, and “coloured” readerships. Journalists face the challenge of making 




different audiences. “There always needs to be why do you have to care about this 
issue, how will it affect you?” (Interviewee 6).  
South African journalists try to push their audiences’ boundaries. “You have to keep 
your audience in mind, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that you should keep them 
comfortable” (Interviewee 2). This often leads to editors’ pushback. In her coverage 
of marginalised communities, Interviewee 5 was told by her editor “it’s not ‘our 
church’s people’”. She made her stories relevant to her middle class, white, 
Afrikaans-speaking audience by highlighting the universal aspects of a topic. “It’s just 
a general human rights story – you can’t stay away from that” (Interviewee 5). Many 
journalists are idealistic and perceive their journalistic role to create awareness, 
challenge ignorance or represent unheard voices. However, stories must sell. “They 
don’t mind pushing boundaries, but the balance tends to be in favour of the readers” 
(Interviewee 2).   
Grassroots journalists have a clear idea of who they write for, and their stories aim to 
send specific, relevant messages to their readers. In contrast, other journalists believe 
in an inevitable disconnect between a publication and its readers. “There’s always a 
disconnect in media between who you imagine your audience is, and who they really 
are” (Interviewee 3). He argues that “you never know who your audience is really”. 
This allows journalists to choose from a broader range of news values. China-Africa 
is more likely newsworthy at mainstream publications because they cater to a broader 
audience, and regularly cover international news. These findings point to the need for 
further research on the grassroots vs mainstream media aspect influencing South 
African journalists’ coverage of China. 
This section explored the organisational influences on South African journalists, 
examining their perceptions on objectivity, ownership, commercial interests, and their 
audiences. Most journalists strive for objectivity because it is at the core of their 
journalism education and their perception of professionalism. The coverage of China-
Africa is likely influenced by the blurring lines between activism and journalism. 
Most South African journalists agree that ownership and commercialisation have little 
impact on their coverage. Journalists are aware of their audiences, and try to both 





4. Extra-media influences 
Also referred to by Reese and Shoemaker (2016) as the influence of social 
institutions, extra-media influences focus on the journalists’ relationship with the 
broader society and elements outside of the newsroom. This includes their sources, 
their relationships with government and non-profit organisations, how they use press 
releases, and their media consumption.  
Interviewing sources 
Most South African journalists interview sources to provide balance or credibility to 
their stories, as prescribed by their journalistic training. “At journalism school, I was 
taught that you’ve got different layers of interviewees and you should be careful of 
focusing too much on official voices and the official narrative” (Interviewee 9). To 
avoid punting the official narrative, Interviewee 9 prefers to interview “your person 
on the street”, and Interviewee 2 prefers interviewing those directly affected by an 
issue. Ideally, South African journalists include a multiplicity of voices. “If it is 
possible for you to speak to about 8-10 people, it’s just so much deeper than one 
informed person at one institution. It adds extra voices that challenge your own 
filters” (Interviewee 2).  
It is common for journalists to interview experts when covering sustainable 
development. Experts can include “professors, economists, and renewable energy 
companies” (Interviewee 6) or “international relations analysts” (Interviewee 4). 
Interviewee 4 uses experts only for in-depth stories – which are rarely on China. 
Investigative stories at Interviewee 10’s publication also almost never focus on China. 
For a story such as air pollution in China, Interviewee 3 uses secondary sources, 
which he tracks via Google, to find out who is writing and researching on China. 
South African journalists tend to use government spokespeople only for confirmation 
of, or comment on, a statement. The relationships between journalists and government 
entities vary – rather than an official spokesperson, some journalists use opposition 
parties, local governments or mayors as sources. Journalists may obtain official 
government comment only to fulfil their “need from a legal and ethical standpoint” 
(Interviewee 9). Officials are considered a time-intensive source, because of their 
slow response time. “These [spokespeople] are not people I would use as primary 




2). Political statements are only considered newsworthy when “it’s a position 
someone has taken on something”.  
Nevertheless, some journalists find official comments newsworthy. Interviewee 1 
includes official quotes when writing about China-Africa. “Sometimes I will refer to 
what South African or Chinese government said. For example, I recently quoted Deng 
Xiaoping.” Interviewee 6 interviews policymakers about renewable energy, but they 
are hard to track down. Regarding nuclear energy, she also interviews people from 
Eskom, Russia’s Rosatom or the countries involved. She finds that sources from 
China, who also support nuclear development in Africa, are quite invisible and hard to 
access for comment on nuclear energy – compared to Rosatom, in particular, who are 
very open.  
Interviewee 3 bypasses political rhetoric, and interviews people in government offices 
involved in the actual work of the topic he covers. “There’s always a person doing the 
work, so you try and find them.” These employees respect his publication, and 
“they’re human. And they get angry and they get frustrated and they want things to 
change” (Interviewee 3). Similarly, Interviewee 9 uses “inside sources in government 
that could speak out”. Again, journalists corroborate their stories by adding a 
stratification of voices. “Even if you went to some political rally, you wouldn’t just 
report what Zuma or Malema says, you would talk to a lot of people in the crowd.” 
Interviewee 9 balances official government responses with opposing political party 
responses. “Oppositional political parties are keen to expose things that are 
happening.” Opposition parties are “almost spying” on departments, and they share 
information with journalists as a part of their political mandate. However, Interviewee 
9 uses information from opposition party members “with caution”. 
Interviewee 5 relies on government departmental research. Some government 
departments’ initiatives are managed by reputable researchers in collaboration with 
universities, schools or research units at universities. Even though Interviewee 5 finds 
working with the spokespeople challenging, their statistics are reliable, particularly 
because they work with credible organisations, such as the United Nations agencies.  
Journalists also find it challenging to access government sources. They spend a lot of 
time trying to navigate through “the doorstopper-effect” (Interviewee 4) – a powerful 




Director-General who knows about an issue, but you can’t talk to them directly. You 
have to go through the spokesperson. And I’ve had this situation sometimes where the 
DG would be willing to talk to me, but then says, ‘Just send these questions via the 
spokesperson’, and then the spokesperson would just be like, ‘Oh no, the DG doesn’t 
want to’” (Interviewee 4). Journalists eventually have too many other stories to 
further pursue responses.  
Journalists need mentorship to guide their pursuit of official state sources, particularly 
when hitting a dead end. “This is the thing, if the spokesperson says, ‘No’, I don’t 
know what to do after that” (Interviewee 4). As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the 
Chinese government offers a constant stream of information to Chinese journalists, 
while South African journalists consider their government to be inaccessible.  
The interviewed journalists often use non-governmental organisations as sources. 
According to Interviewee 9, “in journalism the relationship between NGOs and 
journalists is fairly good”. However, they try to ensure a critical engagement with 
them. “When I use an NGO as a source, I make sure that I include a caveat, because 
these organisations are not objective nor authoritative” (Interviewee 1). Journalists 
expect NGOs to be critical of government. Interviewee 9 uses government quotes in 
opposition to NGOs, because “those are two people on a similar level of authority”. 
Journalists are aware of NGOs’ “specific filter,” which is their need for exposure 
(Interviewee 2). “Don’t make a mistake, they are driving their own agenda” 
(Interviewee 2). NGOs have different levels of credibility as news sources. “With 
environmental NGOs, I sort of learned over time that they were on a sort of a 
spectrum – which ones were closer to sort of being very polite to government, and 
which ones were happy to speak openly, and which ones were just plain crazy” 
(Interviewee 4).  
Journalists refuse to include NGOs that “are not credible sources”, such as “climate 
change deniers” (Interviewee 6) and “crazy animal rights groups” (Interviewee 4), in 
their articles. Interviewee 5 focuses on reputable organisations, such as the Human 
Rights Commission, and only interviews individuals sourced through the 
organisation. 
Some journalists “try to stay away from the NGOs” (Interviewee 11). Interviewee 3 




“The worst kind of journalism these days is where an NGO comes to a journalist and 
says here’s our issue, here’s our community, here’s our problem, and the NGO 
organises everything for the journalist, the journalist goes to the place, speaks to the 
people the NGO has chosen.” However, this saves journalists time and resources. 
“Someone comes to you and says here’s a story, and then you do it and then it’s done, 
because you’ve got one day” (Interviewee 3). 
South African journalists’ media consumption 
Apart from Interviewee 1, South African journalists do not regularly consume news 
about China. Interviewee 1 considers background knowledge of, and visiting, China 
as crucial in covering China. “I am critical of journalists who have never been to 
China and then write critically about China. They write that China wants to colonise 
Africa, but at least they’re willing to pay for it.” Interviewee 1 consumes Chinese 
media such as China Daily, People’s Daily and CCTV every day, hoping it will 
increase the quality of his coverage. 
The rest of the interviewed journalists consume both local and international news 
sources. Regarding South African media outlets, some journalists prefer the Cape 
Times, Die Burger, Sunday Times, Sunday Tribune, The Star, Business Day and 
Business Report (Interviewee 4; Interviewee 7). South African journalists seem to 
prefer international, particularly western, media – the majority indicating a preference 
for The Guardian. “The Guardian is my go-to; they are the winner, always. I read The 
Guardian every day. I’m a religious Guardian reader” (Interviewee 6). Other media 
include BBC, BBC News, Sky News, the New York Times, Huffington Post, Mother 
Jones, The Atlantic, Washington Post and LA Times (Interviewee 2; Interviewee 4; 
Interviewee 6; Interviewee 7).  
Interviewee 3 accuses mainstream international publications of not being “left-wing” 
enough. He rather consults “all the leftie lawyers who are doing human rights cases, 
and university professors who do this kind of courses, and then just Google it”. 
Journalists often consult information sources outside of mainstream media, the most 
common being social media. “I go to news websites very seldom. I get stuff on 
Twitter. I would click through from a link on Twitter, but I curate my Twitter feed to 




news sources unnecessary “because Twitter is so instant. And a lot of news sites will 
also have streaming: BBC, CNN, eNCA” (Interviewee 5). 
China-Africa coverage 
South African journalists can be separated into two groups: those who write regularly 
about China, and – far more common – those who write rarely about China. 
Firstly, South African journalists tend to cover China when it features in an 
environmental or human rights story. “It’s been a while since I looked for something 
specific on China policy-wise, so it depends whether it is an environmental type of 
thing. I might refer to them in a cursory manner” (Interviewee 2). Interviewee 2 adds: 
“I have to tell you honestly, China is not high on my radar.” Interviewee 7 similarly 
views China as a conduit for environment stories. “China came into rhino poaching 
and ivory smuggling, but you know I didn’t ever go to China. I don’t recall ever 
asking China trying to get hold of a Chinese diplomat or anything like that” 
(Interviewee 7).  
Secondly, interviewees who regularly focus on China, believe the topic is “not a big 
thing in South Africa” (Interviewee 3). He argues that South Africans are uninformed 
about China. “And that’s what’s weird about it; it’s thousands of years of 
uninterrupted history. We know nothing about it.” Interviewee 3 highlights the 
problem of an “actual Chinese voice” in the coverage of the country: “The problem is 
that research is often US-sourced. I mean just language is a problem. Like the Chinese 
internet doesn’t exist to us because we can’t access it. Chinese research doesn’t exist 
because we can’t access it. It is very dangerous, because there are no points at which 
you can engage with China, realistically speaking. Unless you go to a Confucius 
Institute, but really. There are people who are experts on China, at South African 
universities or UK universities, but they’re not speaking from China’s side. China just 
doesn’t have the voice.” 
The lack of accessibility to information on China means that journalists are 
particularly suspicious of Chinese companies’ lack of transparency. “It is hard to find 
information on where they’re listed, or who owns them” (Interviewee 3). According 
to Interviewee 6: “China is a strong contender for the nuclear deal, although they are 




“quite the opposite of France and Russia”, in that “we don’t get any information from 
them” (Interviewee 6).  
Interviewee 6 argues that China’s diplomacy is weak in South Africa’s nuclear deal 
compared to the Russian media management. “If I take the Russians – they are a great 
example of diplomacy. The media was very negative about them, when that story 
broke that we had struck a deal with them. Then the Russians came in and worked 
very hard on their public perception. They built relationships, and took journalists to 
Russia to show us how hard they’ve worked and that they don’t have the deal. It was 
very well communicated. They built really strong relationships. Journalists are always 
suspicious if you don’t know the people” (Interviewee 6). She can access a range of 
sources when covering Russia, citing a “host of contacts”. She says that, because she 
knows most of them well, they can assist in finding an answer.  
She does not have a similar relationship with China, although they are strong 
contenders for nuclear power. “If I hear a rumour tomorrow of Zuma receiving this 
much money from China for a nuclear deal, I wouldn’t know who to ask. I don’t 
know anybody from China. I’ve never been invited. What I read, I get from other 
sources. And I’ve never even received a press release from them. I don’t know them 
at all” (Interviewee 6). These journalists have little access to Chinese information, 
sources or contact points, which makes reporting on the China-Africa issue more 
difficult. Interviewee 3 believes his publication does not get press releases because 
they are “a lost cause. They’ve given up on us” (Interviewee 3). This inaccessibility is 
damaging for the China-Africa representation in South African media. 
Interviewee 6 tracks down the Chinese press attaché, but “that also changes often. 
I’ve done stories on poaching etc., and in most cases they simply don’t get back to 
you” (Interviewee 6). And yet, she also perceives the South African government as 
inaccessible. “If they give me proper answers, I will treat it as such. But if they tell 
me, you know, ‘No comment at this stage’, or just one short sentence response, then I 
won’t value it.” Engaging with South African government has become increasingly 
difficult. “In the past two years the SA government has closed up a lot” (Interviewee 
6). Interviewee 6 generally works through the ministerial spokespeople, “but it feels 
like there’s a different spokesperson almost every month”. She is concerned about the 




close to themselves, they don’t share much. They want to make it too much effort to 
get your PAIA” (Interviewee 6). 
Distrust of Chinese media  
A common thread with South African journalists seems to be that they do not 
necessarily seek out Xinhua. “I didn’t go there on purpose; I came across it when I 
was Googling information” (Interviewee 6). South African journalists deeply distrust 
Xinhua News Agency, and actively avoid consuming any Chinese media. One 
journalist described Chinese media as “just government propaganda. And it’s quite 
boring, besides like being very pro-government” (Interviewee 10). Xinhua is 
perceived as “obviously propaganda, or spinning” (Interviewee 3). Interviewee 3 is 
inclined to focus on what Xinhua articles try to hide.  
Some journalists are conflicted about the hypocrisy of their distrust. “The problem 
with those is, again it’s hypocrisy; because they’re owned by the government you 
don’t trust them. But, like technically, the BBC is owned by the government and we 
trust them” (Interviewee 3). Interviewee 4 experiences a similar inner conflict. 
“Instinctively I wouldn’t trust Chinese media, but then I would instinctively also 
worry about the Western media bias where they would automatically see everything 
through their lens. I see this in our own newsroom sometimes when there’s just an 
automatic assumption that anything coming out of the Chinese newsfeed is false. So I 
would trust neither us nor them. We really don’t trust Xinhua at all.” 
This section explored the journalists’ engagement with extra-media influences (Reese, 
2001), and how their sources and media consumption might influence their coverage 
of China. South African journalists rarely deliberately cover China and inherently 
distrust Chinese media sources, which resonates with findings from Madrid-Morales 
and Wasserman (2018). Journalists do not trust Xinhua in particular, because its 
content is considered to be pro-government propaganda, spinning false and 
uninteresting. Journalists admit to being more comfortable consuming western media, 
even if they are also state-owned. Additionally, South African journalists perceive 
China as inaccessible – Chinese companies lack transparency, which leads to distrust 
of Chinese business and government. Media sources and expertise generally reflect a 




close relationship with the increasingly inaccessible South African government, as 
South African journalists have a deep mistrust of their own government.  
 
5. Ideological influences 
This section explores the ideological or “social systems” (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016) 
influences on South African journalists’ coverage of China. The influence of social 
institutions in this study refers to journalists’ regard of the importance of the China-
Africa topic, and their perception of China’s soft power efforts.  
China-Africa as newsworthy topic 
Despite the fact that most of the journalists interviewed rarely cover the topic, they all 
regard the coverage of China-Africa as important. Journalists who feel strongly about 
the significance of the topic, try to write about China regularly and therefore seem to 
know more about the relationship. Some journalists argue that a focus on business 
practice is crucial, while others suggest power relationships are more important.  
Experienced writers on China believe it is an “absolutely essential” topic for South 
African media. “You can’t understand the last fifteen years in Africa, which has 
effectively been a massive shift in growth on the continent without understanding the 
relationship with China. There’s [sic] been many misconceptions about how this 
relationship unfolds across the continent, largely because very few people on this 
continent know anything about China. So much of the thinking around this issue has 
been rumour-based and misconception-based” (Interviewee 11).  
According to Interviewee 11, China-Africa coverage should explain how Chinese 
business works. He highlights the Chinese state-owned SinoHydro’s projects in 
Botswana as a case study. “SinoHydro was doing terrible work. Botswana’s 
regulations with regards to how a company tenders, and how a company produces, is 
[sic] very strict. What they were faced with is the world’s single largest engineering 
firm, a foreign policy initiative effectively of the Chinese government, a partner they 
need, was doing terrible work in Botswana.” He argues that most African countries 
would have allowed this to continue. While he perceives Botswana holding 
SinoHydro accountable as an optimistic step for African countries, he argues that 




stakeholders: first… the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), second, its own 
management. If you know that, it becomes a little bit easier to understand who you’re 
dealing with.”  
Few journalists deliberately distinguish between Chinese business and Chinese 
government as separate but interlinked entities. Interviewee 4 differentiates between 
the impact of China as a country, its government, and individual businessmen. “Can 
we really be, like, China is doing that? Or is this, like, a businessman out of millions 
of businessmen? I feel like we look at it as this big country, and every Chinese 
business venture, I think we conflate it with Chinese government. We see 
government’s influence, where perhaps it’s just business expanding.” 
Journalists feel it is important to understand how Chinese state-owned enterprises 
work because they are deeply connected to China’s diplomacy: “Basically they are 
Chinese foreign policy – this go-out policy that the Chinese have been instituting for 
the past ten years – their state-owned enterprises are an adjunct of those policies. 
They need to be out there. Now that’s a really nice negotiating tool if you know 
SinoHydro needs to be in your country in order to give folk certain initiatives that 
have been sent by the Chinese government” (Interviewee 11).  
Chinese companies increase their competitiveness by cutting labour costs to African 
and Chinese employees. Along with “underpaying African labour”, Chinese 
companies also cut costs “with their own management, where an American foreman 
on a Botswana site will likely demand 10 000 dollars a month salary, if a Chinese guy 
gets a tenth of that, he’s doing well” (Interviewee 11). There is little recourse for 
Chinese companies flouting labour regulations, and Interviewee 11 suggests that even 
companies such as SinoHydro are in “vicious competition” with other state-owned 
companies in a battle for survival. 
The competition among Chinese companies can be a “negotiating tool” if understood, 
“but very often African countries tend to be poor negotiators” (Interviewee 11). He 
experiences that “African countries very often don’t have an appetite to enforce their 
own environmental or labour regulations”. Furthermore, “tender processes aren’t 
particularly transparent, so it’s very difficult to know how these tenders are ratified, 




Journalists’ clearer understanding of the Africa-China relationship could lead to 
coverage that empowers African audiences. 
Neocolonialism 
Journalists who rarely cover China perceive its impact in Africa as neocolonial, 
although, as Interviewees 7 and 10 suggest, these journalists often don’t have “enough 
knowledge to actually back it up” or don’t “really understand it”. Interviewee 7, who 
has written about China when covering illegal wildlife trade, is concerned about a 
“one-sided” relationship where China takes Africa’s resources. “And obviously 
poaching, and ivory, and rhino horn. I think that China is involved there. I understand 
that they’re trying to crackdown, or I’ve read that they’re trying to crackdown, but, I 
mean, I have no idea how effective that is or if it’s fronting or whatever.” The 
perception that China’s policies on poaching might be a “front” illustrates a distrust of 
the Chinese government.  
Interviewee 10 is also concerned about neocolonialism in Africa, based on the 
continent’s history. “I am very skeptical and I don’t trust, you know, with the history 
of colonisers coming here and the history of whoever has the most power and the 
most money being able to cause the most damage, I’m very skeptical. Even though I 
don’t really understand it, but the fact is our poor continent has been taken advantage 
of so many times and still is and will continue to be.” Her concern is also based on 
Chinese governance. “And based on the fact how they run their own country, it just 
can’t be a great thing for us” (Interviewee 10).  
Interviewee 2 also perceives China’s environmental approach as neocolonial – and 
her coverage might warn readers. “The stuff that one reads, and I don’t know if it’s 
just perception, but it feels like everyone is just giving consent to this new colonial 
power.” Regarding climate change: “They are probably one of the quiet, stalking 
countries, well they aren’t even quietly stalking anymore, they used to and now they 
are, like, an obvious key player” (Interviewee 2). 
Interviewee 9 does not perceive China as typically neocolonial, however. “We see on 
the African continent, China really massively investing in various types of 
infrastructure to access those raw materials that we need to sell to them. And, unlike 
the colonisation we saw happening with the west when they colonised Africa, at this 




we don’t see China police perhaps the way we have seen other global powers choose 
to do, when they have a stake in something.” However, she believes China has the 
potential to interfere. “When it’s an issue China cares about, like Taiwan, like the 
Dalai Lama, we do see African presidents bowing to that. Maybe we haven’t seen 
interference, just because there hasn’t been an issue that they really wanted to 
interfere on, but not necessarily because they see it as below them, or from some kind 
of moral sphere of reasoning” (Interviewee 9). 
Interviewee 10 is concerned about powerful countries’ general global impact. “China 
is one of the world’s superpowers. China and America now are synonymous in your 
mind. And we’ve all seen what America has done to the world. Do we really want 
superpowers here on our continent? But what can you do, it’s all about money, it’s 
about opportunities, investments, it’s about the economy” (Interviewee 10). She 
illustrates many journalists’ perception that Africa is powerless against superpowers, 
which might lead to covering China as an imperialistic threat to Africa.  
China thus appears as a superpower vs a powerless Africa. Interviewee 9 argues that 
some African nations do not have “enough land to feed their own population because 
they’ve sold off that land to powers like China”. She is concerned that Africa does not 
benefit from its own natural resources. “So we kind of find ourselves in a difficult 
position where we are kind of like the poor cousin” (Interviewee 9). She refers to 
South Africans as “cautious” about Chinese issues, particularly labour conflicts. 
Chinese labour “raises suspicion”, and Interviewee 9 thinks there is “concern about a 
tipping point, that there may come a point where we’ve given away too much of our 
power, and we don’t feel then that we can call the shots for ourselves”. Journalists 
who have less experience or knowledge about China, indicate higher levels of 
skepticism and pessimism towards China. 
China-Africa and the South African audience  
Journalists seem to feel that the China-Africa topic is not necessarily important to all 
South African audiences. “The topic is fairly interesting. Topics such as Brexit, the 
USA elections, the EU, Russia etc., is more interesting to the average Afrikaans 
reader” (Interviewee 8). Journalists find their audiences’ “South African outlook” 
challenging, because it limits their interest in China-Africa stories. “The average 




kind of the apex of all of the world’s problems. And we don’t tend to see a larger 
picture. There’s a very strict wall on our northern border, an intellectual and policy 
wall on our northern border” (Interviewee 11). Nuanced coverage also does not seem 
to appeal to South African audiences. “We first of all don’t think much about the rest 
of Africa if we think about it at all. We think even less about the rest of the world 
outside of simplistic notions like America = bad, Russia = bad. It’s a very 
unsophisticated outlook that runs all the way up. Almost through policy circles 
straight into the foreign relations departments of the government, and certainly the 
political parties” (Interviewee 11).  
The China-Africa topic is therefore considered by journalists to be primarily of 
academic interest at the moment, as Interviewee 11 suggests. He classes the work at 
Stellenbosch’s Centre for Chinese Studies and the Wits China-Africa reporting 
programme to be “very good work” conducted by people who “know exactly what’s 
going on”, but also believes Africa-China knowledge currently exists in “isolated 
academic pockets,” and apart from his own book and a few others, there’s “very little 
real work that’s been done” (Interviewee 11).  
Wasserman (2016) found that South African journalists are interested in the China 
topic from an economic and political point of view, which Interviewee 4 echoes; “The 
China topic is important to South Africans. I mean any country that comes and makes 
sort of big investments in Africa is something that we should be aware of, because 
this continent has been so exploited” (Interviewee 4). She argues that South Africans 
are “weary” of China’s investments, while western countries are not interrogated. She 
puts this down to assuming that the “US must have good interests; they’re here to 
protect us”, whereas China is not afforded the same assumption.  
Interviewee 2 also considers the economic news value as key to South African 
audiences because of the role of Chinese businesses in South African society. “The 
role of China in the markets, and a lot of our business has major interests in China... 
And then just generally migration – there’s not even a small rural town that doesn’t 
have a Chinese shop. So it is kind of like East meets West – and China is already 
here. It’s not on a map – it affects people already” (Interviewee 2). Interviewee 9 goes 
further and believes Africa is actually dependent on China. “In terms of South 




Regarding manufacturing, “it’s sort of a chicken-egg situation because the rise of 
China and other Asian countries has made our locally produced products no longer 
competitive” (Interviewee 9). 
Journalists might be skeptical about the China-Africa trade relationship, but 
acknowledge its importance. “I say I don’t trust the Chinese government, but I also 
think if we didn’t trade with China at all we’d have a problem” (Interviewee 5). 
Interviewee 5 does not perceive China to be the greatest international threat to South 
Africa, which she feels is “our relationship with Russia” because she thinks “Putin is 
likely a psychopath… I think China is more comfortable with westerners than Russia 
is. And it’s more open to westerners.”  
Besides economics, China also has political news value to journalists, as Interviewee 
6 explains that the ANC are “huge fans of China’s political model”. However, this 
angle seemingly does not appeal to South African audiences either. “The ordinary 
South African doesn’t really care about some Chinese official visiting the country; 
we’re going to have to break it down for them: why this is important, why it matters” 
(Interviewee 10). China-Africa remains an economically and politically important 
topic to journalists, even though they may have to adapt frames to sell it to local 
audiences.  
Interview findings suggest that journalists also believe in the news value of China’s 
sustainable development and human rights. China “has definite footsteps on the 
continent” and they are important to environmental journalism because “it’s one of 
the biggest polluters” (Interviewee 2). Although Interviewee 6 recognises the 
importance of the China-Africa relationship, neocolonialism and environmental 
impact is still an overriding worry, China has “relevance for sustainable development 
in South Africa. China’s influence remains big in Africa, they’re very strong 
contenders for a nuclear deal that will possibly be one of the largest flows of money 
from one country to another. Their influence is growing – they are opening more and 
more mines, and that is also a worry for me. To see the mines they are constructing in 
Africa – coal mines – and they have a very bad environmental track record here. They 
don’t meet environmental regulations – or that’s what I’ve seen, I don’t want to say 
all of them, but a large majority” (Interviewee 6).  




All the interviewed journalists believe the media can impact China’s image, aside 
from Interviewee 8, who suggests that “the media plays no role in improving China or 
South Africa’s image. The media have to report as objectively as possible and analyse 
it” (Interviewee 8).  
Interviewee 9 argues that “the media can influence people’s perceptions. Just as any 
story that you read can influence you or provide you with a certain factual basis for 
your thinking, obviously stories about China can do that.” She argues that the media 
use “buzzwords” such as “xenophobia,” or “economic opportunities” to “drum up 
fear” or “drum up support,” when covering China. “I don’t think that we really see a 
lot of overtly negative reporting in South Africa on China; it probably more has those 
undercurrents of suspicion, of caution, of unpredictability that we see in society.” 
Regardless of positive or negative reporting on China, Interviewee 9 doubts coverage 
affects government policy. “I’m not sure that if there were a lot of negative reporting 
on issues around Chinese cooperation that that would necessarily sway government’s 
position.” 
Some journalists believe media coverage has already affected China’s reputation. “I 
think in the liberal media, the Chinese have inevitably been villainised. I don’t think 
there’s been a proper understanding of how much has changed geopolitically, with 
regards to how the Chinese have behaved on the continent” (Interviewee 11). For 
example, the media lacks coverage of China diverting from its non-interference policy 
by sending its military to South Sudan, taking responsibility for its investments. 
Interviewee 11 argues that, overall, South African media do not cover the progression 
of China’s policies in Africa. He argues that a lack of coverage stems from a lack of 
understanding, especially of China-Africa multilateral initiatives, such as the Forum 
on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). These initiatives have led to “almost the 
beginnings of a Cold War in Africa” with regards to how Japan, Russia and the USA 
perceive their involvement in Africa. 
Chinese media investments can increase journalists’ skepticism of China, whether the 
investment is manifest or latent, says Interviewee 3, who is mostly concerned about 
editorial influence. Interviewee 3 assumes China’s media investments are meant for 
influence, because media in South Africa is “not an entirely profitable industry”. 




other countries. According to Interviewee 3, the former Irish ownership at the 
Independent was less threatening. “Because we imagine we understand them, and that 
they’re not bad people. The main thing is that we know fuck all about China. It’s 
always cast as this thing. And it’s always China, it’s never… when Chinese people 
smuggle ivory – China did it. It’s like China is a single entity that’s either evil or nice 
or whatever. And we know absolutely nothing about the politics of China” 
(Interviewee 3). This links to the argument above that journalists who are more 
knowledgeable about China might produce more nuanced coverage. 
Journalists fear that China’s media interference might impact media freedom in South 
Africa. “Our government speaks so glowingly of China. It makes it difficult not to 
link things like this, like when they come back and write entire articles in the 
newspaper, and how much they’ve learned from the Chinese government, and then at 
the same time try to implement something like the Secrecy Bill. Well who did you 
learn that from? You’ve got two people you’re learning it from: the Apartheid 
government and the Chinese government” (Interviewee 4). Again, China’s close 
relationship with the South African government might damage its image. “And I 
wonder perhaps if a lot of the distrust that particularly the middle class feels for South 
African government sort of spills over to the Chinese government. About China – we 
don’t like them so much and then the ANC doesn’t like them, well we do. There’s 
such a tendency to be pro-anything that the ANC hates, and anti-everything the ANC 
loves” (Interviewee 4). 
Lastly, Interviewee 3 commented on the lack of China coverage and how that 
impacted on the perception of the country in South Africa. The problem is that 
“Europeans, to South Africans, have a face you know – we will be angry about Brexit 
or Boris Johnson, or Angela Merkel doing things to Syrian people, but they’re 
humans. And once they’re humans they can’t really be mean, because they’re people. 
But China is a thing, and once it’s a thing, you can give it any sort of motive. There’s 
no face to China. When you say China did this, they don’t think of the Premier, there 
really isn’t a face, isn’t a person, it’s not relatable at all” (Interviewee 3). Interviewee 
3 does not consider Xi Jinping to be China’s relatable face. “In other African 
countries it’s a big thing, because obviously he goes there and it’s big news. If the 
Chinese premier comes [to South Africa] and you write about it, it seems like you’re 




might come across as supporting Chinese public relations but, conversely, the lack of 
coverage objectifies the China-Africa issue and makes it less relatable. 
Understanding China’s soft power 
Many South African journalists have a vague understanding of the notion of “soft 
power”, but it seems journalists experienced in writing about China have a deeper 
understanding of the concept and how it operates. Journalists who are unfamiliar with 
soft power associate it with fear and danger. Interviewee 10 wonders if “it’s not overt, 
right? It’s subtle but it’s just as dangerous, right? It’s almost like the idea that we’re 
coming here to help you, but at the end of the day, they take over everything.” 
Interviewee 5 is similarly confused: “What it sounds like to me, is soft power in 
relation to hard power – so then soft power would be a more material government or 
leadership. And I would say soft power is stuff that’s more implicit, for example 
something is not illegal, but it is understood that you are not allowed to do that. But I 
really don’t know.” This misconception is potentially because of the word “power”, 
which is generally associated with exploitation. Soft power might be understood 
relative to hard power, which gives it a negative connotation amongst the journalists 
interviewed.  
Some journalists are aware of soft power strategies, such as China’s media 
investments, without necessarily being familiar with the terminology. “No I can’t say 
that I have [heard of soft power]. Look, I mean a Chinese consortium owns a quarter 
of Independent Newspapers, so you know, if that’s the kind of thing you’re talking 
about then, ya. It’s real. Isn’t there a government-owned TV station? And Sekunjalo 
had sent two of my former colleagues to China to go and work there – so there is 
some cross-pollination a bit” (Interviewee 7).  
Most journalists assume soft power is exerted by China in the China-South Africa 
relationship, but Interviewee 2 questions the power flow. Particularly regarding the 
Naspers-Chinese relationship, she says: “I’m not exactly sure where soft power 
begins and ends. Who influences who there? But if you think about countries 
globally, that you should take seriously, I’d say Lesotho has a lot less soft power than 
China” (Interviewee 2). She views South Africa and China’s influence to be 
comparable, and might therefore be less likely to cover China as neocolonial. Some 




South Africa, in their sort of softer policy, and taking that reputation as diplomatic 
and conflict-resolving and using that in international negotiations. So that’s what I 
understand by soft power, it’s not a direct influence as much as a reputation influence, 
diplomatic influence. In relation to China, I don’t know” (Interviewee 4). 
The interviewed journalists also link soft power to a country’s reputation. Interviewee 
4 thinks that soft power is “more like a branding issue, like the way your country is 
perceived in other places, and the sway that can lend you within the global sphere”. 
She compares the soft power of Obama in other countries, “as opposed to a military 
power or an economic power. So it’s like less tangible than traditional forms of 
power, and is more perspective-based” (Interviewee 4). 
Journalists assume soft power also extends beyond nations. Interviewee 2 wonders if 
the “sphere of influence” is limited to countries. She calls soft power the “brainprint”, 
which sectors they stand out in, and in which they lead. “For example, if you’re 
looking towards someone that’s working with solar power then they think of the 
Chinese. I’m not sure exactly how to define it, but it’s a diplomatic term. And 
diplomacy is not just operating in big halls or conference rooms” (Interviewee 2).  
China’s economic influence is also commonly recognised as part of its soft power. 
“When I think about their influence it always comes back to economics. And again 
my gut intuition is that, if you have that much Chinese business interest in South 
Africa, how that might influence politics. I mean there’s a whole lobby group that 
we’re not necessarily thinking about. The mining companies themselves are an entire 
lobby group. They’ve been around for centuries” (Interviewee 4). 
The effect of accessibility on soft power 
Journalists in this sample suggest that Chinese lack of accessibility limits media 
engagement and, accordingly, soft power. For example, the Chinese embassy invited 
Interviewee 3 to visit China, in an effort to soften his coverage of a Chinese 
company’s involvement in illegal fishing. “The Chinese embassy sent a press release 
saying it’s all a misunderstanding, they couldn’t speak English. So the Chinese 
spokesperson said why don’t you come to China on a visit so you can better 
understand us?” (Interviewee 3). Interviewee 3 instead responded with questions, but 
claims he cannot “even get answers out of the Chinese embassy”. He further suggests 




in South Africa”: “It is bizarre how basically our biggest ally and trading partner, and 
the person the ANC is staking its future on – we know nothing. But I imagine all of 
China’s allies are like that. Zambia?” Interviewee 3 argues that media in other African 
countries differ from South Africa, and they therefore engage differently with China. 
For example, an official Chinese state visit is “a big issue in those countries, whereas 
here, like that when the premier visits, or like three weeks ago when the head of the 
Chinese navy visited, which is big right? For South African issues. Nothing.” The 
journalist also suggests that South African audiences do not trust their state media: 
“Because, if the SABC goes and reports on it, people just say it’s all lies. And then 
it’s not an issue. So that could be another thing, we have enough media; there isn’t 
one tone on what China is” (Interviewee 3).  
According to Interviewee 5, China’s soft power is damaged by their close relationship 
with South African government, as South African journalists deeply mistrust their 
state departments. “Our government has quite a friendly relationship with China, so I 
don’t know if I could find anything of substance from, for example, DIRCO. They’d 
probably give me a quote from government, and I wouldn’t rely on it.” She also 
consults news stories that have already been written by “reputable organisations” such 
as Al Jazeera. “I wouldn’t necessarily rely on CNN – I don’t trust American news 
organisations” (Interviewee 5). 
However, some of China’s inaccessibility could also benefit its soft power efforts 
through what Interviewee 3 calls “anti-media”: “It’s like every time you send 
questions to the Chinese embassy – if you just don’t answer things, what are people 
gonna do? You can’t get outraged if someone just completely ignores you. So if you 
have Chinese vessels sailing around Africa, plundering all the fish, and that company 
and the embassy never say anything about it, so what?” (Interviewee 3). 
Some journalists believe China’s soft power efforts are pointless without successful 
media engagement. “Confucius Institutes, etc. are all efforts from China’s side to 
improve their soft power. China doesn’t know how to work with the media. They 
write a press release and boom, there you go” (Interviewee 1). Many journalists had 
never heard of Confucius Institutes. China’s content and distribution of information 
are considered inadequate, and a key barrier to media engagement is language. “All 




The biggest obstacle is the language. But now you can learn Mandarin in so many 
places in South Africa” (Interviewee 1).  
China’s South African media investments also do not necessarily translate into soft 
power success. “They don’t have any. At all. I suppose that’s why China has to buy 
influence. It’s very obviously money, money, oh well, we’ll build you a tar road, or a 
dam. They don’t have Hollywood or Top Gear” (Interviewee 3). Compared to cultural 
initiatives such as Confucius Institutes, China’s investments in South African media 
are potentially counter-productive. This might feed suspicion of China, rather than 
building a positive image. “Sure, they have set up institutes at Rhodes, Wits and 
Stellenbosch. But I guess also in a weird way, something like buying up Independent, 
is almost sort of such an easy way to get people’s backs up” (Interviewee 9).  
Does Chinese soft power need South African media to succeed? 
Interviewee 11 believes that soft power via media investments is virtually 
unattainable. “Soft power is very, very hard to do. There was a great story about a TV 
news channel in Arabic that the Americans started right around the kick off of the war 
on terror, called el-minhar. It was like an Arabic Fox or an Arabic CNN. And it 
completely bombed. Now if the Americans couldn’t do it – you know, the people who 
basically invented the 24 hour news cycle, who invented CNN, who invented cable 
television. If they couldn’t do it – I’m not quite sure what the Chinese were thinking 
when they started a number of these kind of soft power news ventures.” He also 
questions China’s media diplomacy in the robust South African media market. “At 
first, I think some of the CCTV stuff was relatively successful, and I think in 
countries like Kenya, and some other countries it’s become slightly more entrenched, 
but here – the media market is so competitive. While Independent Newspapers does 
have Chinese money, and while there is Chinese money in South African media, 
South African media is also in the Chinese market. It’s not like it’s totally a one-way 
street.” He also claims that China’s soft power fails partly because they underestimate 
Africans’ knowledge of when they are being influenced. “I also don’t think Africans 
are as dumb as people make us out to be… It may or may not be appreciated, and 
Chinese ties with the country may or may not be strengthened, but nonetheless it’s 




China’s soft power does not necessarily reflect its relevance to the African continent. 
In fact, journalists suggest that the discussion around China’s soft power successes 
diverts attention from how they have already been proven invaluable. “The 
relationship is really, really important. It’s provided an alternative to the west that’s 
literally bumped up GDPs across sub-Saharan Africa, by 5.5 %. So I mean to 
decouple and start thinking of the relationship in manipulative terms with regards to 
soft power initiatives, tends to steer you away from how important the relationship 
actually is. It provides an alternate market to the west that is 1.4 billion people strong. 
We can’t afford to turn away from that” (Interviewee 11). 
There is also a perception amongst the journalists that China inefficiently engages 
with South African media, which then pose the question whether China needs the 
media to implement soft power at all. “I would argue that the soft power initiatives 
that do work: clinics, to a much, much lesser extent, education, but you know that 
kind of cultural exchanges is as old as the hills. I would argue that they should be 
going with what works.” Interviewee 11 believes health diplomacy is more relevant 
than media diplomacy. “Soft power is also clinics, soft power is also education – the 
expansion of the Confucius Institutes, the fight against ebola, the fight against 
tuberculosis. There are a number of really interesting Chinese soft power ventures, 
most of which outside of health, I would argue have been unsuccessful.”  
Interviewee 11 suggests that China “go with stuff that works”. He argues that media 
investment does not. “The media stuff – buying up media… any country needs to be 
fairly considerate about how much foreign ownership is allowed in its media 
corporations. But for obvious reasons, here, that’s far less of a consideration than 
sanction battles within the ruling party. So I would be very nervous about more than 
49% ownership in South African media institutions” (Interviewee 11).  
China’s concrete solutions, such as health diplomacy, have the potential to fulfil even 
a charm defensive mandate. “I think the Chinese know better than most that you can’t 
turn around perceptions in an afternoon. If indeed they are, as they say they are, 
playing the long game, any Chinese diplomat or bureaucrat or policymaker you speak 
to will tell you that this is the long game, then chill out. One great way to implement a 
soft power strategy is to do it for a while, and to have it work, and for it to benefit the 




notions of the Chinese as neocolonial powers and oppressors, many of which are 
justified, and human rights abusers, which are entirely accurate, that’s going to take 
time" (Interviewee 11). 
This section discussed South African journalists’ knowledge of China’s soft power 
efforts, as well as their perception on the importance of the China-Africa topic. There 
are potential ideological influences on South African journalists’ coverage of China 
(Reese, 2001). In this chapter, it seems that most South African journalists 
acknowledge their lack of substantial knowledge about China, as they focus on China 
in a cursory manner. Journalists who rarely cover China, seem to be skeptical and 
pessimistic about China’s influence on the African continent, deeming it neocolonial. 
They also distrust Chinese environment policies, and Chinese governance as a whole. 
South African journalists are concerned about the exploitation of Africa by powerful 
nations in general, because they perceive Africa as powerless. This might lead to 
covering China as an imperialistic threat to Africa. 
Journalists who cover China-Africa often, tend to display a more nuanced perception 
of China. Some journalists believe China-Africa coverage should educate readers 
about how Chinese business works, especially because it is deeply connected to 
China’s diplomacy. Knowledge of China in Africa can be empowering to African 
audiences – the competition among Chinese companies in particular can be a useful 
negotiating tool, especially since Africa is considered a poor negotiator. Few 
journalists deliberately distinguish between Chinese business and Chinese 
government as separate but interlinked entities. 
Journalists feel the China-Africa topic is not necessarily important to all South 
African audiences. They perceive the topic remaining stuck in academia, as little 
concrete coverage is being done. Wasserman (2016) found that South African 
journalists are interested in the China topic from an economic and political point of 
view. This study finds that journalists also believe in the news value of China’s 
sustainable development and human rights. Some journalists perceive China’s 
environmental approach as neocolonial – and their coverage might be aimed at 
warning readers. 
The majority of the interviewed journalists believe the media can impact China’s 




increase journalists’ skepticism of China, particularly regarding potential editorial 
influence and media freedom in South Africa. While some journalists believe China’s 
soft power efforts are pointless without successful media engagement, others believe 
media investments do not necessarily translate into soft power success, and China’s 
inaccessibility harms its soft power efforts. Journalists believe concrete solutions, 
such as health diplomacy, hold more value in Africa than media diplomacy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the results of interviews with South African journalists to 
determine the potential individual, routine, organisational, extra-media, and 
ideological influences on their coverage of China’s sustainable development and 
human rights. The results of these interviews seem to show that South African 
journalists only cover China in a cursory manner. They perceive China as 
exploitative, extractionist, careless and harmful towards the environment, but South 
African journalists tend to draw on what they consume in the media or hear from 
peers to inform their opinion of China’s environmental impact. Journalists perceive 
China’s environmental impact in Africa as an expected, normalised side-effect of 
development. They believe China does not necessarily have an intentional disregard 
for the environment, and that their environmental impact is not worse than that of 
developed countries in Africa. Journalists are pressured to provide stories that sell or 
get clicks. Rhino poaching news sells, and, since South African media portrays China 
as the key perpetrator of poaching, it is likely to feature on the news agenda often. 
Journalists also perceive China as negatively impacting human rights in Africa, 
particularly in favour of capitalism. China’s lax human rights are viewed as an 
automatic side-effect of economic growth. Journalists’ lack of understanding of 
China’s approach to human rights vs a western approach, could further the us-vs-them 
ideology when covering China. Anything outside of the western human rights 
framework might be covered as a violation. 
Financial constraints are the key challenge South African journalists face when 
covering China-Africa. South African journalists strive for neutrality despite the fact 
that it is idealistic, again reflecting Tuchman’s (1972) “strategic ritual” of objectivity. 




form of activism. Journalists’ perception of their role in society – the blurring lines 
between activist and journalist – might influence their coverage of China. 
Journalists experienced ownership influences as big shifts in their publication’s 
ownership occurred, primarily as Chinese-linked Sekunjalo took over Independent 
Media. These journalists felt powerless when having to cover China with prominence 
and a positive angle that they were dissatisfied with, illustrating how ownership 
outweighs personal opinions when covering China. 
South African journalists aim to include a multiplicity of voices in their articles. State 
sources are sometimes used, but journalists find both the South African and Chinese 
government to be inaccessible. They also have a positive relationship with NGOs as 
sources. Journalists are concerned that press releases tend to be western sources that 
are highly critical of China, but seem to prefer international, particularly western, 
media to stay informed.  
Overall, this study has found that South African journalists rarely write about China. 
When they do, they find China either inaccessible or inherently distrust Chinese 
media and sources. South Africa has enough independent media available for the 
public not to rely on the public broadcaster or other official sources. While state 
media in other African countries promote visits by Chinese officials, in South Africa 
it can harm China’s image, because South Africans tend to distrust its public 
broadcaster. Generally, China’s soft power is damaged by their close relationship with 
South African government, as South African journalists have a deep mistrust of their 
state. South African journalists also do not trust Xinhua in particular, because it is 
considered to be pro-government propaganda, spinning, false and uninteresting. Some 
journalists are conflicted about their hypocrisy of distrusting Xinhua, while 
consuming western state-owned media. Journalists admit to being more comfortable 
consuming western media, even though it inadequately portrays Africa.  
The nuanced coverage of China is rare, because most journalists don’t know much 
about China because of inaccessible media sources and engagement, and so can’t 
interact with the China-Africa topic in depth. When journalists do cover China, they 
tend to deem the influence in Africa as neocolonial. These journalists feel the China-
Africa coverage should empower South African readers, not only with how Chinese 




deeply connected. Unfortunately, because of the lack of media engagement, the 
coverage of China is limited. 
The China-Africa topic is not considered to be of importance to all South African 
audiences. The topic is therefore considered to be largely of academic interest and is 
not high on journalists’ news. This finding confirms Wasserman’s (2016), namely, 
that South African journalists are interested in the China topic from an economic and 
political point of view. This study finds that journalists also believe in the news value 
of China’s sustainable development and human rights. Some journalists perceive 
China’s environmental approach as neocolonial – and their coverage might be aimed 
at warning readers. 
Journalists believe the media can impact China’s image. However, regardless of 
positive or negative reporting on China, journalists doubt it affects government 
policy. Journalists do not consider Xi Jinping to be China’s relatable, human face, 
perpetuating the villainisation of China while the west is humanised.  
Finally, journalists fear that China’s media interference might impact media freedom 
in South Africa. China’s close relationship with the South African government re-
emerges as possibly damaging to China’s image. Journalists unfamiliar with soft 
power, associate it with fear and danger. Some journalists are aware of Chinese soft 
power strategies without necessarily being familiar with the terminology. China’s 
media diplomacy in South Africa is also perceived as unsuccessful, and China’s 
investments in South African media are potentially counter-productive. This might 
feed suspicion of China, rather than building a positive image. Soft power via media 
investments is virtually unattainable, particularly in such a robust media system as 
South Africa’s. South African journalists’ perception that China inefficiently engages 
with South African media then poses the question whether China needs the media to 
implement soft power at all. China’s soft power does not reflect its relevance to the 
African continent, through concrete solutions such as China’s health diplomacy, 





Chapter Seven: Influences on Chinese Journalists 
 
This chapter explores the influences on Chinese journalists when covering China’s 
sustainable development and human rights. It follows a similar approach to Chapter 6, 
where South African journalists were interviewed according to Reese’s hierarchy of 
influences model (2001).  
Chinese journalists were selected on the premise that they are, or have been, 
employed at what this study considers mainstream Chinese media, therefore China 
Radio International (CRI), China Daily, China Central Television (CCTV) (now 
CGTN) and Xinhua News Agency. Employment at mainstream English-language 
Chinese publications ensures that their responses are directly relevant to their 
publications’ content aimed at African audiences. The selected journalists are from a 
wide variety of backgrounds, but throughout this study I refer to them as “Chinese 
journalists”. Many are from mainland China, and currently living in China, or 
correspondents in Africa. Some interviewees are from Africa and currently living in 
different African countries. The journalists were interviewed in China, South Africa 
or via technological means if they were based in other African countries. Unlike the 
South African journalists in Chapter 6, the Chinese journalists could not be selected 
regarding their beats, as it seems mainstream Chinese media rarely has any form of 
beat journalism. 
The interviewees have a relatively strong command of the English language, which 
facilitated communication during the interviews. Mandarin-speaking interviewees, 
who were less confident about their English-language skills, used iPhones to enhance 
their understanding of my questions, as well as to formulate their responses. They 
translated words or phrases using translation apps on their mobile phones, and 
conveyed their understanding of my questions. I would only record their responses 
once we both agreed that the translation accurately reflected both my questions and 
their responses. This was a time-consuming process, since we sometimes had to 
change the words or sentence structures to ensure clear interpretation without 
assumptions in the asking and answering of questions.  
Access to Chinese journalists proved challenging, mostly because they could not 




contacted via snowball sampling through WeChat, email, Whatsapp, Facebook, 
telephone and middlemen, and many rejected my requests for interviews because their 
editors or managers prohibited this interaction. I often had to change the content and 
tone of my requests – eventually explaining to journalists that it might be beneficial to 
China to air their perspectives on sustainable development and human rights. This led 
to a higher rate of respondents.  
Censorship thus played a role in the interview process of this study, and its broader 
impact on Chinese media as an organisational influence will be further discussed later 
in this chapter. For example, two journalists explicitly asked for their identities to be 
protected. One responded via email: “NB: I think this information will get me in 
trouble with my editor. Is it possible to omit my name and some information and 
work experience which can expose me?” The other journalist only agreed to the 
interview if I could guarantee anonymity. They did not reveal their names or any 
identifiable information to me, and we conducted our interview via a WeChat account 
they created especially for the interview. I do not have an email address or any other 
contactable information for this journalist. Despite the other journalists’ relative 
willingness and openness, I treat their anonymity with the same sensitivity, and have 
therefore tried to navigate their identifiable information by omitting unnecessary 
details that could reveal their identities. 
 
1. Individual influences 
This section explores the background education, work experience and journalists’ 
perceptions of China’s human rights and sustainable development, which could 
influence their coverage (Reese, 2001). The interviewees are journalists at the English 
services for abovementioned news agencies, also acting as writers, researchers, hosts, 
anchors, correspondents, translators or editors. 
Educational background 
Many of the interviewed journalists have Bachelor of Arts (BA) degrees as their 
background education, while the China-based journalists’ education includes studying 
English. Interviewee 19 did not study journalism, but was trained via his publication. 




Interviewee 19 perceives it as an advantage. “If you have the background of media 
studies that will be good, or better, because you can then do your job efficiently and 
faster than other people. But it is not a necessarily requirement. It’s a plus if you can 
speak English, especially if you are covering the international reports.”  
Work experience  
Many of the journalists at Chinese publications consider their positions at the 
mainstream state media institutions as admirable. “CCTV is a state broadcaster so the 
position was very attractive. People who work for them are high up. [In South Africa] 
we seem like ordinary people, but in China national media gets a lot of respect” 
(Interviewee 13). Interviewee 19 explained that he applied to Xinhua during what he 
calls “graduate season”, “because it is the national news agency so it is very famous 
and very powerful”. He was awarded the position after a six month internship. “About 
2 000 people applied for that job and only two people were appointed.” The 
competitiveness to work for a state-owned media agency is based on the perception 
that they offer good, honourable jobs. “Although I got other offers, I rejected them 
and I think at Xinhua this is a very good job.”  
Xinhua in particular is considered special as it involves “the top leaders in China”. 
Xinhua “not only has the right to report like other news agencies, but also it has the 
right to write internal reference[s].” Other people cannot write internal references, 
which are ultimately submitted to top leadership, such as ministers. Internal 
references are not published, but are “private” (Interviewee 19) and used by the 
government as information pieces on a certain topic. Interviewee 19 recently wrote an 
internal reference on Confucius Institutes in Africa. “Because I remember in 2014 
America shut down one Confucius Institute. I [told] my supervisor that there are a lot 
of Confucius Institutes in Africa, and I [wrote] a kind of report or internal reference, 
and he thought it’s okay”.  
“At Xinhua journalists work for local government, which means you represent 
essential government” (Interviewee 19). Interviewee 16 helped promote Chinese 
media in South Africa. He spent time in Beijing, New York and South Africa as a 
correspondent for Xinhua’s TV channel. “We have many clients, some in South 
Africa I have helped develop. In South Africa, I was sort of the public relations 




Interviewee 17 has become a translator for Chinese people in South Africa that are 
affected by crime, and take their cases to court. She also translates for people who 
have been accused of poaching. “These individuals are innocent – local lawyers are 
paid off.” She accuses the South African police of being involved with these cases, 
along with individuals from Hong Kong, Vietnam and Taiwan. Interviewee 17 
explains that big syndicates are using local people or average Chinese people. “These 
Chinese people go to jail and the big syndicates bail them out. They don’t even speak 
any English. The syndicates say it is all organised – ‘gangster’. They are controlling 
the poaching from far away.”  
Many of the Chinese-speaking journalists are employed because of their English 
skills. “I was good at English. Our English is not as good, but we practice with 
international students from USA and African countries at my university. Grammar 
was a big focus in high school” (Interviewee 16). Journalists’ strong command of 
English could open them up to exposure from different news sources outside of state-
owned Chinese publications, which might be critical of China. However, as 
journalists are given clear guidelines what to report on, their English skills might 
simply only increase their chances of employment at English-language Chinese 
publications. Journalists employed at English-speaking Chinese publications often 
find these positions as markers of esteem – particularly because of their proximity to 
the Chinese government. This increases the competition amongst journalists to be 
employed at Xinhua in particular.  
Journalists’ perceptions of China’s sustainable development 
According to Reese (2001), journalists’ personal opinions of a topic can influence 
their coverage. This study therefore explores Chinese journalists’ perceptions of 
China’s human rights and sustainable development to determine the potential 
influences of these perceptions on their coverage.  
China is perceived by some journalists as prioritising economic growth above 
sustainability. “I think the Chinese government is trying to engage with 
environmental issues but there is a hesitancy to enact any real meaningful change at 
this point, as China’s economic success has been largely at the expense of the 
environment” (Interviewee 12). Other journalists, however, argue that environmental 




disrupt the environment for the growth of the economy. Sometimes I think the 
environment is valued more than the economy” (Interviewee 13). China’s pollution 
has been a key factor in prioritising sustainability. “Pollution is serious in Beijing. A 
lot of companies are trying to make more money without the environmental 
protection facilities. We need some time, but not a lot of time. We will pay a lot for 
the environment” (Interviewee 14). Sustainability thus requires time and money, and 
the environment is perceived as an economic investment that China can “pay” for.  
Sustainable development is a relatively new concept in Chinese society, which some 
journalists were exposed to during primary education. “In the old times we didn’t 
have a sense of it. We just knew we were poor. We were told to protect the 
environment” (Interviewee 14). “China now realises the importance of the 
environment. Even with Hu Jintao, he believed in the sustainable development 
concept. The whole of China wants to work together to protect the environment” 
(Interviewee 13). 
China’s goal has been not only to prioritise sustainability but also be a global leader in 
this field. “The country is trying to lead the global society on sustainable 
development” (Interviewee 16). Many journalists illustrate faith in the Chinese 
government’s significant measures to improve its sustainability. “We are trying our 
best to control this. Things will gradually change – give it 8-10 years. We never miss 
our promise.” Interviewee 16 is optimistic about the already visible “positive 
direction” of China’s sustainability. “Compared to 30 years ago – you notice the 
difference. Now it is on government and policy level and local people are aware.”  
China’s “huge population” (Interviewee 16) and unique development seem to 
complicate their sustainable development. “Addressing ecological challenges as a 
developing nation has its own unique set of problems. Using western ideals and 
norms might not necessarily be the best thing for addressing the issues China faces in 
this regard” (Interviewee 12). China’s environment policies, such as decreased coal 
mining, have improved and are increasingly recognised by Chinese citizens, but, 
according to Interviewee 15, “it is complex”. “We have to create jobs for those 
people. China suffers from over-capacity” (Interviewee 15).  
Interviewee 15 believes for China to maintain a favourable image, communities 




level, it is good for government if they can carry it out. But the media needs to look at 
it independently. Like the Peruvians protesting about China affecting their 
environment – those voices are silent in Chinese media” (Interviewee 15). 
Interviewee 12 claims that most Chinese journalists’ mandates are to cover 
international cooperation, and therefore he rarely covers environmental issues, such as 
wildlife trafficking. “I have not seen much focus on this issue. Most of the focus is 
geared toward addressing issues surrounding infrastructure and cooperation across 
nations.” 
Other journalists claim that Chinese media coverage of sustainability has increased. 
“Under the new leadership, I mean President Xi Jinping, or Premier Li, we have paid 
more attention and even focused on sustainable development. Lots more reports on 
pollution in China” (Interviewee 19). However, this coverage does not extend to the 
China-Africa relationship. “But in terms of African countries, we still emphasise the 
hardship of Chinese shop owners, the hardship of Chinese businessmen. We do not 
mention environmental protection or environmental pollution. Domestically, we have 
more and more, but for African countries we have not done a lot about it” 
(Interviewee 19). Interviewee 14 is concerned about China’s environmental impact in 
Africa. “I worry a lot about affecting Africa because the African landscape is 
beautiful.” 
FOCAC’s focus on sustainability illustrates the importance of environmental 
protection in the China-Africa relationship, which could lead to increased 
sustainability coverage. “In the following years I think the cooperation or the 
protection launched by Africa and China will be more than before and we can do 
more reports about Chinese people who cause pollution in cases in Africa” 
(Interviewee 19). Interviewee 19 highlights journalists’ valuing of the Chinese 
government’s official strategies. Journalists display faith in the Chinese government 
implementation of an official strategy, such as those outlined in FOCAC. On the other 
hand, Interviewee 20, a Zimbabwean citizen, doubts whether such policies will be 
implemented: “Recently we are hearing that China is taking a serious stance against 
climate change. We wait to see if the talk and pledges would translate to action.” 
Chinese journalists believe that sustainability is increasingly prioritised by the 




environmental protection policies. They have seen an increase in media coverage of 
China’s environmental impact, though they aware that this coverage does not extend 
to the China-Africa relationship, and that, globally, disconcerted communities remain 
silenced in Chinese media.  
Journalists’ perceptions of China’s human rights 
Some Chinese journalists believe China does not respect human rights, and others 
have faith that China can improve its human rights policies. “Chinese people, like the 
rest of the world, will always respect human rights. But sometimes we have to change 
our policies to address certain problems” (Interviewee 13). Interviewee 16 is less 
confident that Chinese companies will implement the Chinese government’s human 
rights policies. “Companies are told by government you should have this and this 
protection”, “but it is a big country” (Interviewee 16). This interviewee claims 
department regulators are understaffed and inefficient. Not implementing these laws 
seems to be attributed to a lack of resources rather than a lack of respect for human 
rights.   
Similar to sustainable development, human rights is also a new concept in China. 
“Like the black lung disease that coal miners had in a poor village in China… Fifty 
coal miners had that disease for a long time and didn’t think it was connected to 
human rights. The owner was a miner before – he has no knowledge of black lung 
disease. But the government should know” (Interviewee 14). Interviewee 19 suggests 
that China’s primary human rights success in recent years has been its poverty 
reduction. He suggests the Chinese government’s goal to “pull people out of poverty 
in the next three years or five years”, will result in a positive international reputation 
for China.  
Some Chinese journalists believe the “human rights” term is a strategic ploy by the 
West to frame China in a negative light. “I don’t agree with the term ‘human rights’. 
Western people judge the human rights of China” (Interviewee 14). Interviewee 15 
argues that western media are biased when covering China’s human rights. “But in 
the West, they are actively intent to exaggerate the human rights issues in China. 
That’s the nature of media – everything gets exaggerated.” Western and Chinese 
media coverage of human rights differs. “There’s a difference in what I see in China 




good for Communism but bad for civil society. Average people are getting more 
aware of this topic” (Interviewee 15). The increased awareness of human rights makes 
the Chinese government “nervous” and “they continuously refresh their rhetoric”. The 
Chinese Foreign Minister is “vague, not specific” about human rights. “By not 
mentioning it, you are saying something. That you are denying it” (Interviewee 15).  
Many Chinese journalists associate human rights with China’s former one-child 
policy. In 1979, the Chinese government introduced a one-child policy that allowed 
most couples to have only one child, or face potential fines, sterilisations, and 
abortions. In 2013, China introduced a relaxation of the policy, which was eventually 
lifted in 2016, mostly because of an aging population (Clarke, 2015). “We had a one 
child policy and now have a two child policy, it is still controlled. The USA would 
often comment on the one child policy but they have no idea how big the population 
is” (Interviewee 14). The policy was implemented to conserve resources. “Our natural 
resources are limited. If you don’t have control everybody will be starving and they 
won’t have a good life. The birth control ensures a decent life. Every coin has two 
sides.” A large population is also why one-person-one-vote might not work in China. 
“Democracy for billions of people? You will spend a whole year calculating the 
votes” (Interviewee 16).  
Chinese journalists also focus on the labour aspects of human rights. “Labour 
conditions has improved a lot in recent years, salaries are getting higher. Before we 
had a problem: not paying informal workers on time. Now that has changed. In 
Africa, labour department [has] lots of laws to protect their workers. China wants to 
catch up with the rest of the world to change conditions and protect their rights” 
(Interviewee 13). Interviewee 16 claims that China’s human rights have already 
improved, and African labourers are not treated poorly. “As far as I know the 
labourers in Africa get paid even more than me. I’m in the government system too. 
No Chinese companies force their labourers to go to Africa. They are quite willing” 
(Interviewee 16). 
While China has improved some aspects of its human rights record, it has seen a 
worsening of freedom of speech. “Before our president took power, we thought Xi 
Jinping is a very open-minded person and will be the person who protects our media’s 




power, the academia, the scholars, and also our intellectuals and our journalists 
realised the supervision has only been increased, rather than reduced. And the human 
rights will only be more difficult to talk about than before” (Interviewee 19).  
Media workers are under increased pressure. According to Interviewee 19, a journalist 
recently disappeared after reporting critically on the Chinese government. Interviewee 
19 claims that the journalist posted a letter from other party members to ask President 
Jinping to reduce his power, “to allow some more freedom to the general public”. He 
describes Xi’s power in Chinese society: “Mr President Xi, the major of China and 
also the leader of the Communist Party, and is said to be the most powerful leader 
since the First Chairman, Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao is the most powerful person 
in Chinese history, and President Xi is the second one.” The journalist mistakenly 
posted the letter on social media. It was deleted within a few minutes, but had quickly 
been distributed. “That media worker was missing about one week. And his friends 
are also missing. Any related person to him will be checked.” The journalists were 
eventually released, but refused to reveal what happened to them. “And that is one 
case to demonstrate that. You can check the BBC news report and you will see one 
report that explains what happened. But we don’t know. Unless you report for BBC” 
(Interviewee 19).  
The Chinese government expects positive reporting from their reporters. “Mr 
President has held a meeting with the journalists from Xinhua News Agency, and 
People’s Daily, and CCTV. And he said in that conference we have to focus, we have 
to hold the right political direction in our news reports. We have to do more positive 
reports. Which means you have to follow the party’s laws, so the media firstly works 
for the Party rather than the people” (Interviewee 19). Journalists are therefore 
seemingly pressured to prioritise the needs of the Communist Party. “So there is one 
word in Chinese called dao mein xing dao which means your parents are the Party and 
so you have to pick parents firstly. So we kind of lose the function to serve the 
general public. We have to take a great attention about our reports. We cannot do 
anything harmful towards the party” (Interviewee 19). 
Because human rights is a new point of focus in China, many Chinese journalists are 
aware that China has a poor human rights record, but they believe this concept is used 




its human rights policies, such as fair labour treatment, Chinese journalists believe 
that the freedom of speech situation is regressing. Chinese journalists are censored 
and surveilled, and under increased pressure to serve the Communist Party with 
positive reporting.  
This section explored the individual influences (Reese, 2001) that potentially impact 
Chinese journalists’ coverage. Journalists are given clear guidelines on how to cover 
China, which means their journalistic skills are potentially less valuable than a strong 
command of the English language to be employed at English-speaking Chinese 
publications. These journalists often find their positions at Chinese publications to be 
admirable, particularly because of their close connection to the Chinese government. 
Chinese journalists believe that sustainability is increasingly prioritised by the 
Chinese government. They have seen an increase in Chinese media coverage of 
China’s environmental impact, though they are aware that this coverage does not 
extend to the China-Africa relationship, or other silenced communities. Many Chinese 
journalists are aware that China has a poor human rights record, but they believe that 
the concept of human rights is used by the West to create a negative image of China. 
Chinese journalists are experiencing worsening freedom of speech, with tighter 
censorship, surveillance and pressure to serve the ruling party.  
 
2. Routine influences 
According to Reese & Shoemaker (2016), routine influences on journalistic coverage 
include the implicit, unstated rules and ritualised enactments of the newsroom, such 
as deadlines, relationships with editors, and challenges that journalists experience. 
Journalists in Chinese newsrooms are under pressure to conduct positive coverage of 
China. This limits their ability to be critical of their government. “The story needs to 
have a China perspective or angle. We won’t admit it but we are on the government’s 
side. Everything that comes from the US, Xinhua is very critical about. The amount of 
coverage of Obama should never surpass Xi. There is a limit on Obama” (Interviewee 
15). He adds: “When Xi goes abroad it is the most important task we have.” 
Some journalists believe their roles are to disseminate Chinese propaganda. “Our 




implicitly” (Interviewee 15). According to Interviewee 15, international news requires 
professional journalism. “I’m not pro-America, but international news needs to be 
dealt with very calmly, wherever it is from. Xinhua is very careful to report on North 
Korea. Behind the scenes the journalists call Kim Jong Un crazy but they are 
meticulous when reporting on him.” He currently finds a lack of professionalism in 
Chinese journalists’ international coverage, partly because of journalists’ government-
led mandate to compete with western media. “There is no independent thinking, they 
pay attention to foreign ministry or government documents. We tend to team up with 
developing nations such as the Syrian government.” Interviewee 15 views this as 
unprofessional and subscribes to the professionalism underlying watchdog journalism. 
“Professional journalism requires editorial independence, your own voice independent 
of government, balanced view and different angles” (Interviewee 15).  
Correspondents for Chinese publications in African countries are mandated to write 
“good news stories” on their regions. “We only write about good news for Xinhua, 
such as culture, art, charities, or other interactions between Chinese and Africans. 
Xinhua has a neutral style, tries to avoid negativity towards SA” (Interviewee 18). 
During the 2010 World Cup Soccer, Chinese journalists were robbed three times, and 
the third time it was not covered by Chinese media. “They will tell the bad news but 
only to a certain level. Xinhua also has the responsibility with what they report – you 
need to be sensitive because you don’t want to cause a riot” (Interviewee 17). This 
illustrates journalists’ perception that Chinese news has a potentially influential 
impact on its audiences. 
Editor-journalist relationship 
Topics and angles at Chinese publications are approved by filter departments and 
journalists tend to experience censorship in a layered hierarchy. Regarding news 
topics, “the upper hierarchy decides, not the editor. At CCTV there is a top layer, then 
a second layer” (Interviewee 13). According to Interviewee 14, CCTV has 44 
channels run by different departments and centres, and within the departments there 
are different programs, editors and journalists. “We have a WeChat Group for each of 
the seven regional headquarters. Certain editors can be experts on that and tell you 




Despite directives determining which stories are favoured, “there is some degree of 
autonomy in that hosts and anchors can choose their own topics if they can justify the 
news value of it. Stories favouring a China focus tend to be given precedence over 
international stories” (Interviewee 12). Journalists sometimes receive requests, 
especially around coverage of FOCAC or BRICS, but can also submit suggestions for 
a “hot topic” (Interviewee 19), which will be approved or rejected by their directors. 
Approved stories might be edited without journalists’ knowledge. “I guess you know 
how these guys operate. You know the Chinese are cagey at times, they edit 
especially where their country is painted in a bad light and they do not tell you. When 
I check the stories online, I sometimes find many essential points removed” 
(Interviewee 20).  
Interviewee 15 explains that propaganda is maintained through the news production 
process. Sometimes up to four people work on one article. Editors receive articles 
from journalists, and then “experts” edit them, focusing specifically on the article’s 
English language use. Articles are then sent to “releasers” to determine if it is 
“politically correct” (Interviewee 15). Releasers are not officials, but “they carry a lot 
of responsibility” (Interviewee 15). With breaking news, the releaser receives a 
“flash” – only a title and short paragraph, and decides whether the story has news 
value. 
According to Interviewee 19, distributing propaganda is a key part of Chinese 
journalists’ jobs. Government officials “tell us what to report or not to report”, and 
stories that are not part of “a propaganda task” are heavily reviewed before 
publishing. In his newsroom, the three reviewers include the news editor, then the 
department director, and then the shift editor. “So after all three people agree that this 
report is okay, this report is not sensitive, it can be published. Especially for the 
politics...” If the report is not approved, “you have to delete it, or keep it and review” 
(Interviewee 19). During specific events, like the “sensitive time” of the National 
Conservative conference, more censors are added to the process, including the 
director of the news agency.  
Interviewee 14 views his propaganda work as a service to Chinese society. Through 
the propaganda task, “we can let people know that we are trying to help and let other 




achieving China’s goal to reduce poverty. “Seventy million poor people in China, and 
we are the national TV station. We want to help them. This is a national task. There is 
a deadline for local government to relieve poverty for the whole country before 2020 
that Mr Xi proposed” (Interviewee 14).  
Journalism as public service is a concept that has grown in recent years, especially 
through Chinese investigative journalism. Chinese economic growth has increased the 
need to expose misconduct and negligence of business. “The media was not so 
developed. In the past 10 years China has changed a lot – that is the good stuff” 
(Interviewee 14). Interviewee 14 investigates events or requests they receive from 
email, WeChat or phones. He compares his work to the American show 60 Minutes. 
“Someone says they need our help. It is important to influence a lot of people and 
impact them.” He explains that their job is to “unveil the ‘black curtain’, the dark 
secret of the story. Every business area has this side.” 
Regarding international influence, a special team reviews any article going out of 
China. “In China central or local government, there is a department called 
International Relations Department – they will check your report. They have to check 
every single report that’s published by social media, by news agencies, and if they 
find something wrong, they will direct us to delete it. And the propaganda reports also 
pass by them. They will hand the propaganda task to us, and will ask the news agency 
to write some article that is positive [about] the government.” These articles are also 
disseminated to the rest of China’s media. “That department will share those articles 
with all news agencies in China. They will ask you to also post them on all your 
channels like mobile apps or websites” (Interviewee 19). 
Xinhua is perceived as “the loudspeaker of government. Government requires you to 
represent them”. Interviewee 15 believes international media rely on Xinhua for 
credible information on China’s government because “they think it’s authentic”. 
Xinhua newsrooms are therefore additionally managed by the Chinese foreign 
ministry, also in a hierarchy. “The foreign minister is the leadership. Xinhua is at an 
equal level with the communications department of government. At the top there is 
the President of Xinhua, then the Editor of Chief, then four or five Vice-Presidents. 




and external news” (Interviewee 15). The editor is essentially the “departmental 
boss”.  
Once stories are collected, the Chief Editing Department organises topics and sends 
an email to the internal system. “Each person has two PCs, one with the internal 
internet (to submit articles) and one for external internet (to use for resources). 
Through the portal, bullet points information is submitted on what is being reported 
on and the feedback from readers.” Chinese journalists distribute their news via social 
media, but require a VPN to do so. “Why don’t they trust Xinhua with this? It is a 
battlefield to compete with foreign media. We have to make our voice heard” 
(Interviewee 15). China’s internet restrictions thus hamper local journalists’ 
efficiency, which, in turn, affects its own messages being distributed. It also limits the 
ability of their news agencies to compete with international media. 
The Chinese government heavily invests in Xinhua’s technological advancement via 
their “new media centre” to make them competitive. “Xinhua is seen as outdated. 
Partnerships have been created with tech companies to improve this, but it is 
hampered by the system. There is no advancement at Xinhua because it is propaganda 
in nature. If our content is not attractive then technology won’t help. An online TV 
station has also been set up for abroad but it has no signal in China” (Interviewee 15). 
Technology is a point of competition among Chinese news organisations, suggests 
Interviewee 15: “A contentious nature exists between Xinhua, CCTV and People’s 
Daily. This is focused on technology, we compare each other. There is an internal 
fight but they all should be very different.”  
Because journalistic practices are determined by the state, Interviewee 15 perceives 
Chinese journalism to be “easy”. Xinhua journalists can be easily trained “because 
you just follow the government’s sayings. These journalists can be very critical, but 
when assigned a story, [have] to do what’s good for government.” Journalists’ articles 
do not necessarily align with their personal opinions. “There is a gap between their 
career and their off-the-record life. For example, one guy is very critical, but he has to 
edit the article in accordance to the requirements.” Interviewee 15 enjoyed the 
“professional journalism” he experienced at the US edition of China Daily. He 
accuses Xinhua of unprofessional journalism. “Xinhua wouldn’t send me to a critical 




professional. They are lazy – they plagiarise what’s being reported by other news and 
just rephrase. I cannot accept this kind of journalism” (Interviewee 15).  
Deadlines 
Chinese online media compete with other online publications for deadlines on 
breaking news or press conferences. Correspondents outside of China are influenced 
by time zone differences. “I film the story the same day it happens and then it is 
broadcast the next day. But the time difference is six hours. If you are the first with a 
story, you will get the compliment. Early bird catches the worm” (Interviewee 13). 
Journalists thus consider meeting tight deadlines an achievement. The immediacy of 
deadlines is sensible to some journalists. “It is a common sense thing in our media 
industry – the news is the news because it happens right now and it won’t become 
news if it is reported on another day” (Interviewee 19). Deadlines are influenced by 
the amount of work left to a sub-editor, the “expert”, as mentioned before. “The 
quality of English stories at Xinhua is poor. They get some grammar wrong” 
(Interviewee 16).  
According to Interviewee 19, if a topic is approved, he generally has one day to 
complete the article, but investigative stories can be particularly time-consuming. 
“When we investigate, the cameraman and journalist [go] together. We do editing, 
write articles, and packaging ourselves. It can take days, weeks, months. There are 2 
800 counties in China – not all have airports. China is very big. It usually takes a day 
to travel to rural areas” (Interviewee 14). Some Chinese journalists therefore find their 
deadlines stressful. Interviewee 19’s colleague commented on extraordinarily tight 
deadlines: “If I really do things often like this, I think I won’t live long!” (Interviewee 
19).  
Challenges and constraints 
Journalists find it challenging to penetrate the western media system. Interviewee 16 
experienced this in South Africa in particular. While “many said that Xinhua is quite 
good”, South African journalists use western wires like Reuters “because their boss 
told them to”. Xinhua’s political position does not suit South African journalism. 




newswires, because they perceive these wires to put little effort into covering Africa. 
“Their in-depth coverage is not good. At AP they have one reporter from headquarters 
employed to cover Africa. We have 40 reporters and 21 offices in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Not a single western media company manages to do this” (Interviewee 16). 
Interviewee 19 finds writing propaganda challenging “because, in the propaganda 
task, they do not only ask you to be politically right, but also attract the public’s 
attention”. These articles have little news value because they focus on “appreciation 
of officials, appreciation of the government, and our audience does not really care 
about it” (Interviewee 19). Journalists have to be both “creative” to satisfy the 
audience, and “careful”, because the “propaganda task” leads to being closely 
scrutinised. “It is a big challenge for our minds and for our writing capacity. We are 
under really big pressure over every single word we have written. So we have to 
really think about is it okay to be published?” (Interviewee 19).  
Additionally, journalists often clash with their editors about news values. “As editors 
tend to be Chinese and I’m a foreigner, there are often cultural differences in terms of 
what is considered news” (Interviewee 12). Statistics and numbers get a lot of airtime 
at CRI. “That doesn’t necessarily mesh with my news sense that has been instilled in 
me either through my training or through the news culture in my home country” 
(Interviewee 12). Since this journalist is South African, this illustrates that potentially 
there are differences in journalistic training in South Africa vs China that could 
impact their perceptions of news values. It also highlights differences in news values 
between South African and Chinese newsrooms, and that a journalist’s personal 
perception of news value is outweighed by that of their editors. 
On a practical level, some journalists experience technical challenges working for 
Chinese media, such as Internet access in African countries (Interviewee 17). Chinese 
journalists also experience safety issues in countries such as South Africa. 
“Sometimes personal safety is a problem in SA – such as the Marikana shootings. I 
was there with a bodyguard. It was quite tense. There were tens of thousands of 
people. They could do something unexpected but my bodyguard had a gun. CCTV 
provided me with a bodyguard when asked, like for other journalists covering in war 





This section explored the routine influences on Chinese journalists’ coverage of 
China. These include layered hierarchies of censorship at journalists’ individual 
media organisations, which are restrictive in many ways. Many journalists consider 
their work for the Chinese government to include a “propaganda task”. Propaganda is 
maintained through the news production process, as each article goes through a series 
of internal gatekeepers. Some journalists see their propaganda work as a service to 
Chinese society. 
Xinhua newsrooms are managed by the Chinese foreign ministry – the International 
Relations Department, which reviews all articles going out of China. Because 
journalistic practices are determined by the state, journalists believe journalistic 
experience is not as crucial to employment as a strong command of the English 
language. Journalists find the “propaganda task” challenging, as they have to balance 
it with also attracting foreign audiences. A key challenge for Chinese journalists is to 
penetrate the western media system.  
 
3. Organisational influences 
The organisational influences (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016) in this study are defined by 
journalists’ perceptions of their objectivity, their target audiences, and their awareness 
of the ownership and commercial impacts on their publication. 
Objectivity 
China media encourages new ways of looking at Africa. This kind of “positive” or 
“constructive” reporting is a key characteristic of Chinese state-owned media’s 
coverage (Wasserman, Mano & Zhang, 2016). Constructive journalism differs from 
watchdog journalism in the sense that it aims to leave more grey areas (Moeller, 
1999), and empowers people by constructively offering information while remaining 
accurate and critical. Chinese media have adopted this role that is linked to 
“development communication” (Wasserman, 2014), which is also associated with 
“positive psychology” (Yanqui & Matingwina, 2016).  
Constructive journalism has received criticism for its lack of objectivity. In watchdog 




deliberate focus on solutions. Constructive journalism’s nation-building approach can 
result in an institutional and uncritical style which marginalises alternative narratives 
(Lee, 2003; Lull, 1991; Zhang, 2006). Zhang (2013) found that Chinese state-owned 
news media is perceived to have little to no criticism of government. 
Many Chinese journalists consider themselves objective. “I think I’m very objective. 
That is the slogan for our programme. Tell the truth by telling you the facts. You use 
the facts to talk” (Interviewee 14). His objectivity stems from his deeper 
understanding of China’s current issues. “I know there are problems in China, we 
need to face it and solve it.” He believes that reducing poverty will increase the 
education levels in China, which will eventually lead to an improvement in human 
rights and sustainability. “Environmental protection and human rights will get better. 
First solve the problem of surviving and then think about other things” (Interviewee 
14). 
These journalists consider themselves objective because their publications require it. 
“Our organisation always reminds us to be objective” (Interviewee 16). Objectivity is 
also included in some of the journalists’ training. “When I [took] up the job of the 
media, we got lots of training from our company. They say always be objective” 
(Interviewee 13). However, Interviewee 13 strives for objectivity, motivated by a fear 
of making mistakes and the repercussions that follow. “Even if you lose the time, you 
have to double check and make sure. Otherwise there is a big mistake and you will 
have to pay for it. I always remind myself to be objective.”  
According to Interviewee 15, Chinese journalists’ fear of making mistakes impacts 
their coverage. “Journalists are afraid of committing faults, so they translate the 
English articles directly from the Chinese versions. Their English is not so readable. 
This is all because the publication is state-run.” Employees of state-run publications 
are unable to be objective, because they are required to report what they are told. 
“Xinhua journalists use positive tones – they have a trademark of clichés. They use it 
frequently, it has become a habit. That is what government requires them to do” 
(Interviewee 15). 
Journalists’ objectivity is compromised by their expected loyalty to the Chinese 
Communist Party. “When you’re working in the media you know your direction, you 




Party laws a top priority. You know the corruption is happening, you know that 
official is corrupted, but because they hold power, it does not allow you to write nasty 
reports about them, including internal references. So how could you be objective? It’s 
not possible” (Interviewee 19). 
However, these journalists do not consider western media objective either. “They say 
China lacks human rights, or our President Xi Jinping is a kind of dictator because he 
holds power, the most since Chairman Mao. But they also have to look at other sides 
of China – you see the reduction of poverty. In the following years there will be no 
poor people in China, for Chinese standards and that’s a huge success in human 
history” (Interviewee 19). Finally, some journalists do not believe in “true 
objectivity”. “Biases exist unconscious or otherwise” (Interviewee 12). He tries to 
present a balanced view, but only because “it, generally speaking, makes for a better, 
more engaging story”. The concept of objectivity in Chinese newsrooms is 
convoluted and journalists’ ideals often clash with what is expected of them. While 
some journalists consider themselves objective, even though they toe the Party line, 
other Chinese journalists considered true objectivity a myth. There is thus a deeper 
concern around Chinese journalists’ understanding of objectivity, or how it operates 
in Chinese newsrooms. 
Audiences 
The interviewed journalists’ target audiences include African and other international 
audiences. CCTV’s headquarters are in Kenya, and they air on Channel 409 on 
DSTV, a paid satellite television service available to most African countries. 
Regardless of where journalists are based, their material is generally sent to Beijing, 
where it is distributed globally. Xinhua Newswire’s coverage is aimed at a broad 
range of audiences. “We have been covering a lot of international news. We cover 
everything and we don’t have enough reporters” (Interviewee 16).  
Some of their important clients, such as Russia 24, request stories from them for a 
specific audience. To broaden their reach, Xinhua offers a wire service and social 
media news. “Our news is used by international print media. We share our news with 
AP, AFP, Sputnik, Reuters” (Interviewee 15). Their social media, especially 




“We do our own statistics – it’s not for the public, but for the reference of officials” 
(Interviewee 15).   
Xinhua also offers regional news for its local Chinese audiences (Interviewee 19). 
Interviewee 14 considers his current investigative show unique because it targets 
Chinese audiences critical of government. “Our programme is special. Our show is 
one of the highest rated on Chinese TV. Every person in China knows this 
programme; it has a history of 20 years.” The show’s “supervision report” is popular, 
because even though it is state-owned, they are permitted to undermine and broadcast 
government’s “mistakes”. “Westerners think we are under government control, but 
still there is this programme. So the audience expects a lot from us. We have audience 
feedback and try to be interactive” (Interviewee 14). 
Ownership  
Reese and Shoemaker’s (2016) model is concerned with organisational level power 
that is exercised periodically, implicitly, and not overtly, and, as a result, is not so 
readily available to direct observation. Journalists anticipate organisational 
boundaries, which manifests in their self-censorship. This self-policing is more 
effective than direct censorship, however, because outsiders are often not even aware 
that anything has taken place. 
The organisational influences in Chinese media, however, are rooted in an overt 
expression of power by the Chinese government. Yet this power also leads to self-
censorship among journalists. The interviewed journalists are all aware that their 
media institutions are owned and managed by the Chinese government. When asked 
to identify the ownership of his publication, Interviewee 15 responded: “Government 
of course. State department, branch of government on the same level as ministries. 
The president of Xinhua is on the same level as the foreign minister. My superiors are 
journalists who became officials.”  
State-ownership of Chinese media is therefore characterised by censorship. “Anything 
bad about the Chinese government [we] cannot say” (Interviewee 15). He cited an 
example of Xi Jinping’s Czech Republic visit that was framed as “a strategic 
partnership and historical visit”. However, Xinhua omitted coverage of anti-Chinese 




human rights. He was even a friend of the Dalai Lama, a novelist, the first president 
after the Soviet Union. At the protests, the Chinese flag was defaced, but it was 
quickly replaced. Those stories, anti-Xi, are never seen on Xinhua.” Because the 
Czech Republic is seemingly important to the Silk Road Initiative, the Chinese 
government requires positive coverage of this relationship. 
Journalists are also prescribed what not to report. “You will see less reports about 
corruption, you will see less reports about the failures of policy issued by the 
government. You will see less and less reports” (Interviewee 19). Journalists fear they 
are being surveilled and scrutinised. “So we are really under pressure for our words 
and what we did, because of the Party. So that’s why I ask you don’t issue my name 
for this interview because all our media workers are under pressure.” Stepping out of 
line with the official mandate could have negative consequences. “They will see, and 
if they see something wrong in your job, they will have some punishment or 
crackdown on your position” (Interviewee 19). Further highlighting journalists’ 
caution, Interviewee 13 asked to skip the question of how ownership influences his 
coverage at CCTV. 
To avoid negative repercussions, journalists apply self-censorship in their articles. 
“Xinhua editors cut out certain topic areas, such as nudity. For example when we 
wrote the four stories about Afrika Burn, we had to cut out the images of people 
smoking weed. We kind of have to use self-censorship” (Interviewee 18). These 
journalists believe that China’s censorship could influence South African media. “Just 
like South Africa with the SABC broadcaster – they are going to clamp down on the 
Internet. China influences South Africa media censorship, like with the Facebook 
police – they pick up everything you write. We don’t know what is the truth, we 
believe what we are fed” (Interviewee 18). 
Though most social media platforms are censored in China, journalists manage to get 
around it. “You know, Facebook is blocked in China, Google is blocked in China, but 
BBC – the mobile app – is not blocked, and the Guardian mobile app is not blocked 
yet. So you can still receive those news reports, through your mobile, but not through 
the websites. It’s the website that is blocked” (Interviewee 19). In China, journalists 
use social media, such as Weibo and WeChat, for news. On WeChat, users can post 




people can access those news reports through the mobile agency like BBC, Guardian, 
and also read the article and share it in WeChat, Weibo or post it in Line. If that 
article contains some sensitive words, they might be deleted, but before that you can 
take a picture and you can share it with people and then they cannot detect your data” 
(Interviewee 19).  
Interviewee 19 believes that online media can never be completely censored. “The 
information age provides a lot of conveniences to people to share their ideas. And the 
government cannot supervise everything. They are trying to do that but I don’t think 
they can.” Some journalists argue that censorship extends to western media, and is not 
unique to China. “This kind of thing does not just happen in China – look at the 
coverage of Occupy Wall Street, how that was covered up. But people always just 
notice this thing about China” (Interviewee 16). There is a thus a perceived hypocrisy 
in the way that Chinese media are criticised compared to western media. 
Despite some journalists’ frustration with censorship, there are incentives to work at 
Xinhua. “The payment is good and the welfare is very good”. Xinhua provides “very 
big welfares”, ranging from cash or gifts awarded at special events. Journalists 
reiterate that working for mainstream Chinese state-media, especially Xinhua, is also 
considered admirable. “Because of China’s tradition, being an official in Chinese 
peoples’ minds is, in a way, honourable. And being a journalist in Xinhua News 
Agency probably is equal to being an official. Sometimes the power is above the 
official, because they have the right to write internal reference[s]. So it’s a kind of 
honour that you brought to your family” (Interviewee 19).  
Commercialisation 
Capital force became a component of the Chinese media system after the relaxation of 
policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When the media found a strong motivation 
to make profit in the form of media buyers, capital owners invested money into media 
and exerted media content (Zhao 1998, 2004; Sparks 2008; Murphy 2007; Stockmann 
2012). Scholars have therefore referred to the Chinese media system as 
“Commercialised Authoritarianism” or “Marketised Authoritarianism” (Luo, 
2015:52). Broadly, both private and state-owned media buyers include advertising 




advertisements, build partnerships with media or purchase product placement 
opportunities. Commercialised Chinese papers can be owned by private capital or 
joint capital between the private sector and either government or Party organisations 
(Stockmann, 2012). According to Luo, Chinese media’s “capacity to carry 
advertisement has reached its limits and sometimes is already overused” (2015:55). 
Although all Chinese news outlets are state-owned, they have increasingly included a 
commercial model wherein journalists need to write stories that appeal to their wide 
range of audiences. “The government encouraged Xinhua to go commercial for the 
international media market. Only this way we can compete. We need to make profit” 
(Interviewee 16). Xinhua also has other avenues of generating revenue. “We also sell 
ads in newspapers and magazines we own in China. We are not affiliated directly, we 
own shares or are stakeholders. We own a screen in Times Square in New York. We 
act as a manager and clients pay to rent out our space. Some countries rent the space 
to put up their tourism videos” (Interviewee 16). They also sell images. Interviewee 
13 suggests that government-owned Chinese media has similar commercial aims as 
other media. “But other media also have ads, right? [They] have to make money for 
survival. Survival is the first priority” (Interviewee 13). 
However, Interviewee 20 argues that commercialisation “does not apply” because of 
state-ownership. He has seen changes in the Chinese government’s censorship. “In the 
past, they did not want us to criticise the SA government, saying it’s their friend; but 
slowly they are embracing criticism of ANC and government. In the past, they rarely 
accepted coverage of the opposition parties, but have since changed” (Interviewee 
20). 
This section discussed Reese’s (2001) organisational influences on journalists’ 
coverage, by exploring how Chinese journalists’ perception of objectivity, audiences, 
ownership and commercialisation impacts their coverage of China. Most Chinese 
journalists consider themselves objective, because it is a requirement from their 
publications. Journalists’ objectivity ideals seem incompatible with their expected 
loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese journalists believe that western 




Some Chinese media programmes offer material for Chinese citizens that is critical of 
government, but, at the same time, Chinese journalists are aware that their 
publications are state-owned, which is characterised by censorship. They fear the 
repercussions of making mistakes, and believe they are being scrutinised and 
surveilled. Despite the impact of censorship, there are incentives to work at Chinese 
publications, such as financial benefits, and journalists’ positions in relation to the 
state are considered admirable. While Chinese publications are state-owned, these 
have increasingly become commercialised, and experience the same pressures to 
make profit as most other media.  
 
4. Extra-media influences 
Extra-media influences, or the influence of social institutions (Reese & Shoemaker, 
2016), focus on journalists’ relationship with the broader society and elements outside 
of the newsroom. This includes their sources, their relationship with government and 
non-profit organisations, and their media consumption.  
News sources 
Many Chinese journalists consume mainstream English media such as the BBC, 
Bloomberg, the Guardian, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal 
(Interviewee 12, Interviewee 15). Those based in Africa use South African media 
outlets such as IOL, News24, TimesLive, EWN, the Sowetan, and Business Day, 
especially for story ideas (Interviewees 13 and 20).  
Some Chinese journalists consult Russian media, such as Sputnik and Russia Today. 
“I regard Russia Today as a better attempt than China to challenge the West. They 
hire a lot of native English speakers” (Interviewee 15). Interviewee 15 thus perceives 
strong English skills to be advantageous in challenging western media.   
Interviewee 19 prefers the Hong Kong-based Phoenix for local Chinese news. “It is 
more open-minded than us, because it is owned mainly by Hong Kong.” Phoenix is 
allowed more journalistic freedom because its headquarters are in Hong Kong, while 
other publications are based in Beijing. “If it’s in mainland China you have to fully 




control is weaker. So that’s why Phoenix can report on things that we cannot do” 
(Interviewee 19).  
For China-Africa news, some Chinese journalists rely on Xinhua, because “they are 
the most well-known and trustworthy. They are top in China” (Interviewee 13). Many 
journalists rarely consult African or western sources on China, but, regarding western 
sources, they “sometimes consult how they look at a story. They give different views 
to look at. Their perspective is different from my own perspective; I just want to 
compare” (Interviewee 13). Madrid-Morales and Wasserman (2018) found that 
African journalists engage with Chinese media sources to varying degrees – they can 
be categorised as adopters, pragmatists, undecided and resisters. Journalists labelled 
as unconvinced or resisters do not see a need to turn to Chinese media for news. A 
trend emerges where African journalists do not make use of Chinese media for news 
on China, and, as shown by the interviewees in this study, Chinese journalists also do 
not consult African media for news on Africa. Chinese journalists consult few African 
news sources because they consider local African media to be underdeveloped and 
“mainly dominated by the CNN or BBC” (Interviewee 17). 
Some journalists consult Xinhua for positive news on Africa. “The West never sees 
the bright side; you seldom read that” (Interviewee 16). However, according to the 
interviewed journalists, stereotypes about Africa are common in Chinese society and 
vice versa. “Africa is still perceived as a bad place to go: poor, not abundant. Xinhua 
sends young people to Africa, especially who majored in French or English. Africa is 
at the bottom of the hierarchy for journalists, so they get a lot of subsidies to motivate 
them to go” (Interviewee 15). The journalists suggest that Chinese audiences 
generally prefer stereotypical negative reporting on Africa. “In China, people don’t 
really read the positive reports about African countries. Chinese people somehow 
prefer the negative reports. Like the kidnapping, or shootings or somehow something 
bad in Africa for the general public” (Interviewee 19). Furthermore, Chinese media 
coverage of Africa generally focuses on political angles and is therefore not 
necessarily newsworthy. “The headlines that will be African related is always about 





Some journalists choose their sources based on writing style, to improve their own 
English writing. “If you use the BBC app on Apple you can check the meaning of 
vocabulary of some words. But when you have CNN it doesn’t seem to have this 
function. It is not convenient for me if I read some words that I don’t understand, and 
I have now to find a dictionary and check that. But with BBC I can just check that 
word and it helps with the translation and I can go on. It is very convenient for me and 
it is also like this on the Guardian” (Interviewee 19).  
Interview sources 
Chinese journalists most commonly use government officials as their sources. 
According to Interviewee 15, for Xi Jinping’s trips abroad, Xinhua’s content is 
copywritten by the foreign ministry. “The international desk then just translates and 
reorganises it to be more acceptable for foreign readers. But it has to be exact and 
correct. A quote needs to be exact.” Because the outgoing articles are so tightly 
regulated, journalists generally choose interviewees that will be approved by the state, 
as unacceptable sources will simply be deleted. “Because every reporter goes through 
the three kinds of reviews, so, if there is something wrong, they will delete it” 
(Interviewee 19). 
Thus, while politicians are preferred sources, experts or intellectuals are also 
accepted. Interviewee 15 explains that Xinhua has a set pool of experts that provide 
them with government-approved quotes. “There are not so many experts Xinhua can 
turn to. We find the ones who can tell us what you want. These experts are used the 
Xinhua way – they can be more like a diplomat.” According to Interviewee 19, 
“intellectuals are more acceptable than NGOs” (Interviewee 19).  
Many Chinese journalists have good relationships with both NGOs and political 
parties. “We want to contribute to good causes” (Interviewee 13). Others are cautious 
about interviewing NGOs. “If you want to interview an NGO you have to think very 
carefully. We don’t interview NGOs, maybe just ones in foreign countries.” Chinese 
journalists generally cannot interview NGOs that are critical of the Chinese 
government. “If you want to interview NGOs, okay, it has to be governmental 




[the] leading party. There are lots of political parties in China; we don’t just interview 
the Communist Party” (Interviewee 13). 
Journalists are often contacted for stories by “informers” (Interviewee 14). Although 
articles are heavily censored, Interviewee 14 tries to balance articles by interviewing 
sources beyond officials. For example, for a story on bad carrot seeds in Inner 
Mongolia, Interviewee 14 interviewed “everyone connected. We interview the police, 
farmers, the company, the government.” Their journalism played a public service role, 
because China’s Agriculture Department is in charge of the seeds. “We need to warn 
farmers where good seeds can be found. We let people know, they don’t know the 
law, they are uneducated” (Interviewee 14). Through communicating on behalf of the 
Chinese government, the journalists therefore feel that they provide the service of 
engaging government with civil society. 
This section explored Chinese journalists’ sources, their relationship with government 
and non-profit organisations, and their media consumption – all of which form part of 
the extra-media or social institutions influences on journalists’ coverage (Reese & 
Shoemaker, 2016). Chinese journalists consume mainstream international English 
media, a variety of local Chinese media and mainly South African-based African 
media sources. 
Chinese journalists generally rework official government press releases, and most 
commonly use government officials as their sources. Experts or intellectuals are also 
accepted, but are selected from a pool that will offer commentary that is accepted by 
government. Journalists are cautious about using NGOs as sources, and cannot 
interview NGOs that are critical of government. Finally, some journalists play a 
public service role because they interact with citizens and communicate on behalf of 
governmental departments.  
 
5. Ideological influences 
This section explores the ideological or social systems (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016) 
influences on Chinese journalists’ coverage of China. This includes journalists’ 




power, and their perception of the media’s role in advancing China’s soft power 
efforts.  
China-Africa relationship 
Most Chinese journalists believe that the China-Africa relationship is crucial and of 
increasing importance (Interviewee 12). According to Interviewee 16, the China-
Africa relationship “is in its honeymoon phase right now”, although some journalists 
note that the relationship is not new. “The relationship developed thousands of years 
ago. The navy admiral during the Ming Dynasty, Zheng He, came to Africa with a 
massive ship, containing porcelain and ceramics. He took back two giraffes as a gift 
to the emperor” (Interviewee 13).  
The relationship has since maintained its mutual advantages. “When I was a kid I was 
told that Africa are our good brothers” (Interviewee 14). He refers to the African 
support that China had received to become part of the United Nations during its 
Going Out campaign. In exchange, China offered assistance to Africa, which “was not 
very developed” and “associated with natural disasters, poverty”, but he adds that 
China was not a rich country itself. “We’ve heard of the neocolonialism concept, but 
we don’t agree. But I know more than the average person. Sure, we build more mines 
and factories in Africa, which will cause some damage to the environment” 
(Interviewee 14).  
Western discourse often debates whether China is a neocolonial force practising 
“Chinese imperialism” in Africa. China aims not to infringe on African countries’ 
sovereignty, and therefore present themselves as non-hypocritical and more respectful 
(Wagner & Cafiero, 2013). While China’s “no-strings attached” policies are 
economically beneficial to Africa, some argue that “the vestiges of colonialism 
evident in this relationship raise questions about the true cost of realizing these 
benefits” (Manero, 2017). A journalist in the Guardian recently asked: “Is this the 
dawn of a new colonialism, they wonder, a new scramble for Africa in which the 
continent is once again left in tatters? Or is it the beginning of an era during which 
Africans shake off old colonial masters and look elsewhere for direct investment and 
aid?” (Poplak, 2016).  
Chinese journalists believe the China-Africa relationship is not colonialism. “There is 




neocolonialism, albeit with Chinese characteristics. However, I don’t think this is 
necessarily the case. There seems to be a lot of mutual exchange” (Interviewee 12). In 
fact, they argue that China has been praised by African countries for not colonising. 
“But we don’t colonise. Robert Mugabe spoke at the FOCAC opening and said that 
China was the only country who has come to Africa and helped without colonisation. 
Africa needs development and they need the money. We don’t have the money but 
China is willing to offer mutual benefits” (Interviewee 16). 
The “mutual benefits” theme recurs throughout the China-Africa conversation. 
Several Chinese journalists perceive Africa as needing China’s influence for 
infrastructure improvement and assistance in the health sector. “Africa needs the help. 
It’s really a win-win situation. China helps with infrastructure, like railways. With the 
Ebola situation, China sent lots of medical groups and they rescued the people. 
During the process they created friendly relationships with people there. When they 
left, the kids cried” (Interviewee 13). China therefore not only seems needed, but also 
wanted. According to Interviewee 20 “many South Africans or Africans have a keen 
interest to know what they are benefitting from the relationship which their 
government has with China.” He wants to see “that the mutual benefit is realised and 
not on paper only”. 
Africa is perceived as necessary for natural resources and political clout. “China has a 
massive population; it needs to import from African countries like South Africa, who 
provides mineral resources. China and Africa rely on each other. China realises the 
relationship should improve with Africa. China keeps a close eye on it” (Interviewee 
13). China’s relationship with Africa strengthens its competition with the West. “We 
need Africa’s support on the international platform. China needs recognition by the 
global society. The system of globalisation was made by the West – America 
especially. We want to be part of it, but America doesn’t want China to lead. They 
lead and they don’t want their power to be divided” (Interviewee 16).  
While the “top leaders know the significance of the China-Africa relationship” 
(Interviewee 19), this significance is yet to gain importance among the general 
Chinese population. China’s official reports emphasise the importance of the 
relationship, but “the general population do not think it’s a priority or recognise the 




China-UK relationship is more important” (Interviewee 19). The general Chinese 
population seems to have a stereotypical view of Africa, and therefore do not 
acknowledge its importance. These stereotypes include a lack of awareness of the 54 
individual countries on the continent, or its overall size. “The space of that continent 
can contain Russia, US, Canada and all those big countries. But people still think 
Africa as a whole – and they think Africa is full of war, rape, HIV, or starvation, 
poverty” (Interviewee 19).  
Chinese coverage of China-Africa 
According to Chinese journalists the abovementioned stereotypes are perpetuated by 
Chinese media. “I think this is a mistaken picture that is somehow created by our 
media. Because we always report those negative reports to the general public to 
attract their attention” (Interviewee 19). The Special Envoy of the Chinese 
government to Africa agrees that, due to Chinese media coverage of Africa, “the 
Chinese general public thinks that Africa is left behind and is not developed” 
(Interviewee 19). China’s centrality to an article on Africa dictates its tone. “Chinese 
media shows a very Oriental view about Africa. When China is involved, the 
coverage on Africa will be positive, but when it is only on Africa it will be negative” 
(Interviewee 15). The journalists’ regional study groups ensure that coverage is 
positive towards China, but do not focus on doing the same for Africa. 
Some journalists have been relatively unaware that African countries are skeptical of 
China. Interviewee 19 used to believe the China-Africa relationship was “always in 
harmony – no conflict, no dispute. We are brothers. China always gives donations and 
help to African countries, so we are kind of [the] big brother to African countries.” 
While studying, however, he realised “the western academics don’t think so, and the 
reality is not as I expected. We have disputes. And the African people don’t really 
think we are the good man. We are good to some extent, but to some extent we are 
not good. Our relationship is in ups and downs.” He now views China as “taking 
resources. We are taking the money, we are taking the jobs away from Africa. And 
we leave the pollution and disputes”. He cited the example of Michael Sata’s labour 
protests in Zambia. “The Chinese people [take] the jobs from Zambian people, and 
because of this, he became the president of Zambia. And we have kind of noticed this 




However, journalists are mandated to maintain a positive image of China-Africa in 
Chinese society. “But the Chinese media doesn’t cover much about that. When I want 
to report disputes about China-Africa relations, it is not really allowed.” Interviewee 
19 has to “present a harmonious, good picture of China’s foreign relations” so that the 
public thinks that “China’s foreign relations is always good.” After realising how 
other countries might perceive China, he discussed it with his Chinese colleagues, but 
found that “they still think the China-Africa relationship is in harmony. Although they 
have a lot of access to other ways of information, they’re still in that old mindset” 
(Interviewee 19). Access to a wider variety of information might eventually challenge 
China’s curated image. “But in recent years, with the growing of the social media, 
you can have access to a lot of other data and information. So I think more and more 
people will realise that Chinese people are not that popular on the African continent 
or South American continent. There’s the reality” (Interviewee 19). 
The significance of the China-Africa relationship has been highlighted by the Chinese 
media coverage of FOCAC. “We usually only broadcast international activities for 
President Xi. For FOCAC we sent 80 journalists to South Africa for many days of 
coverage” (Interviewee 14). The China-South Africa relationship is particularly 
important. “They are both members of BRICS. Nelson Mandela visited China, Thabo 
Mbeki got consultation from China” (Interviewee 13). However, Interviewee 12 
believes that China chose to base its media in Kenya, because South Africa’s 
watchdog journalism and Chinese constructive journalism are incompatible. “South 
Africa’s traditionally vocal media system would it make it difficult for Chinese-style 
journalism, which sees the media much more as an agent of the state as opposed to a 
watchdog role, to take hold there.” 
Soft power 
As discussed in Chapter 3, soft power is the ability to produce outcomes through 
persuasion rather than coercion or payment (hard power), or influence on a foreign 
country without threats or inducements (Nye, 2004). Chinese journalists understand 
the term “soft power”, and generally know what it entails. They are informed about 
China’s specific soft power efforts and goals. Soft power is “different from military 
power. It’s the more cultural side” (Interviewee 13). “Any power in [a] non-coercive 




“created by an American scholar” and can be “that influence of one country to other 
countries” (Interviewee 19). “The idea behind soft power is that diplomatic progress 
is made and strengthened via non-official means” (Interviewee 12). 
“I know the word. I’ve known it since I was a kid. It was part of traditional Chinese 
education” (Interviewee 14). Chinese soft power is also tied to Confucianism, a 
central part of modern and historic Chinese culture. “Confucianism has influenced 
every Chinese. The key word there is benevolence and kindness. But first be strong or 
powerful enough, and then give kindness and love to the whole world” (Interviewee 
14). Among Chinese journalists, culture is one of the defining aspects of Chinese soft 
power. “Our products, our customs, our culture – all are included in the soft power” 
(Interviewee 19). Chinese history is a key aspect of its culture that can be used to 
wield soft power. “China wants people from outside to know more about them. China 
has a long-standing culture. 5 000 years – so we have a lot to show. We want to 
expand our relationship with the world through culture” (Interviewee 13). China’s 
Confucius Institutes also recur as a reference to China’s successful soft power 
initiatives in the interviewee responses. 
According to Interviewee 19, China has to “work hard to increase our soft power” 
because it is not as successful as countries such as Japan and South Korea. “Because 
we really like the cartoons used by Japan, and we like the South Korean programmes 
– they even take those programmes to Iran, or Iraq – the Arabic world. They really 
enjoy those programmes produced by South Korea. So that’s the soft power, you can 
influence other people, not by your military, not by your wires. You can influence 
people by your TV programmes, by your teaching, by your language” (Interviewee 
19).  
Some journalists thus believe that successful soft power initiatives are not necessarily 
rooted in media diplomacy. Other journalists are aware that the media are central to 
soft power. “Soft power according to me, is the use of the media to further one’s 
interest” (Interviewee 20). Interviewee 15 explains that the “Chinese government has 
a hard time exporting their ideological values – even of their economic model.” 
Chinese journalists are a key part of China’s strategy to improve this, through 
promoting particular terminology in the media. “We are encouraged to use certain key 




strategy. Xinhua is spending a lot of time doing propaganda for these terms, and terms 
such as ‘good for morale’, ‘aligning national strategies’” (Interviewee 15). 
The Chinese central government hosts media exchanges with African journalists to 
influence their reporting on China. Interviewee 19 recalled one such exchange in 
Yiwu, China, where 30 journalists from countries such as Botswana, Zambia, South 
Africa, and Ethiopia were invited to a conference through scholarships. The aim of 
such exchanges is to promote positive reports in African countries. “They can see 
how Chinese people work and can see the Chinese generosity towards African people. 
So when they report to the local community they will know how China is” 
(Interviewee 19).  
The exchange aimed to improve coverage of topics such as the South China Sea 
dispute. “The director asked the African journalists, African brothers, to do more of 
explanation reporting and more of the positive reports to African countries.” 
However, that “explanation” had to entail that China holds full sovereignty of the 
Southern sea, and that the Philippines and America create disputes. “So it has a 
political purpose to provide these scholarships. It’s not only about the positive reports 
about China; it’s also about gaining support from the African countries towards the 
Southern sea dispute. Then we can say to the international communities, look, we 
have a lot of African countries support[ing] us, and we are justified.” These 
conferences make use of a top-down approach in engaging with the journalists. “In 
that meeting with the director, the journalists are not allowed to ask questions” 
(Interviewee 19).  
Some journalists view China’s soft power as a “charm defensive” approach (Shi, 
2013). Chinese journalists’ role is therefore to defend China’s reputation, which has 
been shaped by western discourses and media coverage. The USA is perceived to 
block China from being able to reconstruct its reputation. “Europe and the USA used 
their military. China wants its own soft power in the global system. Right now 
everything is in the US” (Interviewee 16). Interviewee 16 believes a powerful western 
media dominance impedes Chinese journalists’ role to promote China’s soft power. 
“Xinhua needs to play our part – but even if we write what’s true, people will still 
rather follow Reuters.” This is mostly at the instruction of editors. Many Chinese 




improvement of Africa’s image. Therefore, Chinese journalists also play a role in 
Africa’s “charm defensive”. “Even the West, that has never been to Africa, think it is 
conflict, wars and chaos. That is the West’s soft power. Xinhua has the most branches 
in Africa and gives a positive account of Africa. The western media only notice 
negative stories” (Interviewee 16). 
Though China is new to the international communication sphere, it has progressed 
rapidly. “China in the past was not like the West where they could use the media for 
propaganda. China has also joined this. In the past, China had no journalists from 
different parts of the world. China now has [an] Africa editor in Kenya” (Interviewee 
20). The presence of Chinese-employed journalists in Africa is important to 
advancing China’s soft power on the continent. “This is why we are here. We want to 
let local South Africa know more about China and vice versa” (Interviewee 13).  
As mentioned above, China’s soft power efforts also impacts Africa’s soft power. 
Chinese journalists aim to give their audiences a “new perspective” on Africa. “Cape 
Town has informal settlements like Khayelitsha. China thinks South Africa is like 
typical Africa but Cape Town is called the ‘backyard of Europe’. We just want to 
present the real image to Chinese people.” He explains how Chinese journalists’ 
unique reporting has been beneficial to South Africa’s image. “Last year, there was 
xenophobia in Durban and Johannesburg. Some media present the untruthful side. We 
collected information from all around, presenting the real situation here. At the time, 
tourism was affected and lots of people cancelled from China. So it is our duty to 
present the real situation” (Interviewee 13). 
Some journalists argue that the global media often do not reflect China’s 
improvements. Interviewee 19 points to “the huge success” of the Chinese 
government’s poverty eradication in China. He notes that President Xi Jinping is the 
key figure to this perception of progress and “hope” in China. “When I spoke to one 
journalist who has been working for Xinhua News Agency more than 15 years, she 
told me, before Mr Xi took the power, many people don’t see the positive side of our 
country. Our country seem[ed] more corrupt than everywhere else, most officials are 
corrupted, lots of these reports, we really lose our hope. But when President Xi 




corruption. He worked with Premier Li to crack down on the environmental 
protection. We see the hope.”  
However this “hope” seems to come at the cost of media freedom. “And when you 
see the hope, you have to accept that it is overshadowed by thinking our pressure has 
been increased, our freedom has been somehow reduced, but we at least get hope that 
our country is going to lead and not be affected by poverty or environment” 
(Interviewee 19). These journalists feel that western countries do not understand 
China’s sacrifices. “The western side, they really don’t report those things. They only 
see one piece of the picture, how our rights have been decreased, how our freedom 
has been decreased, how the pressure has been increased – that’s true of course, it’s 
part of the picture. But you have to hold a full picture of how our country operates”.  
Chinese journalists’ experience of China’s misrepresentation in western media make 
Africa’s misrepresentation in Chinese media relatable to them. “That’s also how 
Chinese journalists have to hold up a full picture of African countries – Africa is not 
full of poverty, they have rich people. It’s not about the wars – the war is in small 
countries. Africa generally is peaceful, is prosperous, is developing very well. But I 
think every single journalist has to have a picture about the world. So I understand 
that they report on a small side of China, because we also report on a small side of 
Africa.” He further tries to be understanding of western journalists. “I think some 
western journalists are also under pressure from authorities or the general public. I 
understand our business of being a media worker. I also hope the western side can 
understand us, at least with personal communication like this, we can understand each 
other. We can talk to each other, so we can reach mutual understanding” (Interviewee 
19).  
This section explored the ideological influences (Reese, 2001) on Chinese journalists 
by focusing on their perceptions of the China-Africa relationship, and China’s soft 
power strategies. Culture is one of the defining aspects of Chinese soft power among 
Chinese journalists – and they therefore consider China’s rich history and the modern 
and historical influence of Confucianism to be at the core of China’s soft power. They 
are aware of the importance of the China-Africa relationship to wielding soft power, 




neocolonial. Journalists are mandated to maintain a positive image of Africa in 
Chinese media, yet negative stereotypical reporting of Africa remains. 
Chinese journalists believe that they play a central role in wielding Chinese soft 
power abroad, particularly by promoting official terminology. Chinese journalists in 
Africa are important to China’s soft power partly as a “charm defensive” approach – 
in response to negative coverage of China by western media. China’s “charm 
defensive” develops in collaboration with Africa’s, particularly as African 
misrepresentation in Chinese media is relatable, because of China’s own 
misrepresentations. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the influences on Chinese journalists as proposed by Reese 
(2001) and Reese and Shoemaker (2016) in a model that focuses on individual, 
routine, organisational, extra-media and ideological influences on journalists’ 
coverage. Media ownership, an organisational influence, appeared to outweigh all 
other influences on Chinese journalists, as state-ownership of Chinese media strongly 
impacts journalists through every level of Reese’s proposed hierarchy. 
At the individual influences level, this chapter found that Chinese journalists are 
given clear guidelines on covering China, which means their journalistic skills are 
potentially less valuable than a strong command of the English language to be 
employed at English-speaking Chinese publications. These journalists’ positions at 
Chinese publications are considered admirable, particularly because of their proximity 
to the Chinese government. Chinese journalists believe that sustainability is 
increasingly prioritised by the Chinese government and have seen increasing media 
coverage of China’s environmental impact, although that excludes China-Africa 
coverage. Many Chinese journalists are aware that China has a poor human rights 
record, but concurrently believe that the concept of human rights is used by the West 
to create a negative image of China. Chinese journalists currently experience a 
tightening of freedom of speech, with increased censorship, surveillance and pressure 
to serve the ruling party.  
At the routine influences level, Chinese journalists experience layered hierarchies of 
censorship at their individual media organisations. Journalists are mandated to write 




not published, and a “propaganda task”. Propaganda is maintained through the news 
production process, as each article goes through a series of internal gatekeepers for its 
politically correctness, including editors, “experts,” and “releasers.” Some journalists 
see their propaganda role as a service to the Chinese society. Because journalistic 
practices are determined by the government, English language skills are considered 
more valuable than journalistic experience. Journalists find it challenging to balance 
propaganda with also attracting foreign audiences. A key challenge for Chinese 
journalists is to penetrate the western media system.  
At the organisational influences level, most Chinese journalists consider themselves 
objective, because it is a requirement from their publications. Chinese journalists thus 
compartmentalise their learned objectivity – an unattainable ideal – and what is 
expected from them as loyal to the Party. Chinese journalists believe that western 
media is not objective either. Chinese journalists are aware that their publications are 
state-owned, characterised by censorship, scrutiny, and surveillance, and fear the 
repercussions of making mistakes. Despite the impact of censorship, there are 
incentives to work at Chinese publications, such as financial benefits, and status for 
working closely with the state. While Chinese publications are state-owned, they have 
become increasingly commercialised, and experience the same pressures to make 
profit as most other media. Some Chinese media programmes offer material for 
Chinese citizens who are critical of government. 
At the extra-media or social institutions influences level, Chinese journalists consume 
mainstream international English media, local Chinese media and, rarely, African 
media, apart from South African publications. According to the interviewed 
journalists, Chinese audiences generally prefer stereotypical negative reporting on 
Africa. Chinese journalists most commonly use government officials as their sources, 
but experts or intellectuals are also accepted if selected from a pool that will offer 
acceptable commentary. Journalists are cautious about using NGOs as sources, and 
are not allowed to interview NGOs that are critical of government. However, 
journalists may interview opposition or political parties other than the Chinese 
Communist Party. Additionally, for some Chinese journalists, their journalism plays a 




Finally, at the ideological or social systems level of influences, culture seems to be a 
defining aspect of Chinese soft power among Chinese journalists, who therefore 
consider China’s rich history and Confucianism to be at the core of China’s soft 
power. Journalists are aware of the importance of a mutually beneficial China-Africa 
relationship for wielding soft power, which they perceive not to be neocolonial. 
Journalists are mandated to maintain a positive image of Africa in Chinese media, yet 
stereotypical reporting of Africa remains. Chinese journalists perceive their role in 
China’s soft power abroad as crucial, particularly through their promotion of official 
terminology. Chinese journalists in Africa are important to China’s soft power partly 
as a “charm defensive” approach – in response to negative coverage of China by 
western media. China also collaboratively develops Africa’s “charm defensive” 
because of the relatable misrepresentation that Africa has experienced in Chinese 




CHAPTER EIGHT: CHINESE MEDIA COVERAGE OF 
CHINA’S SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
This chapter analyses the findings of a qualitative framing analysis of Chinese media 
coverage of China’s sustainable development and human rights impact on the African 
continent. This study explores six months of coverage from China Central Television 
(CCTV) and Xinhua News Agency. As discussed in Chapter 4, data were collected 
through online searches of Xinhua’s archives using the keyword “China” in 
conjunction with other relevant keywords, including poaching, climate change, 
environment, sustainable development, human rights, and labour. The CCTV sample 
included all AfricaLive episodes for the six-month period. Inserts containing these 
keywords were then transcribed and analysed through a qualitative framing analysis.  
The framing analysis of sustainable development revealed the following six dominant 
frames: China’s climate change leadership in the COP21 coverage, US-China 
collaboration, repercussion for environmental violations, China’s green technology 
and innovation, pollution in China, and Chinese environmental aid. The following 
three frames were identified about human rights coverage: Chinese jobs empowering 
Africa, improved labour conditions, and official human rights engagements. This 
chapter explores each of these frames in detail. 
 
1. Sustainable Development 
1.1. COP21 coverage – China’s climate change leadership 
Chinese media coverage of China and climate change during the sample dates 
centered on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 
(UNFCCC) 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21). Chinese media referred to China as 
a climate negotiations leader, having made seemingly “important contributions” to a 
global sustainable development plan (Xinhua, 2015/08/02). “China, on Tuesday, 
called on all countries to speed up negotiations to reach accord at the UN climate 




Xinhua’s coverage of Chinese leadership featured endorsements from key climate 
roleplayers. According to the UNFCCC president, Christiana Figueres, “there is peer 
pressure among emerging countries. When China commits billions to help developing 
countries fight climate change, it helps change minds” (Xinhua, 2015/10/07). During 
the coverage, former French president, Francois Hollande, emphasised China’s “vital 
role” in climate change, which includes China involving “other emerging countries in 
the fight to mitigate climate change”. Hollande seemed optimistic “because a great 
country, China, has supported us” (Xinhua, 2015/11/03). Additionally, World Bank 
vice president, Rachel Kyte, was reportedly “extremely positive when describing the 
announcement of China's climate aid to developing countries as ‘an extraordinary 
new development’” (Xinhua, 2015/11/04). These quotes create the perception of 
optimism around China’s climate leadership and its influence on developing 
countries, in particular.  
China is further represented as an influential leader through a quote from Energy 
Foundation’s (EF) CEO, Eric Heitz: “But no matter what happens in Paris, it will still 
be true that China has stepped up as global leader on global warming” (Xinhua, 
2015/11/19). China’s apparent commitment seems more significant than the outcome 
of the overall climate negotiations, and essentially more significant than the 
commitments of the rest of the world. According to Heitz, these new commitments 
could highlight China’s leadership image as “many people, including the Chinese 
people, don't know that China has become a global leader” (Xinhua, 2015/11/19). 
However, Heitz is employed by EF, a U.S. non-profit organisation assisting China’s 
transition towards clean energy. His credibility is therefore questionable due to this 
vested interest. His comments could be a public relations strategy of EF, rather than 
true praise for China’s sustainability progress. Furthermore, Heitz’s inclusion creates 
the perception that regardless of China’s power, the country still requires western 
input to guide its climate change policy. 
Xinhua also quoted Hollande’s credit to China for catching up with the climate 
movement: “[N]ow the country tops the world in terms of energy conservation” 
(2015/11/03). China’s catch-up and the word “now” contribute to the perception of 
China’s sustainable development progress, which could affect its environmental 




described as “rapid, breakneck and even reckless”, but going forward, “the word on 
every China watcher’s lips will simply be ‘green’”. China’s environmentally aware 
communication could suggest a charm defensive (Shi, 2013), in which Chinese media 
set up a counter narrative to the criticism China usually receives in the global media 
for its environmental impact. 
Many articles award China with climate leadership authority because of its proactive 
responses to climate change. Xinhua reported that China “aims to cut carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP by at least 60 percent from the 2005 level by 2030” 
(Xinhua, 2015/09/08). China’s climate responses are described as “ambitious” and 
“extremely commendable” (Xinhua, 2015/10/15). Additionally, CCTV focuses on 
Chinese leadership’s grappling with obstacles, but instead of honing in on the 
challenges, it highlights the government’s proactive responses. “China will build a 
low-carbon energy system and help green construction. Are the tasks ahead daunting? 
China says it will strive to fulfill its commitments” (CCTV, 12/01/2015). The words 
“will”, “exploring” and “strive” indicate active responses by government. Chinese 
media coverage of China’s response to climate change displays characteristics of 
“constructive journalism”. Central to this journalistic approach is following up on 
solutions – how a problem was solved, by whom, and what lessons can be learned 
from that (Yanqui & Matingwina, 2016). The portrayal of the Chinese government’s 
proactive responses of finding and implementing environmental solutions thus reflect 
this solutions-focused and optimistic reporting style. 
China also seems to transform challenges into opportunities throughout this coverage. 
While China’s climate change representative, Xie Zenhua, admits that “for China, we 
are suffering a lot from climate change”, China’s optimism is covered in response. 
“We don't take climate change as a burden; instead we take it as a good opportunity 
for us to transform our growth pattern, and an opportunity for economic restructuring, 
industrial restructuring and restructuring of our energy mix” (Xinhua, 2015/09/15). 
China appears as turning an environmental challenge into a development opportunity. 
Particularly, reporting that China’s renewable energy industry “employs around 39 
million people” positions job opportunities as a silver lining to China’s climate 





Articles tend to list the Chinese government’s future plans. “From now on, low-
carbon production will come through better technology” (Xinhua, 2015/09/15). This 
reflects constructive journalism, but also what Christians et al. (2009:30) call 
“collaborative journalism”, which refers to the collaborative role between media and 
the state, in particular to support national interest or development goals. Some articles 
list China’s range of strategies, including “introduction of a national carbon cap-and-
trade system before 2018; 20 billion yuan in promised aid to other developing 
countries to help them adapt to and combat climate change; and cutting CO2 
emissions per unit of GDP by at least 40 percent from the 2005 level by 2020, and at 
least 60 percent by 2030”. The inclusion of deadlines in the coverage of these goals 
illustrates tangibility, pragmatism and urgency. This framing positions China as 
organised and strategic, as articles often include a plan on how their goals will be met. 
Official quotes often affirm these plans. “‘It is crucial for the country in avoiding the 
middle-income trap and improving competitiveness’, said Pan Yue, vice minister of 
environmental protection” (Xinhua, 2015/11/04). 
China prioritises multinational cooperation in the Xinhua coverage. The Chinese 
government often expresses respect and support for foreign governments. 
Spokesperson Hong Lei says, “China appreciates France's efforts so far for hosting 
the [COP 21] summit.” China also “attaches importance to the role of France as the 
host of the talks…, and is willing to enhance communication and coordination with 
the nation” (Xinhua, 2015/09/15). China’s commitment to climate change mitigation 
is depicted as a valuable diplomatic strategy to create and maintain official 
relationships with countries such as France, which is considered a “diplomatic partner 
of priority”.  
China’s communication indicates a high level of respect for official processes and 
systems, including those determined by the United Nations. “The Paris agreement 
should help meet the goals of UNFCCC, follow the rules set out in the UNFCCC to 
contribute to its full and effective implementation” (Xinhua, 2015/09/09). The 
coverage of China’s support of the UN could potentially be viewed as an attempt by 
Chinese media at creating a counter-frame of the China-UN relationship, as China has 
generally been perceived as challenging the UN’s current authority. China’s 




parties”, “reach a comprehensive and balanced accord”, “common but differentiated 
responsibilities, equity and respective capabilities”. Articles further carried Chinese 
rhetoric on multinational cooperation, including “build consensus to the greatest 
extent” with “utmost sincerity” (Xinhua, 2015/09/09). China is portrayed as a 
trustworthy, well-intentioned and respectful partner for cooperation. 
China is portrayed as cooperating with other developing nations on climate 
mitigation. “China will also provide assistance to small island nations including 
Grenada under the framework of South-South cooperation” (Xinhua, 2015/09/10). 
Grenada is presented as an important cooperation partner of China, because it 
supports China’s sovereignty: “China appreciated Grenada's adherence to the one-
China policy, and was ready to further strengthen the two countries’ political mutual 
trust and cooperation.” China’s assistance to developing nations appears as a form of 
diplomacy that fits within an overall frame of China’s climate leadership. Grenada’s 
leadership “hailed the fruits” (Xinhua, 2015/09/10) of the China-Grenada cooperation, 
which further establishes the image of mutual benefits for China and its developing 
world partners. 
Xinhua focuses on China’s developing country status throughout its coverage. An 
article on China’s South-South Climate Cooperation Fund, quotes a Fijian climate 
change director, Peter Emberson, saying “the Fijian government welcomes the ‘bold 
step’ made by China, a developing country” (Xinhua, 2015/10/15). The parenthesis 
emphasises China as a developing country, presenting its climate aid to other 
developing countries as particularly extraordinary and selfless. While climate 
donations are expected, and even required, from developed countries, assistance from 
a developing country is presented as a “bold step,” “encouraging” and an “exemplary 
move” (Xinhua, 2015/10/15). 
According to the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), “here is another case of 
a large developing country, in the spirit of South-South cooperation, doing their 
contribution to the global efforts in not only reducing emissions, promoting clean 
energy, but also supporting the less-endowed countries like the Pacific SIDS”. 
China’s assistance appears to transcend expectations of developing countries, because 
it is not their responsibility but rather offered in the “spirit” of solidarity. The image 




– an exclusive position that has created a potential out-group – most likely nations 
from the Global North. The idea that solidarity (while also being a donor and leader) 
is exclusively available to China is further emphasised by the mention that PIDF told 
Xinhua “in an exclusive interview at the PIDF's Suva-based secretariat” (Xinhua, 
2015/10/15).  
China’s perceived solidarity with developing nations is based on the notion that China 
shares and understands their particular challenges. According to Emberson, China’s 
funding “affirms that China recognizes the importance of mobilizing climate finance 
to transition towards low-carbon futures, whilst building resilience to climate change 
in developing countries. This assistance is also China's recognition of the special 
circumstances of least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing states and 
the African countries alike” (Xinhua, 2015/10/15).  
China seems to advocate on behalf of developing nations for their shared agendas. 
“President Xi Jinping said it is crucial to Paris talks to address economic differences 
between nations, and allow different countries to develop their own solutions to the 
problem of global warming” (CCTV, 12/01/2015). Xi reportedly highlighted the 
importance to “respect differences among countries, especially developing countries, 
in domestic policies, capacity-building and economic structure” and respect 
“developing countries’ needs to reduce poverty and improve people’s living 
standards” (CCTV, 12/01/2015). China is portrayed as the voice of the developing 
world, contributing to the frame of its climate leadership. 
Chinese media characterise Chinese leadership through its country leader, President 
Xi Jinping. “Chinese President Xi Jinping urged world leaders at the UN climate 
conference to work together to ensure an agreement is reached” (CCTV, 12/01/2015). 
CCTV emphasised Xi’s “tightly scheduled agenda” in New York. “At the invitation 
of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Xi Jinping will also attend a working lunch on 
climate change where he and other leaders will discuss ways to address climate 
change” (CCTV, 26/09/2015). The mention of Xi’s busy schedule suggests he is a 
sought after, and therefore important, leader. The emphasis on the UN Secretary-
General’s “invitation,” suggests this is exclusive, contributing to the image of his 
importance. An article titled “Xi’s worldwide diplomacy benefits China, the world” 




development” (Xinhua, 2015/01/05). This article creates the idea that Xi is single-
handedly leading the world through his leadership of China.  
Chinese coverage tended to focus on official COP21 events or communications. 
Xinhua articles are filled with quotes from Chinese officials: “‘China has attended the 
whole negotiation process in a constructive manner,’ Wang Min, China's deputy 
permanent representative to the UN, said to reporters” (Xinhua, 2015/09/15). These 
quotes are obtained through interviews, press releases or other official engagements: 
“State Councilor Yang Jiechi made the comment in a strategic dialogue with Jacques 
Audibert, diplomatic advisor to the French president” (Xinhua, 2015/10/15). Many 
articles also report on official responses from other governments to China’s climate 
change leadership. “Audibert said his country looks forward to working with China to 
make the Paris meeting a success” (Xinhua, 2015/09/15). 
This section discussed how Chinese media’s COP 21 coverage portrays China as a 
climate leader, particularly through its solidarity with developing countries, its 
proactive responses to climate change, and its leadership through President Xi 
Jinping. 
1.2. US-China collaboration 
In its sustainable development coverage, Chinese media focus particularly on the 
China-US relationship. China and the US are often described together as “the world’s 
top two emitters of greenhouse gases” (Xinhua, 2015/09/12). They are referred to as 
“the world's two largest economies”, highlighting China as “the world's biggest 
developing country” and the US as “the biggest developed country”. China is 
presented as a potential competitor to the US for global leadership, although the 
emphasis on its developing country status suggests that China is positioned as leader 
of the developing world, and the US of the developed world. 
Chinese media coverage focuses on China-US cooperation – highlighting their 
similarities, while often negating their competition. China-US collaboration is 
presented as a joint leadership – they will reportedly “jointly push international 
climate change negotiations for a new agreement”. Xinhua reported that the “two 




emission more effectively”. Furthermore, Chinese Premier Li states that “a long-term 
stable and sound development of the China-U.S. relations is not only beneficial to the 
two countries, but also a contribution for world peace, stability and development” 
(Xinhua, 2015/11/13). This contributes to the image of the US and China as climate 
leaders, but also leaders in other crucial global issues. 
While collaboration is generally pertinent to China’s climate strategy, the US is 
singled out as partner: “Climate change is of high importance to China, and we hope 
to work with other parties including the United States to build a fair, reasonable and 
win-win global climate governance system” (Xinhua, 2015/09/09). China’s climate 
strategy is again illustrated as a diplomatic strategy. “Cooperation on climate change 
is not only critical to the future of our planet, but a major milestone in the U.S.-China 
relationship” (Xinhua, 2015/09/14). Rhetoric, “the human use of symbols to 
communicate” (Foss, 2004:4), is a symbolic choice, resulting in seeing the world in 
one way rather than another. The China-US frame often centres on collaboration, 
which includes the following rhetoric: “increasing cooperation”, “close cooperation”, 
“win-win results”, “joint efforts from both sides”, “jointly promote”, “maintain the 
sound momentum of dialogue”, “cement dialogue” (Xinhua, 2015/09/12; Xinhua, 
2015/09/09).  
Chinese media predominantly illustrate amicable China-US collaboration despite their 
existing power struggles. However, some coverage reflects competition with which 
country is leading the other. Some articles portray the US offering leadership to 
China: “Los Angeles’ great efforts in combatting smog is well-known in China. And 
according to the mayor, Los Angeles has more Chinese residents, visitors, and 
students than any other American city” (Xinhua, 2015/09/14). Not only can Los 
Angeles lead Chinese efforts to combat smog, but the article suggests Chinese citizens 
themselves prefer being in Los Angeles than in China. Conversely, others portray 
China leading the U.S. China’s climate responses were described as “very 
impressive” by Todd D. Stern, the Special Envoy for Climate Change at the U.S. 
State Department (Xinhua, 2015/09/15). 
China and the US are portrayed as collaborating regardless of their differences. 
Premier Li Keqiang is quoted saying, “it is normal for the two countries, with 




or even dispute some issues, but they share more mutual interest than disputes” 
(Xinhua, 2015/11/13). Xinhua highlights China’s respect and support of official US 
policies, processes and systems. “China attaches great importance to parliamentary 
exchanges and cooperation with the US.” In return, the US House of Representatives 
Minority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, reportedly “spoke highly of China's development, 
especially in poverty reduction. She said the United States is ready to strengthen 
contact with China in a friendly and candid way to enhance mutual understanding and 
consensus” (Xinhua, 2015/11/13). The inclusion of Pelosi’s emphasis on the 
“friendly” and “candid” tone, suggests that this might not be characteristic of the 
China-US relationship.   
Most coverage of the China-US relationship focuses on official meetings and 
statements. Xinhua covered the “First Session of the U.S.-China Climate-Smart/Low-
Carbon Cities Summit” aka the “Climate Leaders Summit” report (Xinhua, 
2015/09/16), and focused on multiple Chinese and US cities signing the Climate 
Leaders Declaration, the California-China Urban Climate Collaborative (CCUCC) 
and the Memorandum of Understanding between Shenzhen and Los Angeles (Xinhua, 
2015/09/15). These agreements again illustrate China’s respect for official processes 
and systems.  
Chinese media prioritise official sources. In the China-US coverage, Chinese media 
include both Chinese and US officials in one article, in many ways illustrating that 
these two parties are in conversation with each other – strengthening the collaboration 
frame. “Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli met with Brian Deese, senior advisor to 
US President Barack Obama” (Xinhua, 2015/09/09), and “Yang Jiechi, the Special 
Envoy of President Xi and U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will attend the closing 
ceremony Wednesday.” While Xi Jinping is consistently addressed as “President”, 
one article doesn’t afford his counterparts the same treatment: “During his visit to the 
United States, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his U.S. host Barack Obama are 
likely to exhibit even stronger aspiration and resolution to help our planet” (Xinhua, 
2015/09/12). Chinese media showcase a high level of respect for their president. A 
wide range of Chinese officials are also mentioned, which illustrates respect for 
Chinese officials; even those working on lower profile projects are given credit, 




Chinese media emphasised praise that China received from the US leadership. “Bill 
Gates hailed the achievements made by China in coping with climate change and 
developing new energy industries” (Xinhua, 2015/11/13). Gates was quoted 
expressing optimism about US-China leadership, since “the combination of 
advantages of companies from the two countries could push forward technological 
innovation and the industrialization process”. Premier Li responded that “China is 
ready to work with other countries” (Xinhua, 2015/11/12). The word “ready” 
illustrates progress in China’s ideology on the environment, as the article suggests 
there had been a time when China had not been prepared to collaborate on the issue. 
The US and China received joint credit from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. 
“This announcement bolsters prospects for a universal, meaningful agreement in Paris 
this year. It further signals the shared vision and seriousness” (Xinhua, 2015/09/25).  
This section discussed Chinese media’s framing of the China-US relationship, which 
generally reflects cooperation but also competition for global leadership between the 
two countries.  
1.3. Repercussions for environmental violations 
China appears to have strict environmental laws, rules and regulations, as well as 
heavy punishment for violations of those laws. Xinhua’s sustainability coverage 
focuses heavily on a crackdown by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) 
after their Environmental Protection Law took effect in 2015.  
A recurring theme in this coverage is the Chinese government’s application of 
surveillance, scrutiny and supervision. Officials have been urged to “intensify 
supervision” (Xinhua, 2015/08/31) to detect environmental “violations” through 
“inspection teams” (Xinhua, 2015/08/3). Additionally, the MEP aims to “check on 
pollution prevention and control”. References to surveillance in news articles on 
China’s sustainable development, implies a strategic effort by the Chinese 
government to avert a negative environmental impact. This commitment to 
environmental protection creates the counterframe that conservation is prioritised in 
China. 
Environmental violations in China are reportedly harshly punished. “The ministry 




rectification measures to the ministry within 20 work days” (Xinhua, 2015/08/03). 
The Chinese government is portrayed as responding to environmental violations with 
gravity. Chinese media often focus on the MEP – a source that tends to highlight the 
repercussions for environmental violations. “China has imposed punishment in 25,164 
environmental violation cases in the first half of 2015, with 9,325 companies having 
their doors sealed, the Ministry of Environmental Protection said” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/03). 
One form of punishment is heavy fines. The 2015 Environmental Protection Law 
allows “unlimited fines accumulating on a daily basis to be imposed on enterprises 
that fail to rectify violations, which aims to fix the loophole of cheap one-time 
penalties” (Xinhua, 2015/09/10). Another punishment is public naming and shaming. 
“China's environmental watchdog on Monday named and shamed Hohhot, capital of 
North China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region for poor air and water quality” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/05). This was done by the MEP, here referred to as “environmental 
watchdog”, which again refers back to the image of surveillance by the Chinese 
government. Coverage of these punishments not only potentially deters future 
environmental violations, but also contribute to the image of China’s seriousness 
about environmental protection. 
Characteristics of constructive journalism, specifically solutions-focused coverage, 
are evident. Xinhua focuses on government responses to environmental violations, 
including efforts to keep violators accountable, instead of the violations itself. “China 
has cleaned up 1,790 crime cases involving environmental pollution from January to 
July” (Xinhua, 2015/09/14). “Environmental authorities have closed down companies, 
limited or suspended on production, and detained wrong-doers” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/05), and “740 cases of suspected environmental crime have been transferred 
to the police for criminal investigations” (Xinhua, 2015/08/05). The Chinese 
government is illustrated as proactive, having found solutions even before problems 
had been publicised. However, some articles suggest that the crackdown serves as 
damage control to China’s environmental reputation after the Tianjin blast. “Lessons 
must be learned from the recent Tianjin warehouse explosions, Wang said, urging 




government is portrayed as rectifying its mistakes and making reparations for Tianjin 
via implementing new, stricter environmental policies. 
The issue of environmental violations is reported to go hand in hand with corruption. 
Business applications were rejected “because information supplied for them was false, 
the ministry said” (Xinhua, 2015/08/08). Coverage of the Chinese government’s 
environmental crackdown therefore simultaneously illustrates its intolerance of 
corruption. Some companies have “passed their assessments even though they emitted 
excessive pollutants, which proved that the assessments made by some agents were 
falsified”. Since, according to environmental researcher, Chang Jiwen, corruption 
“has discredited the authorities” (2015/08/08), the crackdown could serve as a form of 
retaliation at corrupt companies or individuals that might have damaged the Chinese 
government’s reputation. The Chinese government aims to rebuild its anti-corruption 
image through transparency: “The ministry plans to build an online platform on its 
website this year to manage assessment information and make it more accessible to 
the public” (Xinhua, 2015/08/08).  
Articles on corruption also tend to focus on the proactive implementation of solutions, 
rather than the violations itself. “Six of those agents have already delivered a plan to 
reform their working processes, …and one has lost its license to operate, the ministry 
said” (Xinhua, 2015/08/08). This might again reflect constructive journalism, as well 
as “development journalism”, which is centred around collaboration between media 
and the state, “premised on a commitment by the press to play a positive role in the 
processes of development” (Christians et al., 2009:200). Violations are generally 
mentioned alongside an already determined repercussion, establishing the frame of a 
proactive Chinese government. Additionally, Chinese media reported that Xiong 
Yuehui, head of the Department of Science, Technology and Standards of MEP is 
“under investigation for suspected serious violations of discipline and laws” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/19). The public shaming of the Chinese government’s own corrupt members 
could establish trust in the accountability of Chinese governance. 
Xinhua reported that all Chinese officials, both government and Party, will be subject 
to “a lifelong-liability system”, meaning punishments can be imposed retroactively. 
The new regulations also reportedly “banned promotion for officials found guilty of 




performance assessment”. The threat to their political reputation as punishment 
illustrates the importance of a political career to Chinese officials, as well as Chinese 
government’s regard of the gravity of corruption. Additionally, “all environmental 
impact assessment agencies must cut their links to governments at all levels by the 
end of 2016 to avoid corruption” (Xinhua, 2015/08/07). The separation of 
environmental regulatory bodies and government again implies the Chinese 
government’s commitment to anti-corruption, but also highlights the role that the 
Chinese government might have played in environmental damage in the past. 
Chinese non-governmental organisations enforce accountability for environmental 
violations, indirectly supporting the state’s crackdown. “Eight firms are being sued 
for dumping untreated waste in northwest China's Tengger Desert as part of a high-
profile public interest litigation filed by a non-profit organization” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/18). Cases for illegal dumping were filed by the China Biodiversity 
Conservation and Green Development Foundation, leading to investigations and shut 
downs of companies. The organisations “hoped the case would serve as an example of 
‘a typical public interest lawsuit’ and a warning for other polluters”. After drawing 
the attention of the state, the firms were asked, among other reparations, to “issue an 
open apology on national press” (2015/08/18). This illustrates the collaboration 
between the Chinese state and the national press: the state uses the press as a platform 
to put pressure on corporations to follow its environmental policies.  
Ironically, a segment on CCTV reported that Chinese commitment to environmental 
laws was lacking at the Chinese Mamba cement plant in South Africa. According to 
manager John Mettley, South Africa’s environmental laws were “impressive”, while 
“there was some lack on China’s side but we managed to get it right” (CCTV, 
11/13/2015). This interview differs from other frames in Chinese media, portraying 
China as lacking commitment to environmental policies. However, “get it right” also 
contributes to the frame of improvement and progress of Chinese environmental 
protection.  
 




The Chinese media analysed in this study portray China as a promoter of 
sustainability, using innovation and technology to respond to climate change. “China 
is already the global leader in clean energy investment”, EF’s Eric Heitz said, listing 
China’s areas of expertise: “clean wind power, solar energy, electric vehicles, LED 
lighting that uses less power but gives very good lighting, more efficient appliances 
like refrigerators or washing machines, and more efficient industrial equipment” 
(Xinhua, 2015/11/19). Listing China’s innovations creates an image that China is 
involved in a wide range of renewable projects, contributing to the frame of its 
proactive attitude towards sustainable development.  
Xinhua also portrays China as advancing renewable energy technology. An article 
titled “China tops global list of clean energy investment” reports that China “invested 
89 billion U.S. dollars in clean energy in 2014, the largest among 55 nations surveyed 
in a global report, representing the country's commitment to a low-carbon future” 
(Xinhua, 2015/11/23). The Climatescope 2015 report is based on surveys conducted 
by Britain's Department for International Development and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development. China appears as a world leader in renewable energy 
development, a frame that is established by the credibility of the two organisations 
sponsoring and conducting the research. 
UN Under-Secretary General Achim Steiner, another globally respected source, said 
China is “poised for greener growth and a better environment”. Steiner’s credibility is 
highlighted not only by his official position, but also because he is “a frequent visitor 
to China”. His firsthand experience in China illustrates familiarity and personal 
insight. Steiner acknowledged the “intense government promotion and support” of 
China’s new energy vehicle production, as well as the Chinese government’s 
encouragement of “consumers, domestic and international producers to ensure that 
cars have low emissions” (Xinhua, 2015/06/11). China extends its focus abroad, 
encouraging other countries to follow its lead on green technology, a narrative that 
contributes to the frame of global climate leader. 
However, the Chinese Association of Science and Technology’s vice president, Xie 
Kechang’s views differ. He stated that “China lags behind developed countries in the 
energy sector, relying on imported core technology”. Kechang has called for the 




and building showcase projects as well as pouring in investment and encouraging 
innovation” (Xinhua, 2015/11/25). This article also suggests that, while China tries to 
curate its image as global climate leader, its leadership is discredited by the fact that 
its current coal consumption is at “35 percentage points higher than the global 
average” (Xinhua, 2015/11/25). 
China’s technological innovations reportedly boost its environmental surveillance. 
According to the MEP, “China will build a space-air-ground integrated sensing 
system to detect and stop pollution.” The monitoring system will enable a unified 
standard and an automatic early warning using “surveillance sites across the country” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/04). This again highlights the importance of surveillance by the 
Chinese government to ensure environmental protection. 
China’s technological innovation also promotes conservation. A 70-million-USD 
“eco-friendly overwater highway” was designed to “avoid damage” to a mountain 
range in China's ecology. Along with a thumbs up emoticon, Twitter user, Shankar 
Sharma, said “we can have development and still protect the environment” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/11). Ironically, Xinhua sourced Twitter for a quote on the approval of the 
highway, while this platform is currently banned in China. Although Sharma is not a 
Chinese citizen, his comment serves as the public’s approval of advancements in 
Chinese conservation. This potentially illustrates Chinese media’s high regard for 
foreign comments of approval, since they could just as easily have sourced similar 
quotes from locals on Weibo.  
Many articles emphasise the amount of money the Chinese government has invested 
in environmental projects. “The government has allocated more than 400 billion yuan 
(around 65 billion U.S. dollars) to projects returning farmland to forest since 1999” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/07). Showcasing the large amounts spent on conservation confirms 
the Chinese government’s commitment to sustainable development. Most articles 
contain statistics in an attempt to quantify governmental efforts and results. “A new 
system comprised 2,729 natural reserves, and a number of forests, wetlands and 
geological parks, covering over 1.7 million square kilometers, 18 percent of China's 
land territory” (Xinhua, 2015/08/06). Covering results using quantitative data implies 




This section discussed the framing of China’s contribution to conservation through 
green technology and innovation. 
1.5. Pollution in China: Smog and Tianjin blast 
Although Chinese green technology emerges as a frame, the majority of coverage 
focuses on pollution in China. Many of these articles focus on the 2015 Tianjin 
warehouse blast. “A total of 112 bodies have been found, and 95 people remained 
missing, including 85 firefighters, after two explosions took place in a warehouse for 
hazardous chemicals following a fire” (Xinhua, 2015/08/16). Articles generally draw 
on official information on the blast, provided, for example, by “Gong Jiansheng, vice 
head of the city's publicity department” or “rescue authorities” (Xinhua, 2015/08/31). 
Chinese media coverage from this sample focused on the Chinese government’s swift 
response to the blast. Coverage created the image of a proactive government, mostly 
referencing actions, through verbs such as “using hydrogen peroxide”, “building 
cofferdams”, “trucking away”, “will be processed and drained”, “needs to be treated” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/16; Xinhua, 2015/08/18). Articles also focused on the successes of 
the government’s crisis response: “People living up to three kilometres from the site 
have been evacuated and advised to wear masks and long pants” (CCTV, 
2015/08/14).  
The Chinese government’s crisis response reportedly relied on expertise, which 
illustrates the extent of the government’s response efforts and its capability to control 
the situation. “Specialised anti-chemical warfare troops” and “chemical specialists” 
searched for survivors in the area (CCTV, 2015/08/14; Xinhua, 2015/08/18). 
Additionally, CCTV reported that the Chinese government’s extensive response 
efforts included deploying a “rescue force”, “extra medics”, “psychologists” and 
“professional psychologists” (CCTV, 2015/08/14).  
Surveillance of the area again formed part of the reported response. “Only safe levels 
of harmful gas were detected near the blast site” and hydrogen cyanide levels were 
reportedly “much lower than the national safety standard” (Xinhua, 2015/08/16). 
However, when some water samples contained “28.4 times more than the standard” 




Administration (SOA) began “keeping closer track” and implemented more “urgent” 
monitoring (Xinhua, 2015/08/23). The SOA was covered “promising” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/19) to prevent the spread of cyanide, indicating the government’s confidence 
in its capability to effectively handle the crisis.  
Another response included transparency, such as “releasing data on air pollution to 
the public every two hours” (Xinhua, 2015/08/18). Publicising information was 
translated into policy after the blast, illustrating the gravity of the Chinese 
government’s response. “Air pollution following environmental emergencies should 
be monitored and details made public, according to a latest revision to the draft 
amendment to the Air Pollution Control Law currently under deliberation” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/28). Accountability also formed part of the crisis response. Xinhua reported 
on the Supreme People's Procuratorate’s (SPP) announcement of its investigation into 
the Tianjin blast (Xinhua, 2015/08/16), inspecting “abuse of power or dereliction of 
duty” and holding responsible officials who “fail to effectively carry out supervision, 
or approve environmentally disqualified projects, or attempt to shirk the responsibility 
of protecting the environment” (Xinhua, 2015/08/18). Chinese media coverage of the 
government’s response to the Tianjin blast thus focused on the deployment of 
expertise, monitoring and supervision, transparency and accountability. 
However, some locals found government attempts at transparency to be insufficient. 
Families of missing firefighters said “they’ve been treated with sufficient food and 
water and a place to live” but instead they want “more information, specific 
information about the people they’ve lost in the explosions” (CCTV, 2016/01/25). 
Chinese media reported on the families’ frustration with insufficient government 
communication after they demanded open “communication channels” about the crisis, 
indicating somewhat critical reporting of the Chinese government. However, CCTV 
explained that the officials were “overwhelmed” and therefore “disappointingly” 
could not provide more details (2016/01/25). “Disappointingly” could either mean 
unfortunately, in which case CCTV responds in defense of the Chinese government, 
or it could express disappointment in the Chinese officials’ lack of response, 
reflecting criticism of officials.   
During the aftermath, Chinese media tried to illustrate that the crisis had been 




Area, where the port is located, opened for the new semester on Monday as 
scheduled” (Xinhua, 2015/08/31). This implies that, despite the impact of the blast, 
and due to the government’s efficient response, Chinese society was not completely 
disrupted. Schools symbolise a key part of society returning to normal. Xinhua 
reported that the local Tianjin government promoted development in the area, 
“including relocating companies that handle dangerous chemicals or goods” (Xinhua, 
2015/10/14). Xinhua further included improvements such as safety checks, repairing 
infrastructure damages caused by the blast, and providing housing for those affected 
by the blasts. This contributes to the image that Chinese government’s effective 
control over the situation means the community can move forward.  
Smog coverage 
Reports on air pollution feature heavily in Chinese media. Articles on the increase of 
the pollutant PM2.5 and ozone pollution illustrate a dire situation, with “no sign of 
improvement” in cities like Shanghai (Xinhua, 2015/08/08). Many articles warn about 
ozone pollution’s impact as a result of automobile exhaust and industrial emissions. 
“Potential symptoms arising from prolonged exposure to ozone include respiratory 
diseases, coughing and damage to the immune system” (Xinhua, 2015/08/08). 
Coverage illustrates the disruption of Chinese citizens’ daily lives due to the smog. 
“Environmental departments advise people to avoid outdoor activities when the 
pollution is the most severe between 2 to 3 o'clock in the afternoon” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/08). Additionally, Beijing has implemented a “ban on outdoor barbecues” 
(Xinhua, 2015/06/15). 
Reports on the disruption of Chinese daily life emphasise the gravity of China’s 
pollution problem. The severity of the smog’s impact is further highlighted by a focus 
on children. There have been “heated discussions” over shielding “children from the 
harm of foul air” (2016/01/22). Xinhua reported that the Chinese government had 
created special research committees to study the effect of smog on schools. 
Government plans to install purifying facilities at schools, and children will “attend 
school on clear days, and stay at home on smoggy days” (Xinhua, 2016/01/22). 
Children essentially represent a vulnerable part of society, and the media’s focus on 




The villainous image of smog is further established by an article illustrating how air 
pollution affects the sacred religious practices in China, as “religious personages 
advised people to burn shorter incense at temples” (Xinhua, 2016/01/22). Beijing's 
renowned Yonghe Lamasery began providing free shorter and natural 
“environmentally friendly incense” to followers and visitors. Smog seems more than 
just a health threat to Chinese society, but is also a potential threat to Chinese 
tradition, culture and religion. Yonghe’s Hu Xuefeng  has called on other temples and 
followers to “take actions to follow the call of the society, and make concerted efforts 
to clean our air” (2016/01/22). The publication of Hu’s call suggests that Chinese 
media could be a helpful tool in mobilising the public to participate in anti-pollution 
efforts.  
Pollution articles generally referred to MEP or other official reports, but also source 
Chinese expertise such as the National Meteorological Center (NMC) or engineers 
such as Meng Xiaoyan with the China National Environmental Monitoring Center 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/31). Government often issues warnings to the public to respond to 
pollution. Xinhua reported that “the public has been warned to take precautions”, or 
that Xi’an “activated an air pollution emergency response.” The NMC “issued a 
yellow alert and advised children, the elderly and people with respiratory diseases to 
stay indoors” (Xinhua, 2015/10/20). Furthermore, articles educate local and global 
audiences on the smog alert system. “China has a four-tier color-coded weather 
warning system, with red representing the most severe weather, followed by orange, 
yellow and blue” (Xinhua, 2015/10/20). These reports illustrate how Xinhua is 
instrumental in the government’s efforts to inform and educate the public on air 
pollution. 
Chinese media rarely focused on individuals’ personal experiences of smog. 
However, one article reported on the frustrating experiences of environment 
inspector, Jia Lifei, in Xingtai, which has earned the reputation of “a city of smog”. 
Jia reportedly “felt embarrassed as an environment worker because my hands were 
tied” (Xinhua, 2015/09/20). Jia’s case infers that, while individuals might want to 
respond to pollution, poor governance leads to structural constraints. However, a new 




entrapment by polluting industries” (Xinhua, 2015/09/20). The word “entrapment” 
illustrates a hopeless situation, yet “finally” indicates relief, suggesting progress. 
Similar to the formulae mentioned earlier in this study, articles on the government’s 
response to pollution rely on quantitative data, such as the amount of money spent on 
decreasing pollution: “Beijing will earmark 16.5 billion yuan (about 2.57 billion U.S. 
dollars) to improve air quality in 2016” (Xinhua, 2016/01/24) and the expected 
percentage decrease: “breathable particles PM2.5 in Hebei province decreased by 23 
percent, compared with the same period last year” (Xinhua, 2015/09/20). Many 
articles include a hopeful caveat, implying positive outcomes. “As long as the local 
governments persist in the battle against smog, improve the industrial structure and 
step up efforts to curb pollution, blue skies will stay in Xingtai and other northern 
Chinese cities” (Xinhua, 2015/09/20). These articles often convey a positive 
trajectory for Chinese citizens to look forward to, indicating progress and change. 
This contributes to the frame of the Chinese government’s capability to resolve the 
smog problem, as well as other societal challenges. While coverage of smog generally 
creates a negative image of China, focusing on the government’s proactive response 
suggests that the smog crisis is improving. 
Coverage of important public diplomacy events hosted in China reveals how pollution 
relates to Chinese nation branding. “China on Monday unveiled temporary measures 
to guarantee clean air for the Sept. 3 military parade commemorating the end of 
World War II” (Xinhua, 2015/08/17). Environment Minister Chen Jining said “clean 
air was integral to the success of the parade, as it would showcase the good image of 
the national capital” (Xinhua, 2015/08/17). The article reports on China’s great 
lengths to improve its current image as a heavily polluted country. “Some coal-fired 
power plants will be shut down for maintenance, more than 10,000 factories will close 
or reduce production, and construction at nearly 9,000 sites will be halted” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/17). Similar drastic measures were taken for the IAAF World 
Championships, and initially achieved success during the 2014 Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings. “Measures to control pollution prior to and 
during big political events” had led to “excellent air” and “record lows” of air 
pollution measurements (Xinhua, 2015/06/15). Chinese netizens even coined the 




Chinese air pollution impacts China’s soft power potential. Xinhua affirmatively 
reports that “air pollution has been identified as a major obstacle to Beijing's bid for 
the 2022 Winter Olympic Games” (2015/06/15). Hosting a major sporting event is 
significant in wielding Chinese soft power, and therefore China took drastic measures 
to eliminate any potential threats to this opportunity. With an investment of 130 
billion US dollars, the president of the Beijing 2022 Bid Committee, Wang Anshun, is 
“confident that we can have fresh air in Beijing” (Xinhua, 2015/06/15). These 
measures illustrate the severity of China’s pollution problem, as well as the extent to 
which the Chinese government will respond to curbing pollution in aid of its soft 
power success.  
Xinhua frames air quality improvements as extraordinary cases compared to the 
normalised smog. According to Xinhua, after a “heavenly week” of “unprecedented” 
blue skies, gray haze greeted Beijing commuters. The article suggests that some 
citizens had become so accustomed to smog, they preferred it. “Some people, like 
Chen Shan, welcomed the return of old friend smog, as it was a sign the city was back 
to ‘normal’” (2015/06/15). Here, Chinese citizens seem passive and unperturbed by 
Beijing’s pollution. Chen posted on Weibo that “the more cloudy the sky, the more 
we should remember its blue times” which illustrates a rarity of unpolluted air in 
China. “The dreamy sky was a hot topic across social media, and even made 
headlines”, and blue sky images “went viral” (Xinhua, 2015/06/15), which further 
portrays smog as a normal feature of Beijing, to the extent that blue skies are 
newsworthy. 
One article featured a businessman going for a walk because he did not want to waste 
the “excellent weather” by staying in the hotel, “like I normally do.” The article sets a 
hopeful tone as the businessman claims that “if the sky in Beijing stays blue like this, 
I will enjoy my job even more” (Xinhua, 2015/06/15). This suggests that under the 
current smog employees in China might be experience low job or social satisfaction. 
Xinhua provides readers with a potential smog-free future that could make the 
country attractive to visitors and employees. However, currently, air pollution 
“remains the top concern of many citizens” (Xinhua, 2015/08/31).  
This section discussed the framing of China’s pollution problems by specifically 




to Chinese society, articles tend to focus on the proactive government response, 
consistent with elements of “constructive journalism”. 
1.6. Chinese environmental aid 
Many articles focus on Chinese foreign aid for environmental protection, showcasing 
an aspect of China’s soft power. According to UN official, Wu Hongbo, “it is widely 
recognized that China has been offering its support to countries in need to promote 
global sustainable development” (Xinhua, 2015/08/14). China has built sustainable 
infrastructure in Ethiopia, including wind power plants and an urban light rail, which 
“impressed” Wu “a lot”. Wu noted that “these are quite common in China, but they 
are all new to this African country” (Xinhua, 2015/08/14). The superior tone from the 
official stems from the connotation that Africa lacks infrastructure abundant in China. 
China thus seems more advanced than Africa, and its assistance comes across as 
paternalistic. As the “largest developing country in the world”, China has taken 
sustainability under the South-South cooperation framework as a “serious obligation” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/14). Its duty to assist Africa, as determined by its size and 
leadership position, contributes to this paternalistic tone. 
Coverage often indicates that developing countries experience dire circumstances, 
which, in some way, justifies the need for Chinese assistance. For Sri Lankan 
villagers, “clean and potable water has always been a problem as far as they could 
remember”. The China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) launched the 
Greater Kurunegala Water Supply and Sewerage Project to provide clean water to the 
village. The project has led to “a sigh of relief” from locals, and “has brought hope to 
thousands of local residents who have long been denied a basic necessity, that of 
clean drinking water”. China seems heroic, as a Chinese-owned corporation has 
solved a crucial problem for the community. Coverage suggests the Sri Lankan 
villagers “are very grateful to China for this project” (Xinhua, 2015/08/07). Chinese 
ambassador, Yi Xianliang, said, “China has always supported Sri Lanka's efforts to 
improve the quality of life of its people”, implying consistent support from China to 
its allies. Coverage of the CMEC illustrates how Chinese industry is tied to the brand 




China reportedly offers aid despite that onus being on developed countries. “North-
South cooperation is the mainstream of global partnerships today. South-South 
cooperation is just a supplement” (Xinhua, 2015/08/14). This assistance seems to be 
outside of China’s mandate, which suggests the selfless country is going the extra 
mile for sustainability. A key theme in the coverage of China’s assistance in Africa is 
that of mutual benefits. “We have witnessed a lot of examples of win-win 
cooperation. And they are welcomed by developing countries” (Xinhua, 2015/08/14). 
The caveat that Chinese assistance is “welcomed” in Africa could serve as a charm 
defensive (Shi, 2013) in which Xinhua provides a counter frame to coverage that 
portrays China as unwelcome or harmful in Africa. 
While Chinese foreign aid commonly takes the form of loans, private Chinese 
corporations also reportedly provide assistance. According to Xinhua, “the Chinese 
telecom company ZTE has expressed its commitment to supporting Ethiopia's green 
growth strategy by actively participating in the annual tree planting program in the 
East African country” (Xinhua, 2015/08/05). Under the theme of “Green action”, 
around 100 ZTE staff planted about 2 000 trees in Addis Ababa. ZTE stated: “[I]n this 
era of climate change, Ethiopia's determination to follow a different path is 
appreciable and ZTE is committed to supporting this effort in every way possible” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/05). “Ethiopia’s determination” indicates African agency in its 
sustainable development, and China is “supporting”, rather than leading. This 
provides a counter frame to the paternalism illustrated above, because China only 
supports African agency. 
According to Xinhua, both Chinese and local ZTE staff are “happy about their 
participation in the tree planting program” (Xinhua, 2015/08/05), creating a sense of 
amicable collaboration between the Chinese and Ethiopians. Employee, Zeng Qing, 
confirms that ZTE's participation strengthens the “cooperation and friendship between 
the peoples of Ethiopia and China” (Xinhua, 2015/08/05). In this coverage, the project 
promotes Chinese diplomacy. According to ZTE employee Abi Eshetu, the project 
goes beyond “participating in network expansion or network building” but also 
reflects ZTE’s “social responsibility”. The coverage thus creates an image of respect 




Additionally, “over 50 employees, including 12 Chinese” (Xinhua, 2015/09/20) at 
China Wuyi Company participated in a beach cleanup event in Mombasa, Kenya. The 
emphasis that Chinese employees also participated creates the perception that Chinese 
employees respect the local environment as much as the local employees. This might 
again create a counter frame to the existing narrative of Chinese citizens’ disregard 
for the environment in Africa. The Chinese company “joined environmentalists” and 
were “lending hands” (Xinhua, 2015/09/20), again suggesting a supportive instead of 
leadership role to African agency in local conservation. The sampled Chinese media 
provide a counter frame to existing coverage that portrays China’s disregard of 
conservation in Africa. 
Coverage reveals a generally positive attitude amongst local Kenyans towards Wuyi. 
Wuyi is considered a “major partner” in conservation, and was “embraced by a good 
number of residents who have turned up in the cleanup” (Xinhua, 2015/09/20). 
Wuyi’s good standing in Kenya is due to its regular conservation efforts, as well as its 
sustainable job creation. A local employee’s quote is followed by the parenthesis 
“who has been working in the Chinese company for 7 years” (Xinhua, 2015/09/20), 
which potentially challenges claims that China does not create long-term or 
sustainable job opportunities for local Africans. Xinhua portrays China as a 
sustainable influence on the African continent – regarding both conservation and 
employment.  
Many articles on sustainability focus on China’s multilateral relationships. CCTV 
announced that Chinese President Xi would co-chair the 15th FOCAC summit in 
Johannesburg with South African President Zuma, in which “cooperation” around 
“green development” would be a focus (CCTV, 2015/11/27). Additionally, China’s 
Special Representative Yin Hengmin voiced China’s support to the Forum for East 
Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) of which cooperation to “protect the 
environment” would be a focal point (Xinhua, 2015/8/22). These official meetings 
characterise the coverage of China’s multilateral cooperation for sustainability.  
Kenya has also increased cooperation with China as “a strategic partner” in 
sustainable development based on China’s position as “a source of expertise and 
innovations” (Xinhua, 2015/11/01). While a partnership suggests an equal power 




China leads Kenya in its transition to clean energy, capacity development, skills 
transfer and conservation. The Sino-Kenyan partnership is not only portrayed as 
leading to a renewable energy transition in Kenya, but Kenyan officials express 
confidence that China will offer “strategic leadership” in the Paris climate deal.  
Coverage of China positions it both in solidarity with developing countries, as well as 
being their climate leader. “Developing countries regard China an important ally in 
advancing our mutual interests like green economy” (Xinhua, 2015/11/01). China’s 
South-South cooperation commitment is trusted to “steer the climate change agenda 
effectively” (Xinhua, 2015/11/01). Kenyan officials even consider China an ally in 
“the war against climate change”. “War” suggests an image of two sides, and China is 
portrayed as both an ally and leader of Africa in the climate battle. According to 
Green Belt Movement chairperson ,Wanjira Maathai, “China is leading the world in 
green energy revolution” (Xinhua, 2015/11/1). China’s leadership is acknowledged 
and associated with progression and change by Wanjira Maathai, the daughter of the 
late Wangari Maathai, a globally renowned environmental activist. Maathai therefore 
has credibility in the environmental field, and her endorsement of China might boost 
its environmental reputation. 
Some articles focus on China’s multinational cooperation to end illegal environmental 
trade. “Myanmar and China will effectively cooperate in addressing the issue of 
illegal timber production, Myanmar Environmental Conservation and Forest Minister 
U Win Tun said”. A Chinese Forestry official stressed that the issue requires more 
“deepened cooperation than ever”, which suggests urgency in eradicating the illegal 
trade. Tun warned that the illegal timber trade in the Myanmar-China border area 
could “tarnish the image of the two countries” (Xinhua, 2015/09/24). This again 
illustrates the importance of environmental conservation to a country’s reputation, 
which further contributes to the idea that China’s conservation efforts can contribute 
to its soft power success in Africa.  
Some articles showcase attempts by Chinese role players to prevent wildlife 
trafficking, which could redeem China’s reputation as lacking environmental concern. 
CCTV highlights efforts in China to create awareness around poaching. “The message 
is loud and clear, and it’s been broadcast across China: Stop buying ivory. It comes 




personalities, who have joined forces with the International Fund for Animal Welfare 
to stop the illegal trade in elephant ivory” (CCTV, 2015/11/13). According to CCTV, 
IFAW attributes Chinese ivory consumption to ignorance about poaching’s impact. 
The broadly publicised message suggests that “behind ivory is murder, death and the 
destruction of the environment and communities in Africa” (CCTV, 2015/11/13). 
This insert suggests that Chinese society is unaware of the impact of poaching, a 
problem solved through a powerful awareness campaign. The portrayal of Chinese 
society’s ignorance suggests that their ivory consumption is innocent, and therefore 
not ill-intentioned.  
Additionally, a team of Chinese playwrights “donated motorbikes and other gear to 
Kenyan conservancies that are to be used in the fight against poaching”. According to 
Kenyan official, Judi Wakhungu, the donation “has injected fresh impetus in wildlife 
protection”. Xinhua explains this group joins “a growing list of Chinese animal lovers 
involved in wildlife protection”. This illustrates increasing advocacy in China, which 
could improve its reputation as poaching perpetrator. Highlighting this group’s efforts 
also challenges the essentialisation of China as supporting illegal wildlife trafficking. 
Overall. “We have strengthened cooperation with China to combat illegal wildlife 
trade from both the supply and demand side. This cooperation has brighter prospects” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/10). Though “combat” indicates the current gravity of poaching, 
“brighter” suggests improvement on the issue, in particular due to Chinese-Kenyan 
cooperation.  
This section examined the framing of Chinese environmental aid, which again 
presents China as both a leader and in solidarity with developing countries. 
The overall section found the following frames in the sustainable development 
coverage in the Chinese media studied: Chinese climate leadership in COP21, China-
US collaboration, repercussions for environmental crime, Chinese innovation and 
green technology, pollution in China, and Chinese environmental aid. 
 




Chinese media covered significantly less human rights news than sustainable 
development. Of the 97 articles collected and analysed, only 17 contained coverage of 
human rights, while 80 covered sustainable development. Human rights articles 
mostly focused on China’s efforts to improve working conditions locally and abroad, 
and some articles covered Chinese human rights violations. 
2.1. Chinese jobs empower African communities 
Many human rights articles cover different Chinese role players’ efforts to create job 
opportunities and improve working conditions, locally and in Africa. According to 
CCTV, the Chinese-built Standard Gauge Railway Project in Kenya is “changing the 
lives of local communities” (CCTV, 2015/11/05). Chinese operations seem efficient, 
as CCTV reports the new railway is “ahead of schedule”. Interviewee Mololo Kioko 
explains that the project offers “a rare opportunity” because he now gets a regular 
salary, “which makes all the difference”. Xinhua reported that at Kioko’s former 
public sector employment, “money is not guaranteed”. This coverage suggests that 
China provides financial security to Kenyan locals, which is reportedly uncommon 
for Kenyans. The article emphasises China’s capability to offer better job 
opportunities than local Kenyan government or businesses, which implies Chinese 
superiority in this regard.  
An emphasis on Kioko, “father of one’s”, parenthood implies the Chinese project is 
beneficial to more than just individual employees but also their families, and, by 
implication, the broader community. This reportedly requires some sacrifice. “Mololo 
will be spending several months away from his family, but he says, it’s a sacrifice 
worth making” Chinese-owned companies also reportedly make sacrifices for its 
employees. While the copper price has dropped to a record low, the China Non-
Ferrous Group-owned Chimbisi copper mine in Zambia “will not cut production, or 
reduce staff or investments” (CCTV, 2015/11/27). Assistant CEO of NFC Africa, 
John Mtonga, explains that they are “responsible for looking after so many people 
working for NFCA” (CCTV, 2015/11/27).  
CCTV praises the NFCA, “the largest Chinese investor in Zambia”, for creating  
140 000 jobs in Zambia. Since job creation is “paramount” to Zambians, Chinese 
investment seems crucial to the survival and well-being of Zambian communities. 




living, the quality of life” (2015/11/27). The insert includes a caveat to put to rest the 
skepticism of unsustainable Chinese employment in Africa. “There is no doubt that 
Chinese investors have been sustainable, they have not been here today gone 
tomorrow. They have remained with us in difficult times and in good times” (CCTV, 
2015/11/27). This can again serve as a form of Shi’s (2013) charm defensive, as the 
coverage provides a counter image to an existing negative narrative about Chinese 
employment.  
As mentioned above, China’s influence through business and industry seems 
beneficial to the well-being of African communities. In Zambia, “NFCA also funded 
a hospital offering free medical treatment for local staff”. NFCA has agreed that 
“employees can claim medical treatment for up to four family members” (CCTV, 
2015/11/27). Additionally, China’s Zhong Gan Engineering and Construction built 
the Chinese-designed Tsabong Unified Secondary School in Tsabong, rural 
Botswana. The project employed 20 Chinese along with 420 Batswana. “The number 
of local employees is expected to reach 550 as the project is going on” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/05). Xinhua emphasises the inclusion of local employees, which provides a 
counter-narrative to existing ideas that Chinese companies in Africa mainly employ 
Chinese citizens. School head, Segametsi Matlho, noted that “the school has received 
a lot of assistance from the company, which is very friendly” (Xinhua, 2015/08/05). 
This suggests a positive relationship between Zhong Gan and Tsabong, contributing 
to the image of mutually beneficial relationships between African communities and 
Chinese business. 
The community seems generally satisfied with the Zhong Gan’s community 
involvement. A parent says, “the buildings they are constructing have impressed me, I 
can see they will be better than old ones in the junior school” (Xinhua, 2015/08/05). 
The school project reportedly surpasses mere “assistance” but is also “implementing 
social responsibilities”, such as HIV tests, and prioritises the “local community’s 
other requests for help”. Xinhua reported that Zhong Gan collaborates with the 
Botswana Construction Industry Trust Fund (CITF) to provide skills training to 
employees, such as Edwin Selabe. “Zhong Gan provided me trainings like scaffold 
erecting, which have improved my skills, I'm happy with that. Through trainings, I 
have changed my stage from a labour to a trained man”, Selabe said. These personal 




highlight local satisfaction. Selabe added: “I’m satisfied, but if I have any problems, I 
could talk with the site manager directly. So there was no problem working with 
Zhong Gan. I'm happy.” Africans therefore seem highly satisfied with Chinese 
business in Africa. 
2.2. Improved labour conditions 
Some articles mention China’s successes in improving labour conditions. “China had 
38.6 percent fewer deaths resulting from coal mine accidents in the first eight months 
of 2015 than it did in the same period last year” (Xinhua, 2015/09/24). Additionally, 
the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) reported “no accidents with more 
than 30 deaths for 29 months in a row”. However, SAWS spokesperson, Huang Yi, 
said coal mines “are still dangerous and need to be more strictly supervised” (Xinhua, 
2015/09/24). Coverage of labour conditions relies on statistics and numbers. “Coal 
mine accidents that killed 10 to 30 people declined 83.3 percent from a year ago. Last 
year's deaths represented a sharp decline from about 7,000 in 2002” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/04). Coverage of deaths in Chinese coal mines through statistics rather than 
personal profiles or names, creates the impression that the employees’ lives are 
dispensable, as they are treated as numbers.  
Coverage of Chinese employment safety often includes government responses. 
“Huang vowed that the administration would promote safety precautions and inspect 
workplaces to make sure there are no violations” (Xinhua, 2015/08/04). Proactive 
responses are reportedly already implemented by the Chinese government. “China's 
Cabinet has ordered the closure of 1,052 mines this year, with nearly half of them 
closed already” (Xinhua, 2015/08/04). This again demonstrates constructive 
journalism – coverage of a problem is followed by a solution (Yanqui & Matingwina, 
2016). However, while the article implies coal production cuts are intended to 
improve labour conditions, it reveals that it is a “move mainly aimed at curbing 
slumping coal prices” (Xinhua, 2015/08/04). Xinhua thus portrays a predominantly 
economic decision as human rights driven. This illustrates Chinese media’s framing 
that could be designed to improve China’s image.  
Coverage of improved labour conditions includes accountability for human rights 




blacklist” (Xinhua, 2015/08/10) if they have records of illegal activities, such as 
major work safety accidents. SAWS will reportedly release the blacklist quarterly, 
and “conduct random checks on blacklisted firms” annually. The blacklist will 
“expire after one year but the term will be extended to three years if the firm goes on 
the blacklist again” (Xinhua, 2015/08/10). This article explains SAWS’ elaborate 
strategy to prevent corruption and negligence affecting labour safety. It serves as an 
educational source of information explaining the Chinese government’s latest labour 
policies. This demonstrates a form of “development journalism” (Christians et al., 
2009) wherein media are used as a tool to empower communities through knowledge. 
Additionally, SAWS will increase surveillance, targeting “industries related to 
dangerous chemicals, explosives, fireworks, elevators, non-coal mines, public 
transportation and ports” (Xinhua, 2015/08/18). This highlights the role of 
supervision in China’s human rights improvements. Additionally, its focus on 
chemicals suggests that the government’s new labour policies form part of its 
response to the Tianjin blast mentioned above. Xinhua’s coverage thus serves as 
damage control to the Chinese government’s image, harmed by the incident. 
As mentioned above, some articles portray economically-driven government policies 
as motivated primarily through human rights. According to Xinhua, the Chinese 
government’s well-intentioned leave policies are in conflict with its labour culture. 
Employers “have forced workers to take paid leave, without regard for workers' 
choice and individual circumstances” (Xinhua, 2015/08/08). The article states that 50 
percent of employees do not take paid leave “due to concerns that taking vacation 
might give their bosses the impression they are lazy and influence future job 
promotions”. Additionally, while employees should receive reimbursement for 
unfulfilled vacation, violations are “common in many sectors”. The policy thus has 
the “good intentions of advocating rest” but employees are reportedly unfairly 
penalised for taking paid leave.  
The same article eventually reveals the economic motivation of the policy – it impacts 
local tourism. Chinese authorities promote paid leave “as part of the country's plan for 
economic restructuring, promoting consumption and developing the service industry. 
They hope the time off will give people a chance to shop and spend on travel and 




policy promotes human rights in Chinese media coverage. Workers’ “recreational 
rights” including a potential half-day Friday, intends to give them “extra time for 
weekend travel and boosting the tourism industry” (Xinhua, 2015/08/12). 
Additionally, these measures help employees avoid the peak traveling season, which 
could “tap the full potential of tourism consumption” (Xinhua, 2015/08/12). 
Citizens are reportedly concerned about the policy’s implementation. “We cannot take 
annual leave in the first five years of work, not to mention more holidays”, employee 
Zhang Ying said. According to Zheng Dongliang, the Work Science Research 
Institute’s director, employers may struggle to implement more paid leave because 
“many enterprises are struggling during the ongoing economic transformation. 
Increasing holidays means more labor costs for businesses” (Xinhua, 2015/08/12). 
Thus, while the leave policy intends to improve working conditions, “forced labor, 
forced extension of work hours, withholding back pay and refusal to buy insurance 
for workers are lasting problems in some parts of China and violations of basic labor 
rights” (Xinhua, 2015/08/08). This article illustrates a mistrust in policy 
implementation, as well as a lack of focus on Chinese citizens’ true priorities. An 
image of disconnect and tension between the Chinese government and its labour force 
thus emerges. 
According to Xinhua, the Chinese government promotes vocational training to ensure 
its citizens’ employability. The Ministry of Education’s labour education in schools 
will focus on “skills such as sewing, craftsmanship, cooking, housework and other 
essential tasks. Students will also attend internships at farms, factories and service 
companies in order to nurture more hands-on skills and accentuate the value of labor” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/04). The Chinese government is reportedly concerned that “manual 
jobs and productions are undervalued” among young people, and the shift “is to help 
cull the admiration for ‘becoming rich overnight’” (Xinhua, 2015/08/04). This article 
illustrates China’s pragmatic approach to labour, and highlights the importance of 
Chinese citizens’ buy-in to the greater Chinese economic strategy. At the same time, 
Xinhua reported that because of a greater commitment to labour rights – “rising 
wages” – the Chinese government now has to “replace human labor with robots” 
(2015/08/04). 




Human rights coverage in Chinese media focuses on official conventions and policies. 
This includes policy coverage, such as China’s ratification of the “2006 Maritime 
Labor Convention (MLC)” (Xinhua, 2015/08/29), and its involvement in official 
events, such as the Fourth World Conference of Speakers of Parliament. Coverage 
tends to highlight the calibre of events China engages in. For example, China's “top 
legislator”, Zhang Dejiang, spoke at a human rights event at “the United Nations 
headquarters” where UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reportedly delivered 
opening remarks. The focus on official and influential individuals emphasises the 
high level of the conference, leading to the conference theme becoming secondary to 
the event itself.  
Xinhua also reported that Zhang met with IPU President Saber Chowdhury and IPU 
Secretary-General Martin Chungong, “who thanked him for his participation in the 
conference”. These mentions portray the Chinese government as highly respected. 
IPU also thanked China for “its long-term support” and reportedly looked forward to 
“deepening the cooperation” (Xinhua, 2015/08/31). According to Xinhua, Zhang 
attended Chowdhury’s reception where he engaged with other speakers on mutual 
concerns. The Chinese government’s portrayal as included in the inner circle of 
human rights organisations and individuals creates the image of cooperation and 
collaboration, which contributes to the frame that China has improved its human 
rights record. 
Xinhua reports that China’s development path reflects “distinctive Chinese features”, 
which include a Chinese interpretation of human rights (Xinhua, 2015/09/01). This 
interpretation partly emphasises non-interference. Zhang advocates that “all countries 
should abide by the international law and universally recognized basic norms 
governing international relations, respect each other's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs” (Xinhua, 
2015/08/31). The Chinese government has called for respect for sovereignty, 
particularly to prevent organisations such as the United Nations from interfering with 
China’s tense relationships with its neighbours, which have been perceived as 
violating human rights.  
Finally, coverage also compared human rights in China and in the US. An article on 




China “exchanged views in a candid and professional manner”. This explicit mention 
suggests the civil engagement is newsworthy, which, in turn, implies tension between 
China and the US around human rights. According to a news release published in 
Xinhua, China and the US cooperate, despite differences in approaches to human 
rights. “China and the U.S. should take a comprehensive and objective view on each 
other's human rights situation and handle their differences in a constructive way” 
(Xinhua, 2015/08/15).  
The dialogue focused on “legal and conceptual perspectives of human rights” (Xinhua 
2015/08/15). The Chinese delegation advocates for human rights implementation to 
suit national realities rather than be imposed upon by other countries. This statement 
is in defense of the Chinese government’s continued scrutiny by developed countries, 
such as the US, for China’s human rights violations. According to Xinhua, the 
Chinese government turned the lens on the US itself, pointing out its human rights 
problems, such as “racial discrimination, excessive use of force by police, and the 
violation of the human rights of other countries through massive surveillance 
activities” (Xinhua, 2015/08/15). Highlighting the US’ own human rights violations 
discredits them, which leaves their criticism of China with less substance. 
This section explored Chinese media’s framing of China’s human rights. The 
following frames were established: Chinese jobs empower African communities, 
improved labour conditions, and official human rights engagements.  
Additionally, this chapter discussed the coverage of China’s sustainable development 
and human rights record in Chinese media. China is primarily portrayed is a climate 
leader, particularly of developed nations. Its status as developing country and its 
solidarity with developing nations are emphasised throughout the coverage. Coverage 
of China’s progressive responses to climate change in Chinese media displays 
characteristics of constructive journalism – focusing on the Chinese government’s 
solutions for climate problems. China’s commitment to climate change mitigation is 
depicted as a valuable diplomatic strategy to create and maintain official relationships 
with collaborative partners. Chinese media characterise Chinese leadership through its 
country leader, President Xi Jinping. China is presented as a potential competitor to 




Chinese media further portray China as a country with strict environmental laws, rules 
and regulations, as well as heavy punishment for violations of those laws. A recurring 
theme in this coverage is the Chinese government’s application of surveillance, 
scrutiny and supervision. China is portrayed as advancing renewable energy through 
innovation and technology. However, a large amount of coverage focuses on pollution 
in China, characterised by the 2015 Tianjin blast and smog. The analysed Chinese 
media coverage focused on the Chinese government’s swift, proactive response to the 
blast. Reports on air pollution created the image of a dire situation, often highlighting 
the severity of the impact of the smog on Chinese citizens. Coverage of important 
public diplomacy events hosted in China reveals how pollution relates to Chinese 
nation branding. This study found that coverage of Chinese air pollution impacts 
China’s soft power potential. Chinese media also focused on Chinese environmental 
aid, portraying China as heroic, extraordinary and selfless. Coverage of China’s 
contribution to conservation highlights the importance of conservation to China’s soft 
power success in Africa. 
Human rights coverage was quite scarce in Chinese media. Many articles cover 
different Chinese role players’ efforts to create job opportunities and improve 
working conditions, locally and in Africa. China is portrayed as providing sustainable 
employment and being beneficial to the well-being of its African employees’ families 
and communities. Some articles mention China’s successes in improving labour 
conditions. Coverage of Chinese employment safety often includes proactive 
government responses. Coverage also indicates Chinese media’s portrayal of 
economic decisions as human rights-focused decisions. Human rights coverage in 
Chinese media focuses on official conventions and policies. The Chinese 
government’s portrayal as included in the inner circle of human rights organisations 
and individuals creates the image of cooperation and collaboration, which contributes 
to the frame that China has improved its human rights record. Finally, coverage also 





CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to make a contribution to the conceptual framework of soft power 
by examining the role of the media in the light of the increasingly important 
relationship between China and Africa. The China-Africa relationship has seen 
significant growth in recent years since the implementation of China’s “Going Out” 
policy, encouraging China to increase trade and diplomacy with African nations. As 
mentioned at the outset of the study, this relationship has been controversial. In 
Chapter Three some of the criticism against China’s presence in Africa was 
summarised. This included accusations of China acting like a neocolonial power and 
lacking concern for good governance, transparency, press freedom, and labour and 
human rights, and environmental protection in particular.  
This study focused on the media dimension of the China-Africa engagement. This 
focus is important, as China’s media expansion is aimed at improving perceptions of 
its engagement with Africa. By investing in the “Going Out” of its state-owned media 
platforms such as Xinhua, China Daily and CCTV (now CGTN), China aims to wield 
its soft power to prove itself a reliable and trustworthy trade partner. South Africa, 
through its BRICS membership, as well as other diplomatic relations, is one of the 
key countries China seeks to improve ties with.  
This study discussed the media’s role in China’s pursuit of wielding soft power, 
specifically while China is perceived as having a lack of respect for human rights or 
environmental protection. China’s negative sustainable development and human 
rights reputation could hamper its soft power successes in Africa, as China might be 
perceived as neocolonial, rather than a peaceful trade partner. The study was 
conducted using a qualitative framing analysis to examine the coverage of China’s 
sustainable development and human rights in both South African and English-
language Chinese media. It further explored the potential influences on both South 
African and Chinese journalists when covering China, through in-depth interviews. 
Ultimately, this study aimed to address the following Research Questions: 
RQ1) How China’s human rights and sustainability record is portrayed in South 




portrayed in Chinese media in return; RQ3) What South African journalists’ attitudes 
towards Chinese soft power efforts are; and RQ4) What Chinese journalists’ attitudes 
towards Chinese soft power efforts are. 
 
1. Summary of overall findings  
 
RQ1: South African media: 
Sustainable development 
This study found that a dominant frame in South African media coverage of China is 
China as key perpetrator in illegal wildlife trade and poaching. China in its entirety is 
often portrayed as responsible for wildlife destruction in Africa, and the study found a 
lack of nuanced coverage of the poaching issue – particularly regarding the specifics 
around who is involved and in what way. Frames affirming Chinese anti-poaching 
policy and efforts also emerged, but they often include sceptical undertones, and 
ultimately China is unable to escape its reputation as poacher in South African media. 
The study found that South African wildlife coverage often centres around the duality 
of good and bad: China as perpetrator is also juxtaposed by the western protectors of 
Africa, specifically the UK, via the coverage of British royalty. Additionally, through 
coverage of the poaching of Cecil the Lion as discussed in Chapter 5, the USA was 
positioned as destructive to African wildlife, and in relation, China was presented as 
the conservationist and ally. Ultimately, nuanced representation of poaching is crucial 
to China’s reputation, and poaching can impact China’s ability to wield soft power in 
Africa.  
China and the USA were often framed in competition with each other, but the USA’s 
climate change leadership was clearly established, as well as the USA’s paternalistic 
attitude towards China. However, references to the USA’s lack of credibility as 
climate leader, particularly due to its own disregard of international environmental 
law, also emerged. This illustrated the USA’s success in wielding soft power – they 
have managed to be perceived as the global climate leader, and in particular with 




Climate change articles focused heavily on China as top carbon emitter, especially in 
light of the Conference of Parties (COP21) coverage, but frames of China’s proactive 
policies, growing leadership, and its solidarity with developing nations in the climate 
negotiations also emerged. China’s solidarity with developing nations is particularly 
important in light of climate change – as a developing country itself, according the 
United Nations’ climate agreements, China is exempt from offering mandatory 
funding to global sustainable development, while developed countries are not. 
China’s climate funding as a developing country was portrayed as selfless and an 
expression of true solidarity with its fellow developing nations. Through the solidarity 
frame, South African media itself thus showed some solidarity with China in both 
embracing its developing country status and placing its green funding in high regard. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the association with China as both a developing nation that 
is to some extent exempt from climate funding, and at the same time a self-appointed 
climate funder, as well as a developing country going beyond UN expectations to 
reduce its carbon emissions, successfully contributes to its wielding of soft power. 
This is further illustrated in COP21 coverage that is critical of the USA’s emissions 
and underperformance in climate mitigation, in particular as a developed country – 
which challenges the USA’s soft power success mentioned above. Again a good bad 
duality arises from the coverage in South African media: as the USA is seen in a 
negative light, a positive light on China increases. 
South African media coverage focused closely on China as a polluted country, 
drawing specifically on two events to characterise that - the Tianjin blast and 
Beijing’s smog alerts. This coverage painted a dire picture of China and emotive 
language illustrated the severity of its pollution. The coverage was highly critical of 
the Chinese government, had an undertone of fear and evoked a sense of pity towards 
the impacted, vulnerable Chinese citizens. Ironically, aside from the preferred western 
sources they were able to access, South African media had to rely on official Chinese 
sources and state media to report on these events.  
Because South African media sourced Chinese media, it therefore essentially adopted 
both critical and constructive journalism (as discussed in Chapter 3) as it was used in 
Chinese media. Chinese media contained some critical coverage in this period 




focused on the Chinese government’s proactive response. Because South African 
media were relying on these media sources, they essentially reproduced similar 
frames of both citizen dissatisfaction and government responding proactively. The 
Chinese coverage of these events is discussed in more detail below. South African 
media coverage was also critical of the Chinese government’s efforts to apply 
censorship during these two events, particularly from Chinese social media platforms.  
While the South African media coverage of China’s sustainable development contains 
pessimistic frames about China’s negative environmental impact – such as its role in 
wildlife trafficking or pollution – optimistic frames also emerged, such as China’s 
climate leadership. Additionally, China was positioned as a source of green 
technology and renewable energy investment, that benefits the African continent in 
particular. China’s innovation and increasing commitment to solutions for 
sustainability contributes to the larger frame of China shaping itself to be a climate 
leader, and to be a worthy competitor against current western environmental 
leadership.  
Finally, India as competitor for global climate leadership and future preferred African 
partner also emerged. South African media often portrayed China and India together 
as the developing countries with the highest carbon emissions. While coverage 
generally positions China as proactively reducing its carbon emissions, India is 
portrayed as resisting doing the same, as a form of protest against developed 
countries. In this and other ways India is suggested as able to offer Africa more 
genuine solidarity than China. India in fact openly challenges the Chinese influence 
on the continent. South African media coverage of India illustrates how solidarity 
with Africa is firmly rooted in the extent of a partnering country’s resistance to the 
west. 
Human Rights: 
Compared to sustainable development, human rights received limited coverage in 
South African media during the same period. South African media coverage of 
China’s human rights often focus on natural or man-made disasters related to China, 
and depicts China as creating unsafe work environments for both local and 




including the Chinese government, human rights groups, individuals on the ground, 
and South African and international journalists. This section showed that China is 
often accused of neocolonialism in Africa, characterised by its lack of respect for 
human rights, which is emphasised through grassroots interviews for South African 
media’s human-interest stories. China is furthermore portrayed as currently lacking 
human rights legislation, and that its legal system allows or encourages human rights 
violations. In its current economic framework, Chinese human rights are not 
perceived as needs, but privileges – and human rights violations are portrayed as 
Chinese pragmatism. However, the image of China lacking respect of the law also 
implies that it is a risky trade partner for Africa. 
An optimistic frame about China’s human rights improvements also emerged, mostly 
via a series of promotion articles written on journalists’ visits to China. Finally, some 
articles lauded China for its humanitarian efforts, but the coverage is not significant 
enough to outweigh the depiction of China as human rights violator. For example, 
Chinese anti-torture legislation is overshadowed by NGOs’ publicisation of its 
monitoring of China’s human rights violations. Coverage suggests China is aware of 
perceptions of its human rights impact and recognises that these will slowly change 
over time. 
RQ2: Chinese media: 
Sustainable development 
Chinese media’s coverage of China’s sustainable development optimistically 
portrayed China as a climate leader, particularly of developing nations. Key 
roleplayers in the climate movement, including from western nations, are often quoted 
praising China’s carbon reduction efforts. It is ironic that despite China’s 
competitiveness with the west, for climate leadership in particular, Chinese state 
media rely on endorsements from western influential figures for credibility. China’s 
status as developing country and its solidarity with developing nations are emphasised 
throughout the coverage, and similar to the South African coverage mentioned above, 
China is praised for exceeding international expectations as both developing country 
and selfless climate funder of other developing countries. Although as mentioned 




Africa and other developing countries may prove successful in its competition with 
the USA and other developed countries, but might end up being less credible to other 
potential forces on the African continent like India, who claim they can provide a 
more genuine solidarity. 
Coverage of China’s progressive responses to climate change in Chinese media 
displays characteristics of constructive journalism – focusing primarily on the 
Chinese government’s solutions for climate problems. China’s commitment to climate 
change mitigation is depicted as a valuable diplomatic strategy to create and maintain 
official relationships with collaborative partners. As part of its cooperation frame, 
China is also portrayed as a country that respects official structures and systems, 
including the United Nations and the USA – both of which China has been viewed to 
have tension with. Chinese media characterises Chinese leadership through its country 
leader, President Xi Jinping. This is again in contrast to South African media which 
does not present Xi or any other individual as the “face” of China. South African 
journalists in this study noted that there is no human face to China which contributes 
to it being viewed as mysterious and potentially dangerous.  
China is presented as a potential competitor to the US for global leadership. China is 
also presented as amicably cooperating with the US despite their ideological 
differences. As mentioned above, Chinese media coverage of the USA-China 
relationship often includes praise from influential US figures. It is ironic that Chinese 
state media portrays China as receiving approval from the country they are currently 
competing with.  
Chinese media further portrays China as a country with strict environmental laws, 
rules and regulations, as well as heavy punishment for violations of those laws – this 
coverage again represents constructive journalism. A recurring theme in this coverage 
is the Chinese government’s application of surveillance, scrutiny and supervision of 
its environmental impact. China’s application of supervision for conservation 
illustrates its environmental commitment, which could improve its environmental 
reputation. However, censorship and surveillance is one of the key reasons China’s 
global influence on freedom of expression is feared, and therefore this frame might in 
fact emphasise the supervision itself more than its intentions towards conservation. 




technology. Voices from key figures in organisations such as the UN were again 
sourced to give credibility to China’s green technology. Chinese journalists noted in 
their interview responses that NGO or expert sources need to be approved by the 
Chinese government.  
Coverage of important public diplomacy events hosted in China revealed how 
pollution relates to Chinese nation branding, and how air pollution in China can 
impact its soft power potential. A large amount of coverage focused on pollution in 
China, characterised by the 2015 Tianjin blast and smog. The analysed Chinese media 
coverage focused on the Chinese government’s swift, proactive response to the blast 
and essentially emphasised the Chinese government’s capability to deal with an 
environmental crisis. Reports on air pollution created the image of a dire situation, 
often highlighting the severity of the impact of the smog on Chinese citizens, and the 
disruption of their daily lives. Although rarely, reports also contained critical 
coverage of the local governments – particularly focusing on citizens’ dissatisfaction 
with a lack of transparency by the Chinese government in dealing with both the blast 
and smog events. This study found that Chinese state-owned media produced critical 
coverage of the Chinese government during the Tianjin blast and smog periods, which 
contradicts the stereotype that Chinese media is incapable of producing coverage 
critical of government because they are purely the government’s propaganda arm.  
Chinese media also focused on Chinese environmental aid, an aspect of Chinese soft 
power, and portrayed China as heroic, extraordinary and selfless. Reports suggested a 
potential sense of superiority of China over Africa, and its assistance comes across as 
paternalistic. However, because Chinese assistance is portrayed as so well-received 
by Africa, coverage of China’s conservation aid, highlights its importance, and the 
importance of associating China with conservation, to China’s soft power success in 
Africa. 
Human Rights: 
Human rights coverage was quite scarce in Chinese media. Many articles covered 
different Chinese roleplayers’ efforts to create job opportunities and improve working 
conditions, locally and in Africa. China was portrayed as providing sustainable 




and communities. This can be interpreted both as a charm defensive – responding to 
the stereotype of China’s exploitative and unsustainable nature of employment, but at 
times a sense of superiority regarding China’s ability to provide better job 
opportunities to Africans emerged.  
Human rights coverage in Chinese media focused primarily on official conventions 
and policies. Some articles mentioned China’s successes in improving labour 
conditions, which included coverage of the Chinese government’s proactive responses 
to employment safety. The Chinese government’s portrayal as included in the inner 
circle of international human rights organisations and individuals, creates the image 
of cooperation and collaboration, which contributes to the frame that China has 
improved its human rights record. Coverage also implied tension between China and 
the US around human rights and showcased Chinese government challenging the 
USA’s self-righteous position regarding human rights, while having many of its own 
violations.  
Finally, coverage indicated Chinese media’s portrayal of economic decisions as 
human rights-focused decisions – indicating how the Chinese media uses framing to 
improve China’s human rights reputation, and accordingly increase its soft power 
potential. 
RQ3: Influences on South African journalists: 
Chapter 6 of this study analysed the results of interviews with South African 
journalists to determine the potential individual, routine, organisational, extra-media, 
and ideological influences as determined by Reese (2001) on their coverage of 
China’s sustainable development and human rights reputation. The results of these 
interviews show that South African journalists only cover China in a cursory manner 
– as it becomes relevant to their current journalistic focus. A key focus of this chapter 
was South African journalists’ perceptions of China’s human rights and 
environmental impact, which revealed a variety of views. Most South African 
journalists perceive China as exploitative, extractionist, careless and harmful towards 
the environment. However, some of these journalists have not directly engaged with 
China and reported to draw on what they consume in the media or hear from peers to 




China’s environmental impact in Africa as an expected, logical and normalised side-
effect of development, and that China does not necessarily intentionally disregard the 
environment. These journalists also maintain that China’s environmental impact is not 
worse than both the historical and current environmental impact of developed 
countries in Africa.  
South African journalists reported that they are pressured to provide stories that sell or 
get clicks, due to the financial pressure of South African newsrooms. They indicated 
that news about rhino poaching sells well, and for this reason is likely to feature on 
the news agenda often. As mentioned above, South African media portrayed China as 
the key perpetrator of poaching, and its frequent coverage could further contribute to 
China’s poacher reputation, negatively affecting its soft power potential. 
Journalists also perceive China to negatively impact human rights in Africa, 
particularly in favour of capitalism. Similar to environmental exploitation, China’s 
perceived lax human rights is viewed by South African journalists as an automatic 
side-effect of economic growth. Journalists’ lack of understanding of China’s 
approach to human rights vs the western approach that South Africa currently aligns 
with, could further the us vs them ideology when covering China. South African 
journalists could cover anything outside of the western human rights framework as a 
violation. One viewpoint that emerged was an agreement with Chinese journalists that 
China’s human rights reputation has been shaped by western “propaganda”. 
Financial constraints are a key challenge South African journalists face when 
covering China-Africa, as the culture of “churnalism” (Davies, 2009) further 
develops, and because China-Africa is a particularly expensive topic to research, as 
one journalist pointed out. South African journalists strive for objectivity, a principle 
embedded in their journalistic education, despite the fact that they recognise it to be 
idealistic, reflecting Tuchman’s (1972) “strategic ritual” of objectivity. Some 
journalists interviewed in this study disregard objectivity because they consider their 
journalism to be a form of activism. Journalists’ perception of their role in society – 
the blurring lines between activist and journalist – might influence their coverage of 
China, especially taking in account their abovementioned perception of China’s 




Though most South African journalists agree that ownership does not directly or 
explicitly influence their editorial content, journalists employed at Independent Media 
experienced big shifts in their publication’s ownership, primarily during “the sale” – 
Chinese-linked Sekunjalo’s takeover. These journalists felt powerless when instructed 
to cover China with prominence and positive angles that they disapproved of, 
illustrating how ownership outweighs personal perceptions when covering China. 
South African journalists aim to include a multiplicity of voices in their articles 
including government, NGOs, experts and ideally, people directly affected by an 
issue. Regarding state sources, South African journalists complain about the 
inaccessibility of both the South African and Chinese government, and they are 
considered time-intensive sources because of “the door-stopper effect” (Interviewee 
4). With only one exception, South African journalists interviewed for  this study do 
not consult Chinese media or press releases. They prefer staying informed via 
international, particularly western, news sources, even though some of them are 
concerned that these sources or press releases might be overly critical of China.  
Overall, this study has found that South African journalists find China either 
inaccessible or inherently distrust Chinese media and sources. South African 
journalists also do not trust Xinhua in particular, because it is considered to be pro-
government propaganda, spin, false and uninteresting. Some journalists are conflicted 
about their hypocrisy of distrusting Xinhua, while more comfortably consuming 
western state-owned media, which they acknowledge inadequately portrays Africa. 
South African journalists often refer to the contention between the South African 
press and the South African government – essentially characterised by a deep mistrust 
of the state by South African media. These journalists argue that China’s soft power is 
damaged by their close relationship with the South African government as it 
contributes to South African media’s mistrust of China.  
Journalists’ lack of knowledge and understanding of China, as well as China’s 
inaccessibility, has hampered South African journalists’ in-depth engagement with the 
China-Africa topic and led to a lack of nuanced coverage, often contributing to 
China’s image as neocolonial. For example, few journalists deliberately distinguish 
between Chinese business and Chinese government as separate but interlinked 




South African readers, not only with how Chinese business works but also with 
China’s diplomacy, because these two topics are so deeply connected.  
Though South African journalists believe China-Africa relations is a crucial topic, 
coverage remains limited, and it is not viewed as important to all South African 
audiences. South African journalists therefore consider the topic to be largely of 
academic interest and not high on their news agenda. This study confirms 
Wasserman’s (2016) argument that South African journalists are primarily interested 
in the economic and political aspects of the China topic, but additionally found that 
journalists also believe in the news value of China’s sustainable development and 
human rights reputation. South African journalists that perceive China’s impact in 
Africa as neocolonial – might produce critical coverage of China aimed at warning 
readers about its influence. 
South African journalists believe the media can impact China’s image and some 
believe it already has. However, regardless of positive or negative reporting on China, 
journalists doubt it affects government policy – however they remain cautious about 
Chinese media interference impacting South Africa’s freedom of speech. This is 
particularly due to the Chinese government’s own applications of censorship in 
China, and its close relationship with the South African government, which leads to 
further skepticism of the Chinese government. Journalists do not consider Xi Jinping 
to be China’s relatable, human face as is seen in Chinese media coverage. Instead, 
South African journalists argue that coverage of China further perpetuates the 
villainisation of an unknown China while the west is humanised.  
South African journalists regularly covering China understand soft power, but those 
journalists who rarely cover China, associate soft power with fear and danger. 
However, some journalists are aware of Chinese soft power strategies without 
necessarily being familiar with the terminology. This is in contrast to Chinese 
journalists’ heightened awareness of China’s soft power efforts. South African 
journalists perceive China’s media diplomacy in South Africa to be unsuccessful, 
mostly because of its inaccessibility. China’s media investments in South Africa are 
viewed as potentially counter-productive and might in fact feed suspicion of China, 
rather than building a positive image. Soft power via media investments is virtually 




has been successful in this regard. South Africa has a particularly robust media 
system, and media investments might not lead to an audience penetration with 
positive news on China.  
South African journalists perceive Chinese government and business to ineffectively 
engage with South African media, and therefore pose the question whether media 
engagement is important to China’s soft power at all. According to the journalists, 
China’s soft power does not reflect its relevance to the African continent, particularly 
as wielded through media investments. The journalists perceive China’s most 
successful wielding of soft power to stem from concrete solutions such as China’s 
health diplomacy, which has the potential to fulfil even a charm defensive mandate. 
RQ4: Influences on Chinese journalists: 
Chapter 7 of this study explored the influences on Chinese journalists as proposed by 
Reese’s (2001) hierarchy of influences. This study found that China’s state media 
ownership, an organisational influence, outweighs all other influences on Chinese 
journalists. 
Chinese journalists’ coverage is clearly dictated by the Chinese government, which 
has led to their journalistic training and skills being less valuable than a strong 
command of English to be employed at an English-language Chinese publication. The 
Chinese journalists interviewed consider their journalistic positions to be admirable 
and competitive, particularly at Xinhua, because of Chinese state-owned news 
organisations’ close proximity to the Chinese government. This is true for Chinese 
citizens employed as journalists at Chinese publications in particular –  though one 
journalist noted that they might be considered ordinary in foreign countries, while 
their jobs are perceived as good, honourable and well respected in China. 
Regarding their perceptions of China’s sustainable development and human rights 
impact – a key focus of this study, Chinese journalists believe that sustainability is 
increasingly prioritised by the Chinese government. Some journalists even claim that 
the Chinese government prioritises sustainability over their economy, because of 
China’s ambition to be a global climate sustainability leader. The journalists reported 
seeing increasing media coverage and overall awareness of China’s environmental 




that for China’s positive environmental reputation to be preserved, some communities 
have been silenced.  
Many Chinese journalists are aware that China has a poor human rights record, but 
argue that the concept of human rights is used by the west to create a negative image 
of China. Chinese journalists believe human rights to be a new concept in China, and 
therefore believe that the Chinese government has the ability to improve its human 
rights record. However, Chinese journalists currently experience a tightening of 
freedom of speech, with increased censorship, surveillance and pressure to serve the 
ruling party, through positive coverage in particular. One view emerged that Chinese 
journalists believed human rights would improve under Xi Jinping’s leadership, but 
have disappointingly experienced it worsening from a media freedom perspective. 
Chinese journalists experience layered hierarchies of censorship at their individual 
media organisations. Journalists are mandated to write positive stories about China, 
internal references for the Chinese government that are not published, and a 
“propaganda task.” Propaganda is maintained through the news production process, as 
each article goes through a series of internal gatekeepers for its politically correctness, 
including editors, “experts”, and “releasers”. Distributing propaganda is a key part of 
Chinese journalists’ jobs. One Chinese journalist, that idealises typical watchdog 
journalism, views this type of government-led journalism as “unprofessional” 
(Interviewee 15). However, another journalist noted that there is some degree of 
autonomy in choosing topics if the news value can be justified. Additionally, some 
journalists see their propaganda role as a service to the Chinese society, as they can 
potentially empower communities with information, particularly around nation-
building issues such as China’s poverty reduction goals.  
Xinhua newsrooms experience a particular type of censorship as they are managed by 
the Chinese foreign ministry, who reviews all their articles going to their international 
audiences. According to the journalists in this study Xinhua is also viewed as the 
loudspeaker of the Chinese government, which requires tighter censorship. Chinese 
journalists find it challenging to balance fulfilling their propaganda task with also 
attracting foreign audiences, and especially penetrating the western media system.  
Most Chinese journalists consider themselves to be objective, because the concept of 




compartmentalise their learned objectivity, an unattainable ideal, which is ironically 
promoted by their training at state-owned institutions, and their expected loyalty to 
the Chinese Communist Party and government. The Chinese journalists in this study 
believe that western media is not able to achieve objectivity either. Chinese journalists 
are highly aware of the state-ownership of their publications, which has been 
characterised by censorship, scrutiny, and surveillance, and they fear the 
repercussions of making mistakes, which often leads to self-censorship. Journalists 
are willing to navigate the impact of censorship for the incentives that Chinese 
publications offer, such as financial and other benefits, and particularly status for 
working closely with the state.  
It is important to note that while censorship is a key influence on Chinese journalists, 
some journalists reported that their media programmes do offer material to Chinese 
citizens who are critical of government. Furthermore, Chinese journalists easily 
manage to get around social media censorship, which interferes with their 
international digital marketing of their publications, and maintain that complete online 
censorship is impossible. Although Chinese publications are state-owned, they have 
become increasingly commercialised, and experience the same pressures to make 
profit as most other media. 
Regarding their media consumption, Chinese journalists rarely consume media from 
African publications, apart from a few South African sources. They generally stay 
informed through local Chinese publications or mainstream international English-
language media. According to the interviewed journalists, they have found that 
Chinese audiences generally prefer stereotypical negative reporting on Africa. Unlike 
South African journalists’ choices of sources, Chinese journalists most commonly use 
government officials as their primary sources, but experts or intellectuals are also 
accepted, if selected from a government-approved pool that will offer acceptable 
commentary. Similarly, journalists have a good relationship with government-
approved NGO sources, but are not allowed to interview NGOs that are critical of 
government. However, one journalist noted that they may interview opposition or 
other political parties than the Chinese Communist Party. 
Finally, Chinese journalists are highly aware of the importance of the China-Africa 




but mutually beneficial. They believe that Africa is necessary to China for resources 
and political clout. This relationship is thus crucial to China’s soft power strategy, 
which is essentially based on Chinese culture, and at its core includes China’s rich 
history and Confucianism. Some journalists have been unaware of countries’ skeptical 
attitude towards China about the China-Africa engagement. 
Chinese journalists, highly aware of China’s soft power goals, perceive their role in 
promoting Chinese soft power abroad as crucial, particularly through their promotion 
of official terminology. In contrast to South African journalists, Chinese journalists 
are convinced that media is central to soft power. Some Chinese journalists view their 
importance to China’s soft power as a “charm defensive” approach – defending 
China’s negative reputation that has been shaped by western media. China also 
collaboratively develops Africa’s “charm defensive” through positive coverage of 
Africa, because Chinese media relates to being misrepresented in international media. 
According to the journalists, while Chinese media is mandated to maintain a positive 
image of Africa, they often further perpetuate stereotypical reporting of Africa. 
 
2. Discussion of Findings  
To fill the gaps identified in the literature review in Chapter 3, this study examined 
journalists as both receptors of soft power, as well as tools to promote soft power. The 
focus on Chinese and South African journalists and their local media contexts also 
addresses a weakness in current public diplomacy research of failing to expand 
beyond the scope of the United States. This study specifically looked at the coverage 
of human rights and sustainable development, to determine how these neglected 
topics are covered in South African and Chinese media. 
Chinese media as propaganda 
The theme of Chinese media as propaganda has emerged in this study in several ways 
– while South African media distrusts Chinese media because they consider their 
content to be propaganda, Chinese journalists themselves refer to their jobs including 
a “propaganda task”, and do not necessarily refer to this in a negative way. South 
African journalists rarely consult Chinese media because they distrust its credibility 




and Madrid-Morales’ (2016) findings that South African journalists do not use 
Chinese media as a source, particularly in comparison to western media sources, and 
that Xinhua is especially disregarded as a source of propaganda. This study therefore 
highlights Chinese journalists’ challenge to act as a mouthpiece for the Chinese 
Communist Party through their “propaganda tasks” and trying to be a credible and 
interesting news source. South African journalists indeed do not find Chinese media 
articles credible or appealing.  
Even though Chinese media’s access to a wide range of resources, including 
journalists in the field, can theoretically produce a greater variety of stories, their 
content is automatically rejected as propaganda. In this study, Chinese journalists 
proudly emphasised their bigger presence in Africa compared to western outlets, 
however, these advantages are clouded by Chinese media censorship, close 
monitoring of journalists and propaganda tasks. In South Africa, serious doubts are 
cast on any media content that is perceived as propagandistic, which again points to 
the credibility Chinese media need to be successful as instruments of soft power.  
Additionally, the framing analysis in this study found evidence of China’s state-
owned media’s aims to provide an alternative and authentic view of China in Africa 
(Yanqui & Matingwina, 2016), but as mentioned above, found these efforts to be 
irrelevant to South African journalists because they disregard Chinese news sources. 
South African media trusts western media more, and rely on Chinese media mostly 
when they have no other western options, as seen in South African media coverage of 
the Tianjin blast. CGTN’s (2019) attempts at strengthening China’s global reporting 
ability, as well as expanding its mobile platforms and media convergence, is thus 
futile as the expansion does not solve the issue of their content, that is rejected as 
propaganda.  
China has come to better understand that its image in the foreign media partly stems 
from the bias of reporters covering China, and they have therefore suggested 
journalistic training to reduce journalists’ prejudice. The South African journalists in 
this sample are relatively aware that this bias and a hypocrisy towards Chinese media 
exists, however reject Chinese state-led training as propaganda as well.  
While the literature calls for distinguishing Chinese journalism from just propaganda 




study themselves refer to their reporting as “propaganda tasks.” Chinese journalists 
consider distributing propaganda as a key part of their jobs. While some Chinese 
journalists experience frustration with their propaganda tasks, and find it 
unprofessional, other Chinese journalists view their propaganda reporting as a public 
service role – being a tool of government that informs and empowers its citizens. 
This study has thus found that Chinese journalists use different styles of reporting, 
including constructive journalism and collaborative journalism, as well as other public 
service roles such as educating and empowering citizens – characteristic of 
development journalism. Constructive journalism was particularly visible in the 
Chinese media coverage of the Tianjin blast and smog, which illustrated the Chinese 
government’s proactive response to societal challenges. Collaborative journalism was 
highlighted in one viewpoint, emphasising the importance of being able to 
communicate current issues or government policy to disconnected people in rural 
areas on behalf of the Chinese government.  
Furthermore, while censorship is a key influence on Chinese journalists, Chinese 
media do also at times publish content that is critical of the Chinese government. This 
critical coverage is rare, however, for example in the case of Chinese media coverage 
of pollution in China, which revealed both complacency among citizens, as well as 
outright tension and frustration with government. On the other hand, South African 
media and media training in general align with the western style of watchdog 
journalism. This study found however, that some South African journalists criticise 
this “detached” style of reporting. 
Both South African and Chinese journalists find themselves in a complex position in 
negotiating journalistic objectivity. True to the watchdog journalism reporting style, 
South African journalists strive for objectivity as an ideal, reflecting Tuchman’s 
(1972) “strategic ritual” of objectivity. However, some South African journalists 
interviewed in this study disregard objectivity because it interferes with their 
perception of their role in society – they have positioned themselves within the 
blurring lines between activist and journalist. On the other hand, Chinese journalists 
compartmentalise their strife for an unattainable learned and required objectivity, and 




above, some Chinese journalists view their inability to be critical of government as 
unprofessional, while others view their propaganda reporting as a public service role. 
Finally, Nye (2008) noted that public diplomacy’s degeneration into propaganda can 
be unconvincing and in fact undercut soft power. This seems to be the case with 
Chinese media investments in South Africa, that have left the journalists interviewed 
for this study even more cautious of Chinese soft power. The counteractive impact of 
media investments in Africa will be further discussed below.  
Chinese-South African governments’ relationship:  
South African media’s reception and portrayal of China’s relationship with South 
Africa could be influenced by their current antagonistic stance towards the South 
African government. In the interviews conducted for this study, South African 
journalists suggested that China’s close relationship with the South African 
government can harm its soft power efforts, as according to the interviewees, South 
African media have a strained relationship with the South African government. This 
mistrust extends to both the South African public broadcaster as well as Chinese state 
media. Ironically, China has generally directed its efforts towards foreign government 
officials and elites, securing cooperation on policies, but neglecting engagement with 
civil societies (Jijun, 2016). China’s close relationship with the South African 
government is thus negatively impacting its ability to wield soft power among South 
African journalists. 
Mutual benefits: 
China frames its engagement in Africa as mutually beneficial, rather than asymmetric, 
(Madrid-Morales, 2016; Tan-Mullins, 2016) through key terms such as a “win-win 
situation”, “partners”, “south-south cooperation”, “mutual respect” and “non-
interference”. Chinese journalists view their “propaganda tasks” to include the 
promotion of this terminology. The strong focus in Chinese media on mutual benefits 
steers the conversation away from China as neocolonial in Africa, essentially 
fulfilling a charm defensive mandate.   
Chinese journalists generally view Chinese soft power as benign. While some 




relationship and do not perceive it as neocolonial, other journalists have become 
aware that China is in fact treated with skepticism by some African countries.  
In particular, this study found that both Chinese and South African media present the 
China-Africa relationship as rooted in solidarity, expressing camaraderie with “the 
victimized” (Zhang 2013; 2016) developing world. Both media often emphasise 
China’s developing country status, and present western countries as disapproving of 
this status – partly due to China’s own high carbon emissions. In both South African 
and Chinese media China is praised for exceeding international expectations as both 
developing country and selfless climate funder of other developing countries – which 
affirms China’s solidarity with developing nations, and successfully contributes to its 
wielding of soft power.  
However, while China’s reliance on its developing nation status to promote solidarity 
with developing countries may prove successful in its competition with developed 
countries, it might end up being less credible to other potential forces on the African 
continent like India, who claim they can provide a more genuine solidarity. This study 
found a strong frame of competition for leadership in Africa between China and India. 
China and India are both portrayed as trying to leverage their solidarity with Africa, 
particularly through anti-western sentiment. However while China’s solidarity is 
mostly based on assistance, India is presented with a stronger, more relatable anti-
western attitude because of its shared colonial history with Africa. 
Furthermore, China is presented as both climate leader of and in solidarity with 
Africa. This leadership might create an unequal power dynamic within the China-
Africa relationship. Ironically, some South African journalists did bring up the 
concern of power dynamics in this relationship, but because few South African 
journalists perceive China as an environmental leader, none of these were based on 
China’s leadership, but rather on the perception of China as neocolonial. 
Neocolonialism:  
South African media often accuse China of neocolonialism in Africa, characterised by 
its lack of respect for human rights. South African media coverage ultimately reflects 




responses to its environmental impact. Journalists’ perceptions of China as 
neocolonial fluctuate: some do, like Zeleza (2008) says, vary from glee to gloom, but 
there are also more nuanced responses, both from Chinese and South African 
journalists. South African journalists do not necessarily view China as neocolonial, 
but generally do view them as exploitative of Africa.  
Similarly, South African journalists’ responses vary on China’s environmental 
impact. Some journalists argue that China’s environmental exploitation is a side-
effect of development, not worse than developed countries’ historical or current 
impact. Most South African journalists feel that development from China is going to 
mean environmental damage, but it is a sacrifice, or side effect, rather than intentional 
damage. Some journalists’ perceptions on China as exploitative has been informed by 
hearsay or media consumption, as they have not directly engaged with China 
themselves. Chinese journalists perceive China’s sustainable development and human 
rights status as improving, and that sustainability is even prioritised over China’s 
economy. Chinese journalists also perceive China as a global climate leader and that 
there is a growing awareness in China about the concept of sustainability. Some 
journalists are aware that for China’s positive environmental reputation to be 
preserved, some communities have been silenced.  
South African journalists also perceive China to negatively impact human rights in 
Africa, particularly in favour of capitalism. China’s lax human rights is also viewed 
by South African journalists as an automatic side-effect of economic growth and 
development. Journalists’ lack of understanding of China’s approach to human rights 
vs the western approach that South Africa currently aligns with, could influence them 
to cover anything outside of the western human rights framework as a violation. This 
study also found that watchdog journalists – both western and South African, are 
seemingly awarded with the credibility to monitor China’s human rights. The current 
lack of understanding of cultural differences between China and African countries 
might hamper South African journalists from incorporating terms like human rights 
and violations more contextually. 
Many Chinese journalists are aware that China has a poor human rights record, but 
argue that the concept of human rights is used by the west to create a negative image 




China’s human rights under Xi Jinping, Chinese journalists currently experience a 
tightening of freedom of speech, with increased censorship, surveillance and pressure 
to serve the ruling party. 
Limitations to nuanced coverage of China:  
Zeleza (2008) argues that the various positive and negative portrayals of China in 
African media could fit into one of three frames: imperialism, globalisation and 
solidarity. These frames were found to be visible in the content analysed in this study, 
but proved too simplistic for the coverage of China’s sustainable development and 
human rights impact. China is framed as important to the field of climate change, and 
possibly a global climate leader, while also framed as neocolonial or exploitative. 
China’s role in climate mitigation is optimistically acknowledged, particularly for its 
renewable energy and green technology contributions. Human rights barely features, 
but its coverage differs from sustainable development – more optimistic frames about 
China’s climate change involvement emerged; but generally pessimistic frames about 
Chinese labour exploitation emerged.  
Limited resources were found to limit South African journalists’ nuanced coverage of 
China. Journalistic professionalism, within the watchdog journalism framework, is 
compromised by financial constraints, and funding dictates editorial decisions on 
covering the China-Africa relationship. However, this study found that China’s 
inaccessibility might be a bigger reason why nuanced coverage of China has not 
emerged. South African journalists interviewed in this study were of the opinion that 
China is misunderstood because information on the country is inaccessible, which 
contributes to the perception that they are threatening. China’s inaccessibility is 
discussed in further detail below. 
This study also backs Wasserman’s finding that South African journalists recognise 
the importance of the South Africa-China relationship, even though few of them ever 
cover the topic. South African journalists find coverage of the topic crucial, 
particularly to keep China accountable in Africa for environmental or human rights 
violations. South African media frames China as poachers, with little focus on actual 
Chinese policy – this is because poaching articles increase readership and clicks. 




China has implemented a range of strategies to challenge the western discourse on 
China (Zhao, 2011). Its African media headquarters in Nairobi is aimed at deflecting 
western criticism, and its FOCAC strategies are aimed at countering the western bias 
in coverage of the China-Africa topic in particular (Gagliardone, 2010). As mentioned 
above, this study found that the China-Africa relationship is essentially framed as 
mutually beneficial in Chinese media, countering claims of Chinese neocolonialism in 
Africa. Additionally, Chinese journalists often make use of the “charm defensive 
approach” in their coverage of China, but this study found that Chinese journalists 
find it challenging to penetrate the western media system, and that South African 
journalists do not consume of trust Chinese media. 
South African media coverage varied in the way that it positions the west in relation 
to China. The frame emerged of a western patronising attitude towards China in the 
British colonial tropes in poaching coverage, as well as the USA’s claim to 
superiority in climate change coverage. The study also found however, that the USA 
was crucified in South African media for its involvement in the poaching of Cecil the 
Lion, which inevitably elevated the depiction of China as an ally to Africa. The study 
also found contradictory coverage of the USA in climate change – while it was clearly 
positioned as global leader in most articles, much coverage also criticised the USA for 
its lack of climate mitigation efforts, which again led to an elevation of a seemingly 
proactive Chinese government. Coverage of the USA in relation to China pointed out 
both the failures and successes of the USA’s soft power linked to its environmental 
reputation.  
From a human rights perspective, Chinese media also framed China as contributing to 
the well-being of Africans, challenging the existing narrative that Chinese 
employment in Africa is exploitative. Chinese media in fact portrayed China’s job 
opportunities in Africa as superior to Africa’s own opportunities – thus, through its 
charm defensive, China created a patronising image of itself towards Africa. Chinese 
journalists, and Chinese media coverage, have underlined the hypocrisy around the 
USA and other western nations’ supervision of China’s human rights, while 
perpetrating their own human rights violations. Similarly, South African journalists 
admitted their own hypocrisy in trusting western state news sources and dismissing 




Additionally, this study found that Chinese journalists can relate to Africa’s 
misrepresentation in Chinese media, as they perceive China as having been 
misrepresented in western media. Chinese journalists view their media coverage as a 
charm defensive, and recognises a need for something similar for Africa’s 
misrepresentation. They thus recognise the need for increasing fair coverage of Africa 
to assist Africa with its own charm defensive. Ultimately, in this study evidence of 
defending China’s presence was clear in Chinese coverage, but the charm offensive 
was unclear. China’s climate leadership, for example, was portrayed as in competition 
of that of the US, which is more characteristic of a charm defensive.  
Is media relevant to China’s soft power? Chinese and South African media coverage 
indicates the importance of sustainable development to China’s image – China’s 
pollution negatively impacts its public diplomacy and therefore soft power potential. 
Emotive language is used in coverage of China’s pollution to create the image of a 
dire situation in China, which damages its environmental reputation. Economic 
decisions are often portrayed as human rights-driven, showcasing Chinese media’s 
role in determining the narrative around China’s human rights.  
China is portrayed as enforcing strict environmental laws and regulations, as well as 
rooting out corruption, primarily making use of surveillance and monitoring, all in aid 
of conservation. Chinese jobs in Africa are also framed in a positive light and Chinese 
media coverage suggest an improvement in China’s human rights status. Additionally, 
according to Chinese media coverage, China shows great respect for official systems, 
process and plans – even from institutions such as the UN or USA. 
However, the stricter limitations on freedom of speech that has increased under Xi 
Jinping’s rule, can negatively impact China’s reputation. While Chinese journalists 
believe human rights is culturally determined and currently used as a ploy by the west 
to harm China’s image, they do express disappointment about the increased 
censorship of media. 
Chinese journalists believe culture and Confucianism are at the core of Chinese soft 
power. Chinese journalists are very familiar with the concept of soft power, 
illustrating the coherent Chinese soft power strategy – while on the other hand, South 
African journalists are generally unfamiliar with the concept, and China’s soft power 




Chinese media, and they therefore question the role of Chinese media in wielding 
Chinese soft power. They challenge Tan-Mullins’ (2016) view that China’s 
involvement in international aid requires mass media and public engagement, if it 
wants its soft power to gain traction.  
Both South African and Chinese journalists in this study pointed out that China is not 
successful at wielding soft power, particularly as promoted by media diplomacy – 
echoing Nye’s argument that “China is weak in its soft power” (2012:4). South 
African journalists explained that this is a territory owned by American media, and 
even they are not succeeding with media investments in Africa. Chinese journalists, 
on the otherhand, pointed to the fact that while they are packaging propaganda for 
African audiences, it will remain challenging for them to wield soft power. Instead, a 
Chinese journalist pointed to South Korea and Japan, illustrating that their media is 
more successful at soft power. 
This study echoed Madrid-Morales’ (2016) findings that South African journalists are 
skeptical of Chinese media investment. Instead, China’s defeat of poverty is a more 
appealing aspect of Chinese soft power to influence African audiences. Some South 
African journalists note that China’s development assistance to Africa, which takes 
many forms, but essentially respond to the concrete needs of African communities, 
has more soft power potential than media investments. This study’s framing analysis 
of Chinese media coverage of China found that China’s soft power can be 
successfully wielded through its perceived selfless environmental aid, which is well 
received by developing nations and therefore positively impacts its reputation. Thus, 
within the broader definition of soft power, which includes investment and aid, China 
is recognised by South African journalists for successfully wielding soft power.  
The question of the soft power potential of Chinese media investments vs aid also 
touches on the question on whether economic power is hard or soft (Zhang, 2016). 
China’s ability to lift its people out of poverty is admired by South African journalists 
and is covered with respect in both Chinese and South African media. However, it 
raises the question of whether the image of China as defeating poverty is enough to 
contribute to its wielding of soft power, or whether that rather presents a promise or 




reflects soft power potential. This could reflect Zhang’s idea of “soft power with 
Chinese characteristics.” 
Furthermore, new public diplomacy extends beyond government operations to the 
activities of the private sector and broader society. The interconnectedness of Chinese 
state and business is visible in the coverage of Chinese business in Africa. They are 
framed as tools of Chinese public diplomacy, and as mentioned above framed as well 
received in Africa. Coverage of Chinese environmental aid and assistance, as well as 
its job provision, intends to illustrate that soft power has reached public levels and are 
not just aimed at the elite. On the other hand, this study found that in South African 
media, “China” is sometimes depicted as a single entity, and coverage tends not to 
distinguish between Chinese government, business or individuals. China is thus rarely 
presented with nuanced coverage. 
Inaccessibility of Chinese sources:  
This study found that the greatest threat to Chinese soft power, according to South 
African journalists, is the inaccessibility of Chinese government and business. South 
African journalists prefer to interview sources that provide balance or credibility to 
their stories, but often have to rely on secondary sources in their coverage of China 
because of a lack of engagement or relationship with Chinese sources – in particular 
Chinese government and business. South African journalists find using Chinese 
official, state or business sources difficult, because of China’s lack of media 
accessibility. One particular journalist suggested that the lack of media accessibility 
from China, in terms of sources and information, actively dehumanises China – there 
“isn’t a face, it’s not relatable at all” (Interviewee 3). Xi Jinping does not seem to be 
the humanising face of China for South African journalists. Ironically, on the other 
hand, Chinese media promotes Xi Jinping as that humanised face of China, placing 
him at the centre of coverage emphasising China’s leadership. 
South African journalists reported that the South African government itself is also 
increasingly becoming inaccessible. Some journalists pointed to the “door-stopper 
effect” that makes interviews with the South African government near impossible. As 
mentioned above, South African journalists suggest that China’s close relationship 
with the South African government can harm its soft power efforts, as South African 




The inaccessibility of Chinese sources is perceived as damaging to Chinese soft 
power, but journalists also raise the point that perhaps media engagement is not 
necessary for China’s soft power success. Journalists are confused as to what soft 
power actually means, and journalists accuse China of being bad at media 
engagement and soft power. For some journalists, media engagement might in fact 
increase suspicion of China and therefore damage China’s soft power. As mentioned 
above, these journalists believe that Chinese soft power efforts that in fact respond to 
the needs of Africans, such as health diplomacy, will actually wield more success. 
 
3. Limitations  
One key limitation of this study is potential language barriers, as most of the Chinese 
journalists interviewed are first language Mandarin speakers and the interviewee is a 
first language Afrikaans speaker. Although both parties use English as their second 
language, both the interviewer and interviewees are fluent in English (the Mandarin-
speaking interviewees are all employed at English-language Chinese publications), 
and English was the choice for the interviews. Great care was taken to understand 
each other – as mentioned in Chapter 4 on methodology, smartphone technology was 
used to interpret and contextualise questions and answers.  
Additionally, while South African environment or human rights beat journalists were 
selected for this study, Chinese beat journalists essentially do not exist, and therefore 
the study sought out Chinese journalists working at English-language publications. 
Regarding the South African beat journalists, most of them are now freelance or 
employed in other media sectors, which also meant that much of their responses were 
based on previous experiences, when they were employed as beat journalists. 
Another limitation was the choice of South African publications. The three 
mainstream publications provide a sense of the South African media discourse on 
China, but the sample excluded grassroots or tabloid publications, that could reflect 
coverage that lower income societies are exposed to. Furthermore, the study also 
excluded social media, which could provide insight into the range of messaging that 
South Africans might be exposed to, especially if audiences are now leaning more 





4. Future research  
Regarding the significance of audiences, the social media space could also make or 
break China’s soft power ambitions on the African continent. (Zhang, Wasserman & 
Mano, 2016). This study also argues for future research on the discourse on China on 
South African social media platforms.  
Future research is also required on China’s soft power impact on both elite and public 
audiences (Hartig, 2012). As mentioned above this study did not consult tabloids or 
grassroots publications, and the inclusion of Mail & Guardian might therefore reflect 
what the elite audiences are consuming. Future research can compare grassroots 
publications such as GroundUp or tabloids such as the Daily Sun’s coverage of China. 
Future research can also measure whether the results above changes over time. 
These elements ultimately culminate in the comment made by Thussu (2016): “But 
who is ultimately watching Chinese programmes and with what effect remains an 
open question”. Who do SA and Chinese journalists consider their audiences to be? 
This study recommends further research with reception studies to determine how 
China’s sustainable development and human rights impact is perceived by African 
civil societies, and whether media coverage has an impact on these perceptions. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This thesis set out to examine the role of the media, and specifically in China’s soft 
power efforts, in the increasingly important China-Africa relationship, by answering 
the following research questions:  
RQ1) How China’s human rights and sustainability record is portrayed in South 
African media; RQ2) How China’s human rights and sustainability record is 
portrayed in Chinese media in return; RQ3) What South African journalists’ attitudes 
towards Chinese soft power efforts are; and RQ4) What Chinese journalists’ attitudes 
towards Chinese soft power efforts are. 
To answer these questions, two methodologies were used: Firstly, a qualitative 




Chinese media; and secondly in-depth interviews with both South African and 
Chinese journalists, guided by Reese’s (2001) hierarchy of influences model. 
This study found that the perception of Chinese media as propaganda plays a crucial 
role in how English-language Chinese media content is received by South African 
journalists. South African journalists distrust Chinese media because of its 
government ownership and control, and do not find the content appealing. Chinese 
journalists, on the other hand are faced with navigating their role as mouthpiece for 
the Chinese Communist Party, and producing interesting and credible news content. 
Essentially, this study found that as long as South African journalists disregard 
Chinese media as propaganda, China’s efforts to leverage their media to wield soft 
power in South Africa will likely fail.  
Chinese journalists are aware that they conduct “propaganda tasks” and while some 
consider that unprofessional journalism, others consider it a helpful service delivery 
tool to the Chinese government. This study found that Chinese journalists use 
different styles of reporting, including constructive journalism and collaborative 
journalism, as well as other public service roles characteristic of development 
journalism. Furthermore, while censorship is a key influence on Chinese journalists, 
Chinese media also at times publish content critical of the Chinese government. On 
the other hand, South African media and journalistic training generally aligns with the 
western style of watchdog journalism, but some South African journalists criticise this 
detached style of reporting as detached.  
Both South African and Chinese journalists find themselves in a complex position in 
negotiating journalistic objectivity. South African journalists strive for Tuchman’s 
(1972) “strategic ritual” of objectivity, characteristic of watchdog journalism, but also 
disregard objectivity because it interferes with their perception of their role in society 
as activists. On the other hand, Chinese journalists compartmentalise their aim for an 
unattainable learned and required objectivity, and their expected loyalty and service to 
the Chinese Communist Party. 
This study also found that South African journalists’ skepticism of China is not only 
based on China’s propaganda, but also on China’s current close relationship with the 
South African government – towards which the South African print media displays an 




foreign government and elites, but this could harm its soft power efforts in South 
Africa.   
China frames its engagement in Africa as mutually beneficial, which steers the 
conversation away from China as neocolonial, essentially fulfilling a charm defensive 
mandate. This study found that South African journalists do not view China as 
neocolonial, but as exploitative of Africa – a perception influenced by hearsay and not 
direct engagement with China. South African journalists also generally perceive 
China’s negative environmental impact as a logical side-effect of development – on 
par with the impact of developed countries – and therefore not intentional 
environmental damage. Chinese journalists perceive China’s sustainable development 
to have improved to the extent that it is now prioritised over the economy. Chinese 
and South African media coverage indicated the importance of sustainable 
development to China’s image, and negative coverage of China’s environmental 
impact therefore limits its public diplomacy success and soft power potential. 
South African journalists similarly perceive China’s negative human rights impact as 
an automatic side-effect of development, particularly in favour of capitalism. 
However, South African journalists’ lack of understanding of China’s approach to 
human rights vs the western approach that South Africa currently aligns with, could 
influence them to cover anything outside of the western human rights framework as a 
violation, and therefore hamper their ability to contextualise this coverage. Chinese 
journalists argue that the concept of human rights is used by the west to create a 
negative image of China. Additionally, Chinese journalists currently experience a 
tightening of freedom of speech, with increased censorship, surveillance and pressure 
to serve the ruling party. Economic decisions are often portrayed as human rights-
driven in Chinese media, showcasing its role in determining the narrative around 
China’s human rights. Chinese media also framed China’s employment as 
contributing to the well-being of Africans, challenging the existing narrative that 
Chinese employment in Africa is exploitative. 
This study found that both Chinese and South African media present the China-Africa 
relationship as rooted in solidarity, expressing camaraderie with “the victimized” 
(Zhang 2013; 2016) developing world, which contributes to its soft power. Both 




countries as disapproving of this status. Additionally, competitive forces such as 
India, claim to offer Africa a more genuine solidarity than China. China and India are 
both portrayed in South African media as trying to leverage their solidarity with 
Africa, particularly through anti-western sentiment. China’s solidarity is based on 
assistance, while India offers a stronger anti-western sentiment to Africa, because of 
their shared colonial history. 
Furthermore, Chinese journalists often make use of the “charm defensive approach” 
in their coverage of China, but find it challenging to penetrate the western media 
system. South African media coverage showcased frames of both paternalism and a 
superior attitude of western developed countries towards China. Both media 
emphasized the China-USA relationship – South African media framing it as 
competitive and Chinese media framing it as collaborative. Additionally, Chinese 
journalists can relate to Africa’s misrepresentation in Chinese media, as they perceive 
China as having been misrepresented in western media. Chinese journalists view their 
media coverage as a charm defensive, and recognise the need to assist Africa with its 
own charm defensive. 
While Chinese journalists are very familiar with the concept of soft power, most 
South African journalists are not. South African journalists question the role of 
Chinese media in wielding Chinese soft power, challenging the view that media is 
central to soft power. Both South African and Chinese journalists believe that China 
is not successful at wielding soft power. Some South African journalists instead 
recognise China’s development assistance to Africa as soft power success, because it 
responds to the concrete needs of African communities. Chinese media’s framing of 
China’s perceived selfless environmental aid as well received by developing nations, 
can contribute to Chinese soft power success. 
Additionally, China’s defeat of poverty is a more appealing aspect of Chinese soft 
power to influence African audiences. However, it raises the question of whether the 
image of China as defeating poverty is enough contribution to its wielding of soft 
power, or whether that rather presents a promise or possibility of assistance to African 
countries to do the same – thus reverting to the fact that China’s assistance might be 




elite, China’s aid manages to reach broader civil society, leading to a potentially 
broader impact. 
Finally, this study found that despite the perception that media is not crucial to 
China’s soft power, South African journalists attribute China’s soft power failure to 
inaccessibility to China’s government and business. South African journalists 
experience a lack of engagement or relationship with Chinese government and 
business sources. China’s lack of media accessibility actively dehumanises China – 
there “isn’t a face, it’s not relatable at all” (Interviewee 3). Xi Jinping does not seem 
to be the humanising face of China for South African journalists, even though he is 
promoted as such by Chinese journalists. The inaccessibility of Chinese sources is 
perceived as damaging to Chinese soft power, but South African journalists also raise 
the point that perhaps media engagement is not necessary for China’s soft power 
success. Media engagement in fact increases suspicion of China and therefore has the 
counter-effect of damaging China’s soft power. As mentioned above, these journalists 
believe that Chinese soft power in forms such as health diplomacy, will actually wield 
more success. 
This study, through the use of framing analysis and interviews, contributes to our 
understanding of how Chinese soft power operates in different contexts. The frames 
found in this study reveals how China is portrayed in South Africa media, in 
comparison to how China portrays itself in its outgoing media, and therefore how it 
aims to be perceived. The interviews with South African and Chinese journalists on 
the other hand, provides insight to the influences that produce these two types of 
coverage of China. This contributes to our understanding of China’s soft power 
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